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Abstract 
This dissertation attempts to highlight existing patterns surrounding 
locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) and explain how institutional features of a 
country influence the likelihood those LULUs become operational. Focusing on 
cases of nuclear facility siting from around the world, the primary empirical 
research question is: does variation in coalition opportunity structures influence 
the siting of nuclear facilities? If so, how? Using Coalition Opportunity 
Structures (COS) to answer this question, the dissertation also contributes to the 
theoretical advancement of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and its 
applicability to varying political systems. To this end, the primary theoretical 
question explored in the dissertation is: what are the mechanisms through which 
coalition opportunity structures influence the policy process? Using both 
quantitative and qualitative methodology, I test the influence of COS on three 
separate but interrelated elements of the siting process—coalition formation, 
coalition strategies, and policy change. Findings indicate that both openness of a 
political system and norms of consensus affect policy outcomes. Additionally, I 
find that opportunity structures influence the emergence of organized opposition 
against the project as well as the nature of the strategies adopted by policy 
opponents.
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Nuclear Facility Siting Dilemmas 
1.1. Introduction 
In July 2006, the United States Congress passed a civil-nuclear agreement 
with India, allowing the two countries to trade nuclear raw materials for civilian 
purposes (Levi, Ferguson, and Relations 2006; Perkovich 2010; Potter 2005). 
This agreement was further reinforced in 2008, when the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG)1 approved a similar India specific exemption (Rai 2009). Subsequent to 
this, the Indian government has signed multiple trade agreements pertaining to the 
import of civilian nuclear raw material and technologies with countries like 
France, Russia, and the United States. These agreements are at the center of 
India’s growing nuclear energy policy, which includes the construction of 
numerous “energy parks” throughout the country.2 However, having spent several 
years and a considerable amount of resources on choosing suitable locations for 
these facilities, many of them are currently stagnant. For example, the Jaitapur 
Nuclear Power Plant (JNPP) in Maharashtra was recommended by the Site 
                                                
1 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was instituted in 1974 and is a group of 
nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that could 
be used for nuclear weapons development. 
2 These parks have been announced in Jaitapur (Maharashtra), Mithi Virdi 
(Gujarat), Gorakhpur (Haryana), Kovvada (Andhra Pradesh), and Chutaka 
(Madhya Pradesh).  
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Selection Committee3 in 1985. Feasibility studies on the site started in 2002, and 
the site was approved in 2005.4 Despite receiving regulatory and environmental 
clearance in December 2010, construction is yet to begin at the site. Similarly, 
after spending over $3.5 billion to construct the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant 
(KNPP) in Tamil Nadu, the facility was weeks away from going online when a 
series of events brought the whole project to a halt in September 2011 (Fried and 
Dimon 2004). These events have significant implications for the Indian nuclear 
energy policy, as well as for more pragmatic issues such as the growing demand 
for electricity (according to the International Energy Agency, roughly 400 million 
people do not have access to electricity in India).5  
This experience is not unique to India. There are numerous cases in other 
countries where the government has spent billions of dollars on developing a site 
for a nuclear facility that never becomes operable. For example, in the case of 
                                                
3 The site selection for is carried out by the Site Selection Committee, notified by 
the Government of India which selects site for  setting up a nuclear power 
plant, reviews various parameters as per the requirements laid down in the code of 
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and the laid-down criteria. 
4 “A Brief on Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project”, accessed from the Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) webpage. Document can be found at: 
http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/A_Brief_on_JNPP.pdf  
5 International Energy Agency report, found at 
http://www.iea.org/work/2006/gb/publications/india_electricity.pdf  
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Yucca Mountain in Nevada, the United States spent an enormous amount of time 
and resources on research and development of the site. Thirty years and over $10 
billion later, in 2010, the Secretary of Energy Stephen Chu was directed by 
President Obama to withdraw the license for the facility. Even though the fate of 
Yucca Mountain and KNPP have yet to be decided, it is clear that the siting of 
nuclear facilities is a major challenge.  
It is not always the case that the government decides where and when 
these facilities should be sited, only to be shot down by the public and other 
opposition. For instance, in Bulgaria the construction of Belene Nuclear Power 
Plant has been cancelled once (in the 1970s) and is currently stalled after 
resurfacing in 2002. Prime Minister Boyko Borisov of the right-wing Citizens for 
European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party has stalled the development of 
the power plant twice, despite efforts from the opposition party (Bulgarian 
Socialist Party) to open the plant. More recently, the socialist party called for a 
public referendum in Bulgaria, which resulted in a majority of the vote in favor of 
the plant siting. Despite these political and social initiatives, the future of Belene 
nuclear site remains uncertain.6  
The examples presented here are not meant to suggest that all efforts to 
site nuclear facilities are bound to get cancelled. For example, Big Rock Point 
                                                
6 http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/01/28/bulgarians-vote-for-new-nuclear-
power-but-referendum-is-not-binding/#axzz2JIwJhe9D  
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Nuclear Power Plant (now decommissioned) was a nuclear power plant in 
Michigan, US. It became operational in about two and half years from when 
construction began and was operational from 1962 to 1997. It was eventually shut 
down after owner Consumers Energy decided not to apply for relicensing. An 
original dataset that records both operational and cancelled siting efforts globally 
used in subsequent chapters of this dissertation provides some additional insight 
into trends of policy outcomes and what percentage of nuclear facilities became 
operational versus cancelled.  
Among other things, it reveals that overall, approximately 20 percent of 
cases in the database experienced policy change. In these cases, the designated 
site for construction of a nuclear facility was cancelled before it became 
operational. In the remainder of the cases (about 80 percent), the status quo was 
maintained and the site became operational as intended. This ratio is much higher 
in the US, where about 32 percent of cases experienced policy change. This is 
offset by the low percentage of policy change in international cases. With these 
examples and siting trends in mind, how can we best understand the complexities 
associated with nuclear energy policy and nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) facility siting 
in various political and social contexts?7  
                                                
7 For the purposes of this dissertation, NFC siting includes nuclear power plants, 
low and intermediate level waste repositories, as well as high-level waste disposal 
facilities. 
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1.1.1. Why Nuclear Energy? 
When studying complex social problems like siting contentious facilities, 
the goal for political scientists and public policy scholars is to look for systematic 
trends that help explain and—perhaps—alleviate some of the apparent 
randomness of policy outcomes. Identification of systematic patterns can also 
help broaden our understanding and generalize to cases and issues beyond those at 
hand. Studying the case of nuclear facility siting is useful and important for 
several reasons. First, nuclear energy is a salient issue both within the US and 
globally. Within the US, nuclear energy is inherently tied to the principles of 
attaining energy independence in a sustainable way and dealing with growing 
problems of climate change. Internationally, nuclear energy is touted as the 
answer to growing energy deficits but its expansion is complicated because of 
issues regarding nuclear raw materials management and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons technology more broadly.  
Second, as more and more countries continue to add nuclear energy to 
their existing sources of energy, issues of used nuclear fuel management will 
require greater attention. Experience tells us that siting nuclear repositories is 
extremely complex and lengthy, and findings from this dissertation will have 
significant implications for siting these facilities in different political and 
institutional contexts. Third, the issue of nuclear facility siting is well suited for 
an international comparative analysis. The perceived risks of nuclear energy make 
it a highly polarizing issue with strong incentives for people to participate in the 
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decision making process. Variations in participation, mobilization, and policy 
outcomes during nuclear facility siting lend themselves well to comparisons of 
different opportunity structures. Fourth, the issue of nuclear energy and the 
lessons drawn from this dissertation will also help to inform policy decisions in 
other areas of contentious facility siting. The examples, trends, and complexities 
highlighted here go far beyond the purview of nuclear facility siting. Similar 
principles apply to other forms of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) such as 
airports, prisons, and landfills. Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to highlight 
existing patterns and explain how the institutional makeup surrounding LULUs 
impacts the mobilization of Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) sentiment and the 
likelihood that LULUs become operational. The empirical focus of the 
dissertation is nuclear facility siting, and the primary empirical research question 
is: does variation in coalition opportunity structures influence the siting of 
nuclear facilities? If so, how? However, to be clear, the patterns uncovered and 
lessons learned apply to cases and issues beyond nuclear facility siting and will 
have implications for LULUs more generally.  
1.2. Previous Research 
Findings from previous research and the ongoing experiences described 
above indicate that siting NFC facilities is complex, and predicting outcomes of 
siting efforts is extremely challenging (Carter 1987; Gerrard 1995; Keeney and 
Nair 1975). In general, the risks and benefits associated with nuclear energy are 
constantly debated, both by scientists and lay-men (Sjöberg et al. 2000). These 
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debates about the pros and cons of nuclear energy also manifest in decisions on 
siting particular nuclear facilities—when, how, and if nuclear plants should be 
constructed; what is the best way to dispose nuclear waste; how economical and 
safe is nuclear energy as compared to other sources; how do public risk 
perceptions affect siting; and the role of equity, fairness, and compensation in the 
siting process (Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; Gowda and Easterling 2000; 
Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Kraft 2000; Kunreuther and Easterling 
1996). Often times this means that even though the government chooses to site 
nuclear facilities, sections of the scientific community and the public oppose that 
decision. Therefore, finding a suitable location with all of the desirable attributes 
like public acceptance, technical safety, and economic viability can be extremely 
challenging.  
In an effort to understand the dynamics associated with siting nuclear 
facilities, for decades now, scholars have been studying individual risk 
perceptions, government policy designs, and other elements of the siting process 
(Bonano et al. 2011; Dunlap, Kraft, and Rosa 1993; Morton, Airoldi, and Phillips 
2009; Ramana and Kumar 2010; Sjöberg 2003). Studies focusing on nuclear 
facility siting are closely tied with research on the siting of contentious and 
noxious facilities more generally, which include landfills and prisons 
(Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, and Aarts 1993). In all of these cases, the siting of the 
facility is seen as a social and technical problem that faces public and political 
opposition, with concerns of fairness and equity among the host populations 
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(Brion 1991; Clary and Kraft 1988; Freudenberg and Rosa 1984; Goldsteen and 
Schorr 1991; Ladd and Laska 1991). Previous research has focused on a range of 
issues such as how do individual risk perceptions affect the siting process, 
including perceptions about the impact of the facility and perceptions of the 
quality of the siting process (Schively 2007). These studies subsequently led to 
the proliferation of acronyms such as NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) and LULUs 
that are commonly used to describe various forms of opposition to the siting of 
unwanted facilities (Amour 1984; Benford, Moore, and Williams Jr 1993).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I am most interested in understanding 
the political outcomes of siting processes. In other words, why do some facilities 
get completed and become operational, while others get cancelled? One way to 
think about these outcomes is from a risk vs. benefit viewpoint, which argues that 
people are likely to support the siting of a facility whose perceived benefits are 
higher than its perceived risks. On the other hand, cases where the perceived risks 
outweigh the perceived benefits; the site is likely to face public opposition. A 
majority of the research on LULUs (including nuclear facility siting) use this 
general framework to explain public reactions to facilities and the political 
outcomes we experience. In contrast, research on the effects of institutions and 
political contexts on siting outcomes remains understudied. The remainder of this 
section briefly presents this research, with the ultimate goal of highlighting the 
gaps in it and how this dissertation fills some of those gaps. Most research on 
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facility siting can be broken down into a few broad categories:8 individual and 
group risk perceptions, ideological and cultural identity effects, and the tools used 
by government and industry groups in an effort to garner public support 
(primarily through financial compensation and/or stakeholder engagement). 
Finally, scholarship on the influence of political and institutional contexts on 
nuclear facilities remains broad and focuses mostly on the evolution of nuclear 
energy in different countries and the rise of social movements against nuclear 
energy. As I illustrate, this scholarship has some methodological and theoretical 
shortcomings, some of which are addressed by this dissertation.   
Studies focusing on individual risk perceptions argue that people’s 
attitudes on how ‘risky’ they perceive nuclear energy to be in turn influences their 
policy beliefs (de Groot, Steg, and Poortinga 2013; Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg 
2001; Sjöberg 2003, 2004). Although individual risk perceptions do not have a 
direct determine facility siting outcomes, they are crucial for tracing the roots of 
individual-level and organized opposition to some facilities. For example, de 
Groot, Steg, and Poortinga (2013) examine how personal values and individual 
perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with the acceptability of nuclear 
energy in the Netherlands. They find that people’s perceptions of risks associated 
with nuclear energy do impact their acceptability towards it. The more risky 
                                                
8 These categories have been devised for the purposes of a broad literature review 
of the somewhat disparate topic of nuclear facility siting. The goal here is to 
summarize the critical themes that bind these studies together.   
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people perceived nuclear energy to be, the less accepting they were, and vice 
versa.  
The examples cited in the introduction reflect the power of public 
opposition, among other things, in delaying the siting process as well as 
influencing its final outcome. Therefore, understanding these risk perceptions and 
their genesis can help design better policies and public engagement measures to 
alleviate public concerns and increase institutional trust. For these reasons, 
research on risk and risk perception has also ventured into how best to alleviate 
the perceived risks such that the public can become more supportive of siting 
decisions. One of the tools recommended by some scholars is risk 
communication—how to communicate the various risks to the public. Risk 
communication programs aim to better educate stakeholders and in the process 
make them more willing to accept the siting of nuclear facilities in their 
community. Studies on this topic have postulated that increasing awareness about 
the facility through public education and other means can help increase public 
acceptance. For instance, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1981) argue that the 
“NIMBY syndrome” is a result of a general lack of public awareness. Similarly, 
Matheny and Williams (1985) in their article titled “Knowledge vs. NIMBY” 
suggest using an educational approach to deal with public opposition to a 
particular site. 
However, the effectiveness of risk communication strategies and public 
education as a solution for contentiousness remains weak. One body of research 
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suggests that it may be due to the lack of trust in the agencies and institutions in 
charge of siting nuclear facilities (Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler 1992; Leiss 
1996; Slovic 1993). According to Kasperson et al. (1992) for instance, conflicts 
regarding the siting of hazardous facilities in the US can be traced back to social 
trust relating to perceptions of commitment, competence, caring, and 
predictability. They argue that effective risk communication can help alleviate 
some of this distrust, but until that is achieved, a broad loss in leaders and major 
institutions in the US will continue. There is another body of research suggesting 
that the lack of effectiveness does not stem from a “knowledge deficit” or a lack 
of trust in certain agencies, but rather underlying ideological and cultural identity 
effects (Kahan and Braman 2006). According to this research, these distinct 
ideological and cultural identities lead to cognitive biases that ultimately make 
risk communication fruitless. In essence, they argue that an individuals’ cultural 
worldview precedes their views and opinions on highly charged political issues 
such as nuclear energy.  
Another potential tool to downplay perceived risks and increase the 
benefits to be gained by siting is providing compensation and recommend 
economic benefits to the host community. Focusing on economic models of 
rationality, some scholars have studied the effectiveness and fruitfulness of 
mechanisms like financial compensation and an increased stress on the economic 
benefits of the proposed facility (Bacot, Bowen, and Fitzgerald 1994; Ferreira and 
Gallagher 2010; H. Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001, -; ter Mors, Terwel, and 
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Daamen 2012). The gist of the argument, in line with rational choice theory 
assumptions, is that compensation in the form of economic benefits and incentives 
can potentially tip the balance of risk vs. benefits in favor of perceived benefits, 
thereby increasing public acceptance towards the project (Hadden and Hazelton 
1980; O’Hare 1977; Portney 1985). While some have found that direct monetary 
payments to individuals and/or communities can increase facility acceptance 
(Bacot, Bowen, and Fitzgerald 1994; Groothuis, Groothuis, and Whitehead 2008), 
a majority of studies have found no significant relationship between compensation 
and acceptability (Claro 2007; Ferreira and Gallagher 2010; Frey, Oberholzer-
Gee, and Eichenberger 1996; Kunreuther et al. 1990). For instance, Kunreuther et 
al. (1990) conducted a study where respondents were asked to vote for or against 
a nuclear repository in Nevada. Some respondents were offered monetary 
compensation in the form of tax rebates while others were not offered any 
financial incentives. Among other things, the authors found that the compensation 
offers had no significant effect on the respondents and their willingness to vote 
for the facility.   
In addition to financial compensation, some scholars have looked at the 
use of more normative tools such as stakeholder engagement, public deliberation, 
and the values of equity and fairness. In contrast to compensation, these studies 
assert that monetary incentives can sometimes actually deter individuals from 
supporting a siting initiative. In a study measuring support for a nuclear waste 
repository in Switzerland, Frey et al. (1996) found that the percentage of support 
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actually dropped (from 50.8 percent to 24.6 percent) when the host community 
was offered compensation in return for accepting the facility. Supplementing 
these findings, some scholars have found that non-monetary compensation in the 
form of public goods is better received than money (Claro 2007; H. Jenkins-Smith 
and Kunreuther 2001; Kunreuther and Easterling 1996; Mansfield, Houtven, and 
Huber 2002). For example, in an experimental survey of eight different 
compensation measures for the siting of LULUs (a medium security prison, a 
municipal landfill, a hazardous waste incinerator, and a high-level nuclear waste 
repository), Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther (2001) asked respondents to rate 
different compensation measures (financial and in-kind). Each respondent was 
asked about one of the four facilities and were directed to rate compensation 
measures on a scale from 1 (completely acceptable) to 5 (completely 
unacceptable).  
Findings revealed that across all facilities, in-kind compensation measures 
were ranked higher and viewed as more appropriate than financial ones. This 
relationship between facility acceptability and the nature of the incentives offered 
(financial vs. in-kind) gets at the heart of the intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation 
debate. Intrinsic motivation is derived from an individual’s personal sense of 
altruism or justice connected to an act and is activated when in-kind benefits are 
offered. Extrinsic motivation on the other hand, is related to factors on the 
outside, such as monetary incentives and deterrents, which are consistent with the 
generalized economic law of demand (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997).   
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Finally, a tool that has received a lot of attention recently is the concept of 
stakeholder engagement and inclusion of all the relevant parties in the siting 
process (Devine-Wright 2012; Fan 2008; Lawrence 2002; Sjöberg 2003; 
Tompkins, Few, and Brown 2008). Both experience and recent policy 
recommendations have contributed to this increased attention. For instance, the 
final report of the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) for America’s Nuclear Future 
(BRC 2012) calls for scrapping the top-down, primarily technically driven facility 
siting approach outlined in the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act in favor of a more flexible consent-based siting approach that is dependent on 
potential host communities, in collaboration with states and tribes, “opting in” for 
consideration as candidates in a competitive process for choosing technically and 
socially acceptable sites. This recommendation, which is based on past 
experiences, in conjunction with the political deadlock and possible cancellation 
of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada because of the lack of 
public consent highlight the significance of engendering and maintaining public 
involvement and ownership of the facility.  
The literature reviewed above mostly deals with the underlying risk 
perceptions individuals have regarding nuclear energy or any other elements of 
contentious facility siting. The scholarship, as discussed, has remained focused on 
the nature of the risk perceptions, how these perceptions affect the acceptability of 
these facilities, and the tools that can help alleviate some of the perceived risks 
and increase the perceived benefits of the facility. These tools range from risk 
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communication, public education programs, different forms of compensation, and 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms. While these studies play an important role 
in advancing our understanding of public opposition or acceptability towards 
LULUs, the factors listed above are not the only ones that might impact policy 
outcomes. In addition to these dynamics, we must also consider the impact of 
macro political and institutional factors on nuclear facility siting. Individual and 
group level dynamics such as risk perceptions, risk communication, and 
stakeholder engagement exist within a broader institutional context. This context 
provides structure to how some of the other tools are used and defines the 
“baseline” on what is possible and what is not. Some contexts inhibit the use of 
such tools whereas others enable their institutionalization. For instance, pluralist 
systems such as the US have a central place for communication and engagement 
tools as compared to systems like France that centralize decision making authority 
and place less value on pluralism.   
In studying the impact of institutions and political context on siting 
contentious facilities, the trend has been to draw long-term historical comparisons 
between somewhat similar cases with divergent outcomes or vice versa (for 
example, scholars study the different nuclear movements in France and the US, or 
France and Germany). These studies are interested in the long-term evolution of 
nuclear energy and its use as a function of political and institutional contexts. 
Macro-political structures are sticky and unlikely to change drastically in the 
short-term, making long-term analysis almost necessary. In so doing, these 
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analyses tease out key differences that can then help explain divergence in actual 
experience. For example, Hsiao et al. (1999) study the evolution of anti-nuclear 
movements in three East Asian countries (Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong) 
with a focus on the state structures and how that impact the strength of these 
movements. Similarly, Jasper (1990) analyzes the divergence in the use and 
expansion of nuclear energy in United States, Sweden, and France. He presents a 
‘state-centered explanation’ and argues that the differences in commitments to 
nuclear energy in the three cases can be best explained using the dynamics of state 
policymaking and the political and economic structures within which 
policymakers acted.  
This research is useful in that it highlights the importance of macro 
political and institutional factors such as electoral shifts, political autonomy, 
regime type, and judicial independence. Studies like the ones mentioned above 
allow for the identification of the rich array of factors that may have influenced 
the course of issue evolution in a specific context at a particular location.  
However, the body of research suffers from critical drawbacks, both 
methodological and theoretical. The remainder of this section briefly presents 
these weaknesses and how this dissertation remedies them.   
1.2.1. Methodological Contributions 
While long-term case studies provide important insights into how an issue 
(in this case nuclear energy) evolved over time, there are a few key shortcomings 
that need to be addressed. First, the body of research focusing on political and 
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institutional factors using case study analysis has a tendency to choose cases in an 
unsystematic way, making wide generalizability complicated. Sometimes the 
choice of cases is driven by the type of political system, other times by the 
divergence in outcome. In most instances however, the studies run a risk of 
cherry-picking cases, which threatens their ability to generalize. To remedy this 
shortcoming, this dissertation uses an original large-N dataset comprising the 
universe of known cases (excluding North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China). Using 
this dataset alleviates concerns about picking cases that make sense in some 
instances and not others.    
Second, these studies, by design, suffer from two closely interrelated 
problems—many variables and not enough cases (Lijphart 1971). More 
specifically, the number of variables available to explain the outcome of interest 
(in this case variation in the importance of nuclear energy) employed in these 
studies exceeds the number of cases, rendering hypothesis testing and the drawing 
of general conclusions difficult. When making cross-national comparisons as 
these studies often do, they engage in the testing of “macro hypotheses” that 
usually concern the “interrelations of structural elements of total systems”(Merritt 
and Rokkan 1966). Furthermore, use of notable cases (or notable features of 
particular cases) as the basis for “lessons learned” poses the risk of 
overemphasizing particular variables that may have different effects in other 
cases. For example, focusing on France and Germany as notable cases, where 
France is highly reliant on nuclear energy and Germany has chosen to phase it 
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out, can be problematic. These cases might be outliers, which would make 
generalizations drawn from their experience difficult. This can be particularly 
dangerous when too much significance is attached to a negative finding based on 
a single or a few cases (Galtung 1967). At the same time, some apparent 
relationships in a case will inevitably be stochastic (or ideocratic), and when they 
draw attention they may result in learning the wrong lessons.  
For these reasons, scholars have asserted the importance of supplementing 
case studies with quantitative comparative analyses of larger sets of cases, 
permitting hypothesis testing and the accumulation of evidence and provide 
crucial control in the study (Lijphart 1971). Again, it is important to reiterate the 
value of small case comparisons, especially in the theory building stage and in 
helping to understand the rich context behind political outcomes. However, in 
order to test hypotheses and draw generalizable findings, these studies need to be 
supplemented with larger comparisons. To do this, this dissertation uses an 
original dataset of the universe of nuclear facility efforts globally to overcome this 
key shortcoming. Doing so provides critical leverage and allows us to engage in 
hypothesis testing and draw generalizable findings. It is important to remember 
that comparative studies have their own limitations; the need for quantification 
across a large number of cases limits the subtlety and precision with which 
important variables can be operationalized, and some potentially important 
variables may be omitted altogether from the analysis because relevant 
documentation is unavailable or due to the absence of valid and reliable measures. 
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In short, qualitative and quantitative analyses have different strengths and 
limitations, yet both are needed to provide the kind of cumulative knowledge base 
for effective facility siting that was called for in the BRC’s final report (BRC 
2012). To remedy this problem, this dissertation presents both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of nuclear facility siting in different political and institutional 
contexts around the world.  
1.2.2. Theoretical Contributions 
In addition to the methodological weaknesses described above, the 
literature on how political and institutional contexts impact the evolution of 
nuclear energy and facility siting outcomes more generally contains some 
theoretical shortcomings that need to be addressed. Closely related to the issue of 
too many variables and too few cases mentioned in the previous section, this 
literature suffers from a lack of theoretical organization. Research on this topic 
does not have a common theoretical framework that is used to analyze different 
cases. I do not mean to suggest that a single framework is necessary or desirable, 
but in fact that theory building, hypothesis testing, and the accumulation of 
evidence is easier when there is a broad theoretical framework to organize some 
portion of the research on nuclear siting and its findings. By organizing the 
influence of institutional and political contexts under an overarching theoretical 
framework, we can begin to accumulate knowledge rather than running the risk of 
talking past one another. In addition to formulating and testing a suitable 
theoretical framework, it must also start by focusing on “key” variables and aim 
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for parsimony. These key variables must be broad enough to incorporate a 
multitude of cases and in so doing, increase the generalizability of the findings.  
Jasper (1990) for example uses a whole array of variables ranging from partisan 
cleavages, policy styles, bureaucratic politics, elite opinions, cultural meanings, 
and political and economic structures to compare three countries in their divergent 
commitments to nuclear energy. However, examining this entire array of variables 
can get overwhelming and makes highlighting broad overarching lessons difficult.    
In an attempt to overcome this weakness, this dissertation draws on a 
parsimonious, overarching theoretical framework that can be used to analyze a 
multitude of siting cases both across and within political systems. Using the 
concept of Coalition Opportunity Structures (COS) as found in the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF), I formulate a list of key variables that can be used to 
analyze the influence of political and institutional contexts on outcomes of facility 
siting efforts. The explicit reasons for choosing COS and the ACF will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, where I also define and outline the theoretical 
framework at length. The use of this parsimonious framework, I argue, will help 
policy scholars to study contentious issues like LULUs and generate testable 
hypotheses with potentially generalizable findings.  
Finally, while relying on institutional structures provides some crucial 
explanatory power, it is necessary to recognize the existence of other factors that 
might influence the siting process. As a result, this dissertation employs a 
probabilistic model of decision-making and policy outcomes, which represents a 
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theoretical compromise between the extremes of the deterministic and stochastic 
models of public policy. On the one hand, the probabilistic model recognizes that 
collective decision-making is significantly impacted by stochastic elements and 
contextual variables that are difficult if not impossible to fully define a priori. On 
the other hand, the model recognizes that the collective decision-making process 
is characterized by important systematic elements consisting of patterns and 
relationships that constrain the seemingly chaotic policymaking process. 
1.3. Dissertation Outline 
As alluded to in an earlier section, the research questions that motivates 
this dissertation are twofold: does variation in coalition opportunity structures 
influence the siting of nuclear facilities?9 If so, how? These questions have both 
empirical and theoretical significance. Empirically, they help us understand some 
of the complexities associated with nuclear facility siting in a systematic, 
generalizable manner. The knowledge gained will help policymakers to 
understand the patterns of outcomes from past siting efforts, and – perhaps – to 
facilitate the design of siting processes that are more robust to the political and 
institutional environments within which they operate. In other words, lessons 
from this dissertation can aid in designing policies that would be conscious of, 
and apply to, different contexts ranging from democracies, non-democracies, 
                                                
9 For the purposes of this dissertation, NFC siting includes nuclear power plants; 
low and intermediate level waste repositories, as well as high-level waste disposal 
facilities. 
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parliamentary systems, presidential systems, to one-party, two-party, and multi-
party systems. They also apply to policy problems other than siting of nuclear 
facilities. The findings will speak to issues of LULUs more generally, with 
relevance for the siting of all contentious facilities. Thus, while the specified 
research question is defined narrowly, in reality the theoretical and practical 
implications go well beyond the issue of nuclear energy. 
Theoretically, the dissertation applies the ACF with particular attention to 
the previously under-developed concept of “coalition opportunity structures” 
(COS) to answer these empirical questions. In so doing, the research is a 
simultaneous effort to build upon the fuzzy, largely untested concept of COS. The 
dissertation achieves this by answering the following question: what are the 
mechanisms through which coalition opportunity structures influence the 
policy process?  
To answer these empirical and theoretical questions, the chapters in this 
dissertation address three distinct but interconnected questions. These questions 
relate to critical elements of the policy process, and help highlight important 
aspects of the siting process: siting outcomes (policy outcomes/policy change), 
organized opposition to siting (coalition formation), and oppositional strategies 
(coalition strategies). This leads into the three specific questions: 
1. Once a site has been designated for use as a future nuclear facility, how 
do coalition opportunity structures influence whether the site becomes 
operable?  
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2. Why do revisionist coalitions form in some siting processes and not 
others? Do coalition opportunity structures influence the formation of 
organized opposition to some nuclear facilities and not others? 
3. Do coalition opportunity structures influence the strategies adopted by 
revisionist coalitions in pursuit of policy change?10 
Again, all three of these sub-questions contribute to the larger research 
question and are of both empirical and theoretical significance. Before answering 
them, however, Chapter 2 describes in length the theoretical framework that 
provides the conceptual basis for understanding the nuclear facility siting 
problem. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form the empirical core of the dissertation, each 
pursuing one of the sub-research question outlined above. Chapter 3 focuses on 
how COS impact policy outcomes; to achieve this, I construct and analyze new 
data in the form of an original dataset of 269 cases of attempted nuclear facility 
sitings all around the world. The cases vary on several aspects, including the final 
                                                
10 Revisionist coalitions are defined in this dissertation as coalitions that pursue 
policy change by actively challenging the status quo policy decision. They are, by 
extension, the opposite of hegemonic coalitions that support the status quo and 
benefit from it in some way. With reference to the empirical issue, revisionist 
coalitions are coalitions that are opposed to the de facto policy decision to site the 
nuclear facility and are engaged in challenging that status quo by attempting to 
get the facility cancelled.  
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policy outcome—whether the facility became operational or not. Chapter 3 
studies how COS impact a change in policy from the status quo (the attempt to 
site the facility). I argue that the two dimensions of COS (degree of openness of a 
political system and the degree of consensus required for major policy change 
within a system) influence the likelihood that policy change will occur. Certain 
configurations of COS make policy change less likely and vice versa. Moving on 
to chapter 4, I use COS to explain coalition formation in different nuclear facility 
siting subsystems. In particular, this chapter uses a smaller, randomly selected 
sample of 50 cases from 13 different democracies to look at how COS in these 
countries influence whether ‘revisionist’ coalitions challenging the attempt to site 
nuclear facilities form or not. Finally, chapter 5 uses COS to explain varying 
strategies adopted by ‘revisionist’ coalitions. In particular, this chapter focuses on 
how different forms of COS affect the strategies revisionist coalitions adopt in the 
pursuit of policy change. To conclude, chapter 6 presents a summary of the main 
results, as well as a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of the 
study. This chapter also discusses the implications of the findings for nuclear 
facility siting to other kinds of LULU and NIMBY cases. It also outlines general 
themes for future research. 
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Chapter 2: The ACF and Coalition Opportunity Structures 
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the empirical problem driving this dissertation, and 
why the issue of nuclear facility siting presents a significant opportunity to 
understand the role of institutional structures in siting these facilities and in 
contentious politics more generally. The siting of nuclear facilities is an excellent 
example of LULUs, where individual risk perceptions are heightened and 
stakeholders have a strong incentive to participate in the siting process. The 
process of siting begins with a decision (usually by the government or a private 
company) to site a nuclear facility at a particular location. However, not all these 
decisions translate into operational facilities. As such, the process of nuclear 
facility siting also presents an intriguing policy change question: why does policy 
change occur in some cases and not others? By policy change, I refer to cases 
where the status quo policy to site the facility is cancelled before the facility 
becomes operational. The lack of policy change, by extension, refers to cases 
where the facility was constructed and became operational as intended. I argue in 
this dissertation that studying a large number of siting efforts across varying 
institutional and political contexts can provide crucial insights into how these 
variations influence siting outcomes and policy change.  
Having described the real world problem and reviewed the existing 
literature on it in chapter 1, the primary goal of this chapter is to outline the 
theoretical framework used in this dissertation. In the previous chapter I briefly 
 
 
26 
discussed the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, which will be 
elaborated here. I begin by explaining why the ACF provides a suitable 
theoretical frame to answer the empirical problem summarized above, and how it 
can help overcome some of the weaknesses of the siting literature as described in 
Chapter 1. Specifically, I discuss how the concept of COS can provide an 
overarching theoretical framework that can then be used to analyze the role of 
institutions across different cases of contentious siting over time. In addition to 
the contributions made to the substantive literature on facility siting, I also 
highlight the contributions this dissertation makes to the ACF. The 
operationalization, measurement, and analysis of COS conducted in this 
dissertation fill an important vacuum within the ACF and the public policy 
literature, which can be employed in future research to other issues and in 
different policy contexts.  
2.2. Why the ACF? 
As alluded to in an earlier section, the research questions that motivated 
this dissertation are twofold: does variation in coalition opportunity structures 
influence the siting of nuclear facilities? If so, how? This section describes why 
I employ the ACF (specifically the concept of COS as defined within the ACF) to 
answer these questions and why I think it is both relevant and ideal for 
understanding this issue. To be clear, more than one of the existing theories of the 
policy process can provide a platform to explain some of the complexities of the 
siting process and the outcomes associated with it. As argued by Parsons (1995, p. 
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xvi), in order to study the policy process, we must focus on “how problems are 
defined, agendas set, policy formulated, decisions made policy evaluated and 
implemented.” In response to this, scholars have formulated theoretical models 
and frameworks intended to capture different aspects of the policymaking 
process, policy change, and policy outcomes. Some of the theories of policy 
process that have been widely utilized in the public policy literature include the 
ACF, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD), Multiple Streams (MS), and Social Construction (SC). 
Essentially, by observing decision-making patterns over time and space, scholars 
have been able to develop widely used theories that can explain what is likely to 
occur given a specific set of circumstances (Kingdon 1984; Olstrom 1990; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
Of these, the ACF is not the only theory of the policy process that can 
adequately help to understand the siting process associated with nuclear facilities. 
Nonetheless, I argue that the ACF is the ideal framework to answer the research 
questions for several reasons. First, compared to other theories, the ACF pays 
more attention to policy issues involving seemingly irresolvable goal conflicts, 
important technical disputes, and multiple actors from various levels of 
government (Hoppe and Peterse 1993). Developed to deal with “wicked” policy 
problems, the ACF was applied to energy and environmental policy issues before 
scholars began testing its applicability to other issue areas (Sabatier and Weible 
2007). These characteristics make the ACF capable of capturing key elements of 
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the problems associated with siting--the highly technical nature of nuclear energy 
policy and NFC facility siting, the presence of strong competing coalitions, 
different agencies and elected officials from all levels of government, as well as 
actors outside the ‘iron triangle’ (consisting of the Congress, Bureaucracy, and 
Interest groups) like journalists, activists, and the public.  
The second reason for choosing the ACF relates to the level of analysis at 
which the framework deals with policy issues. For instance, PET (that has since 
evolved into the politics of attention project), as developed by Baumgartner and 
Jones (1991, 1993) functions at the macro level of analysis, focusing on large 
scale changes in public policies. It is primarily interested in two related elements 
of the policy process: issue definition and agenda setting. As such, it studies large 
scale, macro flows of information, how issues are defined in policy arenas, and 
what issues make it on to the policy agenda. For example, in a recent article, 
Baumgartner, Breunig, Green-Pedersen, Jones, Mortensen,  Nuytemans, and 
Walgrave (2009) employ a comparative approach to study the policy process in 
different political systems—Belgium, Denmark, and the United States. Their main 
research question is whether governmental efficiency and the level of institutional 
friction differs across countries based on institutional configuration.11 The PET 
framework would be useful to study the rise and fall of nuclear energy on the 
                                                
11 The concept of friction originated in the authors’ earlier work on politics of 
attention, where they argue that certain issues emerge to the political agenda 
while others get marginalized (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
 
 
29 
legislative agenda, as well as big changes in the trajectory of the use of nuclear 
energy. However, in this dissertation, I am more interested in policy change 
experienced by each effort to site nuclear facilities. Therefore, PET and its macro 
level of analysis is not an ideal framework for the purposes of this dissertation. 
While the PET focuses on issues at a macro level of analysis, another 
policy process theory—the IAD—studies them from a micro level of analysis. 
First introduced by Kiser and Ostrom (1982), the IAD is the most influential 
strand of institutional rational choice thinking in the field of public policy. At its 
base, the IAD is a framework designed to answer questions about the way in 
which various institutional arrangements can help people come together in order 
to solve collective action or common-pool resource problems. The primary 
analytical focus of the IAD is on the action arena (subsystem), which is where 
public decision-makers and other interested actors “interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” (Ostrom 2007, 28). 
Institutions are important to the IAD in that some institutional configurations 
promote trust, cooperation, and encourage collaboration by reducing transaction 
costs (Ostrom 2005; Weber 1998). However, the focus of the IAD is at the micro 
level of analysis—the rational individual and citizen self governance. The IAD 
would be useful if this dissertation was motivated by how rational actors can 
overcome self-interest and develop trust in the context of common pool resource 
management (Ostrom 2005). However, this is not the case and this is why I do not 
employ the IAD in this dissertation.  
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In sum, while all three theories—PET, IAD, and the ACF—incorporate 
institutions, individual rationality or belief systems, and subsystems to some 
extent; the different level of analyses they operate at makes the ACF the ideal 
framework for this dissertation. The PET is at the most “coarse” scale of inquiry, 
mainly interested in system-level patterns of decisions (Schlager 2007, 297). IAD 
is at the other extreme, with its fine grain attention to institutional configurations 
that individuals create to overcome self-interest in the interest of a larger 
community goal. In contrast, the ACF provides an ideal middle ground, by 
operating on a meso level of analysis. The ACF explains policy outcomes and 
policy change in a subsystem over long periods of time. It is not interested in 
patterns of decision making as such, nor is it interested in how individuals 
overcome common pool resource issues. By identifying and measuring belief 
systems, issue specific subsystems, and mechanisms of policy change, the ACF 
provides the most relevant and ideal backdrop for this dissertation. The next 
section of this chapter presents a brief overview of the ACF, some key critiques of 
the framework, and how this dissertation is an effort to respond to these critiques.  
2.3. Brief Overview and Key Components of the ACF 
The ACF, initially developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith 
(1993), argues that individuals with similar core beliefs form coalitions to 
advance their policy preferences. These coalitions, which act within policy 
specific subsystems, interact through nontrivial coordination with the intent to 
influence policy outcomes. Rather than focusing exclusively on governmental 
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actors such as congress, the executive, etc., the fundamental unit of analysis in the 
ACF is the subsystem—the issue-specific unit within which interested actors from 
all levels of government as well as advocates such as journalists, consultants, and 
scientists interact to influence policy outcomes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). Within each subsystem (provided that it is relatively mature) a small 
number of opposing advocacy coalitions form and fight to preserve the status quo 
or to change a particular policy. The number and nature of these coalitions will be 
determined by the distribution of hierarchical beliefs within the subsystem.  
The ACF’s main hypotheses and causal arguments rest on a set of 
assumptions: (1) scientific and technical information play a central role in the 
policy process; (2) a long term policy perspective of more than a decade or so in 
required to fully understand the complexities associated with the policy process; 
(3) policy subsystem is the primary unit of analysis; (4) a wide array of subsystem 
actors from different levels and branches of government, media, the public, and 
scientists; and (5) policy goals and programs are essentially a translation of belief 
systems held by coalition members (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 118-120). 
In addition to these assumptions, the ACF argues that individuals are boundedly 
rational and that they rely on a hierarchical set of beliefs as the primary heuristic 
to simplify and filter policy positions.  
The ACF argues that a vast majority of policymaking—i.e. efforts to 
shape and influence the course of public policies--takes place among experts 
within issue specific subsystems. As described above, competing coalitions exist 
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in these subsystems and fight policy battles by devising strategies to impact the 
policy process and influence policy change. Policy change comes about when a 
previously dominant coalition looses ground to an oppositional coalition. 
However, to explain policy change within the ACF, one must identify the reasons 
why the balance of power between coalitions within the subsystem suddenly 
shifts. According to recent versions of the ACF, this shift in power can arise 
endogenously or exogenously (Weible and Sabatier 2007). On the exogenous end, 
there are two sets of variables that influence the balance of power within the 
subsystem—relatively stable parameters (such as the basic attributes of the 
problem, sociocultural values, and constitutional rules) and external events (such 
as changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, or changes in 
government).  
Among other things, external events shape the policy beliefs and strategies 
of coalitions, as well as their ability to influence policy change (Fenger and Klok 
2001). Although the relatively stable parameters rarely change themselves, they 
are crucial for establishing the distribution of resources and constraints within 
which subsystem actors operate. Both these exogenous variables ultimately shape 
the dynamics between different coalitions, including the balance of power among 
them. The relatively stable parameters set the stage for basic rules and regulations 
that constrain or enable coalitions, and the external events hold the potential to 
alter the amount of influence a coalition has compared to its opponents. For 
example, incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are external system events that 
 
 
33 
can act as windows of opportunity for anti-nuclear coalitions, allowing them to 
shift public opinion in their favor, gain additional resources, and tip the balance of 
power.12 
In terms of endogenous policy change, the ACF points to three different 
catalysts—policy oriented learning, internal shocks, and negotiated agreements 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007). Learning occurs when coalitions use information 
(practical or scientific) to gain an advantage over their opponents. Internal shocks 
come about when a coalition suddenly gains a significant amount or resources 
allowing them to surpass their competitors. Lastly, a negotiated agreement 
between coalitions because of unsustainable conflict or the sudden realization of 
mutual interests can cause sudden changes in policy outcomes.  
 
 
                                                
12 To be clear, whether external events are actually “external” depends on the 
boundaries of the subsystem in question. For instance, in this case, Fukushima 
was an internal shock to the Japanese subsystem but external for the rest of the 
world. Similarly, Chernobyl was a major external event for the rest of the world 
except for the USSR. It is important to note that the boundaries of subsystems are 
not always clear, and events can sometimes be difficult to deem external or 
internal, especially in the case of broad ranging subsystems whose scope goes 
beyond national boundaries.  
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2.3.1. Defining Action and Institutional Context within the ACF 
Though there are numerous advantages to the ACF, there are a number of 
shortcomings as well as theoretical voids that remain unfilled and/or 
underspecified. One long standing critique of the ACF relates to its incorporation 
of institutions. This criticism questions the applicability of the framework to 
policymaking contexts outside of the US, which is where it was developed and 
initially tested (Sabatier and Weible 2007). More specifically, critics have argued 
that the “pluralistic” institutional arrangements that govern policy making in the 
US (i.e., numerous and fragmented decision making venues that are relatively 
easy to access) are different in kind than the institutional arrangements that 
govern policy making in other settings, like the “neo-corporatist” regimes found 
throughout Europe which are characterized by a smaller set of relatively 
centralized decision making venues that are difficult to access and governed by 
consensual rather than majoritarian traditions (Lulofs and Hoppe 2010). Until 
recently, a significant number of the efforts to apply and test the ACF were 
limited to the US and North American context, which is defined by a specific set 
of institutions and pluralism. This, according to some scholars, is problematic 
because it is not clear whether the ACF is suitable for explaining and predicting 
policy processes in other types of institutional settings (Kübler 2001, 627). In 
reaction to these critiques, the concept of “coalition opportunity structures” was 
incorporated into the ACF. The next section will describe the genesis, 
incorporation, and evolution of this concept in more detail. 
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Also related to the concept of COS, the ACF has been critiqued for the 
lack of specification about how these structures influence the policy process. As 
Schlager (1995, 259) notes, “[I]f the AC framework is to better account for action, 
the institutional structure and characteristics of the situation in which coalitions 
form and act need to be better specified. The institutional setting which both 
constraints and promotes action must be further developed.” As described above, 
the ACF recognizes the role of institutions in the form of relatively stable 
parameters, but fails to explicitly account for the links between these parameters 
and the policy outcomes we witness. For instance, though the ACF clearly 
accounts for the fact that relatively stable parameters and opportunity structures 
influence the resources available to coalitions and constrain the scope of their 
actions, the link between these structures and coalition behavior is relatively 
unclear (Schlager 1995). Do structures cause coalitions to behave in theoretical 
predictable ways? To what extent or when are coalitions able to overcome 
structural constraints in order to influence policy outcomes?  
Furthermore, though the ACF is rather strong on explaining the balance of 
power between coalitions within subsystems, it is somewhat weaker on explaining 
the strategies that actors might use in order to win a policy battle (Schlager 1995; 
Kübler 2001). In addition to the amount resources a coalition has, it is feasible 
that coalitions might strategically act in ways that enhance the likelihood of 
winning a policy battle. For instance, coalitions might try to expand the scope of 
conflict beyond the traditional subsystem by shifting policy venues 
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(Schattschneider 1965), they might try to strategically manipulate policy images 
via heresthetics (Riker 1986), or they might network with coalitions from adjacent 
subsystems in order to bolster their position vis-à-vis their opponents. Though 
ACF scholars have devised and incorporated the concept of COS to account for 
coalition behavior and strategies, the theoretical concept needs to be refined and 
tested before we can fruitfully answer these questions. These critiques are a major 
impetus for this dissertation. In addition to formulating a parsimonious theoretical 
framework to study contentious facility siting, this dissertation also answers these 
longstanding questions that fill some important gaps within the ACF. 
Accordingly, the next section of this chapter describes the concept of COS at 
length, in genesis in social science, and some general hypotheses derived from 
current knowledge. 
2.4. The ACF and Coalition Opportunity Structures 
In response to the critiques discussed above, Sabatier and Weible (2007) 
amended the ACF by incorporating a new set of variables—collectively referred 
to as “long-term coalition opportunity structures” (COS) —that mediate the 
relationship between relatively stable parameters like political institutions and 
external events and the dynamics (coalition formation, coalition behavior, 
strategies, and policy change) that occur within policy subsystems (see Figure 
2.1). Simply put, COS are features of institutions that enable or constrain actions 
and outcomes within a political system. These structures can be formal (such as 
federalism) or informal (such as the norms of consensus prevalent in a society).  
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In updated versions of the ACF, COS are conceptualized along two 
interrelated dimensions—(1) the openness of a political system and (2) the degree 
of consensus needed in that political system for major policy change (Weible and 
Sabatier 2007). The relative openness of a political system is defined along two 
sub-dimensions—(a) the number of decision making venues that policy proposals 
in that system must go through and (b) the accessibility of those venues. 
According to this conceptualization, pluralist countries such as the US are 
relatively open. Policy making authority is separated across multiple institutions 
and different levels of government, all of which are relatively accessible to actors 
that wish to involve themselves in the policymaking process. Corporatist and neo-
corporatist countries (like Norway, Sweden, and Austria), by comparison, are 
traditionally categorized as less open, because decision-making is more 
centralized and access to the policymaking arena is relatively difficult to come by 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007; Lulofs and Hoppe 2010). 
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Figure 2.1: Flow Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Source: Workshop on Policy Process Research, maintained by the School of 
Public Affairs at the University of Colorado Denver. 
The second dimension characterizing COS, concerning the degree of 
consensus needed for policy change, specifies the number of people, 
organizations, opinions, and/or votes necessary to alter public policy in a given 
setting (Sabatier and Weible 2007). The authors argue that the higher the degree 
of consensus required for any major policy decision, the greater the incentives 
coalitions have to be open, inclusive, and to make compromises with their 
opponents. The degree of consensus required can be viewed as a continuum. At 
one end, countries like Switzerland are governed by strong norms of consensus, 
wherein major change requires the consent of as many people as possible—
including minority groups. In middle of this continuum are countries like the US 
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and UK are governed by plurality, majority, or supermajority norms, wherein 
change requires the consent of the majority or relative majority, but not the 
minority. At the low end of the continuum, policymaking in authoritarian 
countries, like North Korea, is governed by powerful minorities capable of 
changing policy without the consent of the others, much less the majority 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007; Lulofs and Hoppe 2010). 
2.4.1. The Intellectual Roots of Coalition Opportunity Structures 
Although a nascent concept in public policy, COS, also known as 
“political opportunity structures,” has been used extensively in the social 
movement literature to illustrate how the outcomes of protests and social 
movements are shaped by the political, institutional, and social structures of a 
country (Eisinger 1973; Piven and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1983; Kitschelt 1986; 
Kriesi et. al. 1995; McAdam et. al. 1996; Tarrow 1998; Kolb 2007). The basic 
premise of this concept is that exogenous factors built into the political structure 
of a state influence the fate of a protest movement. More specifically, these 
structures work to either enable or constrain essential elements of a social 
movement like the ability of protestors to mobilize, to advance certain types or 
claims over others, to carry out certain strategies, and ultimately to impact 
mainstream institutional politics (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Scholars have tested 
the concept using a variety of different contexts ranging from Southern Italy, 
highland Peru, and to a 1940s farm workers’ movement in the US. Simply put, 
scholars argue that the choice of protest strategies and their degree of success 
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depends, in part, on the COS of a country, as measured by the unique 
configuration of resources, institutional setups, and historical precedents for 
mobilization (Kitschelt 1986: 58). Findings from these studies illustrate that the 
course of social movements did in part depend on “the political opportunity 
structure within which they revolt” (Tarrow 1967; Hobsbawm 1974; Jenkins and 
Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1983: 3 emphasis added). 
Inspired by this research and contentious politics more broadly (Kitschelt 
1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; S. Tarrow 1989), the concept of COS was incorporated 
into the ACF in 2007. It allows the ACF, among other things, to broaden its scope 
to include political systems and institutional characteristics other than American 
pluralism. In the context of the ACF, COS remind theorists that people do not 
form advocacy coalitions, amass resources, make strategic decisions, and affect 
public policy in a vacuum. Rather, the opportunity structures within which people 
and coalitions exist provide the incentives, rules, and norms (i.e., the 
opportunities) that make some decisions more attractive and some actions more 
effective, than others (Meyer 2004). Thus, if we want to understand and explain 
the policy process, we must account for the role of opportunity structures, which 
vary across institutional contexts.  
2.5. Mechanisms Linking COS and the Policy Process 
Since the incorporation of COS into the ACF in 2007, only a handful of 
studies have attempted to use the concept. In a general sense, these studies argue 
that opportunity structures affect the policymaking process in one of two ways. 
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First, they influence coalition behavior. For example, Kübler (2001) and Gupta 
(2013) find that opportunity structures demarcate the ‘venues’ available to 
coalitions and thereby influence the strategies (litigation, public protest, etc.) they 
will adopt in pursuit of policy change. On a related note, Leifeld and Schneider 
(2012) find that opportunity structures also mediate the transaction costs 
associated with information exchange in policy networks (advocacy coalitions) 
and thereby influence patterns of communication and coordination within and 
across advocacy coalitions. Second, coalition opportunity structures affect the 
probability of policy change in a given subsystem. For example, a number of 
scholars have recently argued that a political system (or subsystem) with a large 
number of COS leads to a proliferation of “veto players”, which can induce 
stalemate and reduce the likelihood of policy change (e.g., Tsebelis 1995; Sotirov 
and Memmler 2012; Ingold and Varone 2012).       
However, this research is somewhat disparate in the way that COS are 
measured and tested. To remedy this, this dissertation offers standardized 
measures of COS derived from its two dimensions as defined by Sabatier and 
Weible (2007). Doing so, I argue, can provide a common theoretical core with 
uniform measures that can be used in future research. In addition to presenting 
measures, I also test these measures to gauge the utility of the concept and its role 
in the policy process. This is of critical value to the ACF, in that it is the first time 
COS have been measured and tested using a mixed methods strategy. I do so by 
testing COS using large-N, quantitative data across different institutional and 
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political contexts; as well as using qualitative case studies. The former allows me 
to maximize comparative leverage across different opportunity structures over 
time, and the latter provides some much needed depth to the analysis. As such, 
this mixed method strategy allows for a thorough test of the utility of this concept, 
which has not been conducted thus far. To do this, this dissertation explores the 
following theoretical question: what are the mechanisms through which 
coalition opportunity structures influence the policy process? I argue that COS 
influence the policymaking process through three primary mechanisms: coalition 
formation, coalition behavior, and policy change.  
To test the utility of COS, I use the issue of LULUs, specifically the siting 
of nuclear facilities. Nuclear facility siting presents an excellent opportunity to 
study the influence of COS on the policy process. From a theoretical and research 
design point of view, the efforts to site nuclear facilities in different countries all 
over the world provide the critical variation on the independent variable—the 
varying opportunity structures that characterize these systems. The issue of 
nuclear siting is ideal not only for theoretical/research design reasons, but also 
because it is an increasingly important political and social issue. Significant 
amounts of time and resources are spent on planning and constructing these 
facilities only to see some of them get cancelled. The findings from this 
dissertation can help minimize some of the uncertainty inherent to siting 
contentious facilities and provide policymakers with insight into how existing 
opportunity structures might affect the policy process.   
 
 
43 
Again, the main empirical research question of this dissertation is: does 
variation in coalition opportunity structures influence the siting of nuclear 
facilities? If so, how? The empirical core of the dissertation focuses on 
demonstrating how these relationships function. There are three questions that 
will be the focus of chapters 3, 4 and 5 pertaining to policy change, coalition 
formation, and coalition behavior respectively. The next section of this chapter 
presents synopses of the theoretical arguments and general hypotheses on each of 
the three mechanisms.  
2.5.1. COS and Policy Change 
Referring back to Figure 2.1, this chapter explores the relationship 
between COS and “policy outputs.” Policy outputs, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, are defined as instances of policy change or lack thereof. Policy 
change took place in cases where the status quo policy decision to site the facility 
was overturned and the facility was cancelled. In cases where the status quo was 
upheld and the facility became operational, policy change did not happen. This 
chapter is an effort to analyze the COS that enable policy change, and which ones 
make change increasingly difficult, by answering the following research question: 
Once a site has been designated for use as a future nuclear facility, how do 
coalition opportunity structures influence whether the site becomes operable? I 
argue that a country’s broad national opportunity structures enable or constrict the 
ability of actors to change a policy status quo. They create barriers to change that 
are difficult to overcome in some cases, while in other cases the policy can be 
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implemented with little competition. The choice of nuclear facility siting as the 
empirical issue used to test this relationship is critical here because it provides the 
necessary variation both on the independent and dependent variables. With 
reference to the independent variable, the comparative analysis is supported by 
the variation in political systems and the resulting COS in different cases. With 
reference to the dependent variable, the case of nuclear facility siting provides the 
much needed variation on the dependent variable of this chapter—policy outputs 
or policy change. In some cases of siting, the nuclear facility was constructed and 
became operational as intended. However, in other cases, the siting efforts did not 
go as planned and the status quo was overturned resulting in a cancelled facility. 
This variation allows us to test the influence of our independent variable—COS—
on the dependent variable—policy change.    
I use a unique and original dataset of 269 cases of nuclear facility siting in 
30 different countries, which will be described in more detail in chapter 3. 
Opportunity structures are measured along the two dimensions specified by 
Sabatier and Weible (2007): degree of openness and degree of consensus 
required. Political systems that have a higher degree of openness and require a 
higher degree of consensus are more likely to experience policy change. Such 
systems are more open, providing opportunities for challengers to become a part 
of the policy process, thus giving them a chance to overturn the status quo.13 
                                                
13 An alternative hypothesis postulating the relationship between the degree of 
consensus required and the likelihood of policy change is plausible. The 
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Additionally, political systems with a higher number of decision-making venues 
provide opportunities for outside actors to become involved in the policymaking 
process. If this is true, then the following hypotheses will hold: 
H1: Political systems characterized by a larger number of decision-
making venues are more likely to experience policy change. 
H2: Political systems characterized by a higher degree of accessibility are 
more likely to experience policy change. 
H3: Political systems that require higher degrees of consensus are more 
likely to experience policy change. 
2.5.2. COS and Coalition Formation 
Chapter 4 focuses on an understudied but important element of the policy 
subsystem box in Figure 2.1: Coalition A and Coalition B. In particular, this 
                                                                                                                                
alternative hypothesis, which would correspond with the majority of the veto 
player literature in comparative politics, would suggest that given that a decision 
to site was made, countries with a lower degree of consensus could be more likely 
to produce policy change. This depends in large part on what the status quo is 
defined to be, which in this case is the official policy to site the facility. In future 
research, I plan to test this alternative hypothesis. However, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, I focus exclusively on the theoretical relationships specified 
within the ACF.   
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chapter explores how COS influence the formation of advocacy coalitions. The 
ACF makes a big assumption about when and how actors with similar belief 
systems decide to come together and form coalitions to pursue common policy 
goals (Schlager 1995; Kübler 2001). However, the factors that lead to the 
formation of coalitions need to be examined further. As a remedy, this chapter 
looks specifically at how varying COS impact the likelihood of coalition 
formation. For the purposes of analytical clarity, this dissertation looks solely at 
the formation (or lack thereof) of revisionist coalitions. As described in Chapter 1, 
revisionist coalitions are defined in this dissertation as coalitions that pursue 
policy change by actively challenging the status quo policy decision. They are, by 
extension, the opposite of hegemonic coalitions that support the status quo and 
benefit from it in some way. With reference to the empirical issue, revisionist 
coalitions are coalitions that are opposed to the de facto policy decision to site the 
nuclear facility and are engaged in challenging that status quo by attempting to 
get the facility cancelled. Again, the issue of nuclear facility siting is ideal to 
study this relationship because it provides the necessary variation on the 
independent and dependent variables. With reference to the independent variable, 
the comparative analysis is supported by the variation in political systems and the 
resulting COS in different cases. With reference to the dependent variable, some 
cases of facility siting faced organized opposition in the form of revisionist 
coalitions whereas other cases did not. This provides the critical variation on the 
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dependent variable.  The research question driving chapter 4 is simple: Why do 
revisionist coalitions form in some siting processes and not others?  
In answering this question, I theorize that opportunity structures influence 
coalition formation; they (in addition to other factors, like resource availability) 
define the transaction costs and shape the perceived benefits that individuals 
weigh when deciding whether or not to form (or join) a coalition that challenges 
the status quo in a given subsystem. When the barriers to entry (costs) are 
relatively low (i.e., access is easy) and the potential benefits of coalition 
formation are high (i.e., there are a relatively large number of potentially 
sympathetic venues that are inclined towards consensus), decisions to form (or 
join) revisionist coalitions will be more likely to form. When barriers to entry are 
high (i.e., access is restricted) and potential benefits are low (i.e., the number of 
potentially sympathetic venues is relatively small and/or dominated by a select 
group of people), decisions to form (or join) revisionist coalitions will be less 
likely to form. The analysis in chapter 4 uses a subset of cases from the larger 
dataset used in chapter 3. If the theoretical logic posed above is true, then the 
following hypotheses will hold: 
H4: revisionist coalitions are more likely to emerge in open settings 
characterized by a large number of decision-making venues 
H5: revisionist coalitions are more likely to emerge in open settings 
characterized by a high degree of accessibility 
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H6: revisionist coalitions are more likely to emerge in settings where 
higher degrees of consensus is needed (or highly valued) for policy change   
2.5.3: COS and Coalition Strategies 
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between COS and another critical 
element of the subsystem box in Figure 2.1: strategies. The ACF argues that in the 
fight for their policy beliefs and preferences, competing coalitions adopt specific 
strategies to gain more resources, mobilize these resources, and ultimately tip the 
balance of power in their favor. Although this is a significant element of the 
framework, we know very little about why coalitions adopt the strategies they do. 
The chapter is driven by the following research question: Do coalition 
opportunity structures influence the strategies adopted by revisionist coalitions 
in pursuit of policy change? Again, the issue of nuclear energy provides an ideal 
backdrop for this analysis because of the heightened risk perceptions and the 
resulting incentive to engage in the policy process. Once revisionist coalitions 
form, if they do (as illustrated in chapter 4), what strategies do they adopt and 
why? Is there a pattern to the adopted strategies? To gain additional comparative 
leverage, this chapter compares the issue of nuclear energy to that of forest 
management in India. Using a base country allows us to keep the national 
opportunity structures constant, while analyzing the variation at the sub-
national/subsystem level. This is crucial because thus far, COS and its analysis 
within public policy has been limited to the broad national level. However, given 
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the centrality of the ‘subsystem’ to multiple policy process theories, it is essential 
to gage the existence and influence of COS at that level.  
While chapters 3 and 4 employ a quantitative analytical strategy, chapter 5 
uses a qualitative case study comparison to answer the research question. This 
methodology complements the quantitative findings from earlier chapters and 
provides a more holistic view of the role of COS in the policy process. I argue 
that revisionist coalitions will adopt different strategies in pursuit of policy 
change, based upon the openness of a political system and the resulting nature of 
the COS. To study COS at the subsystem level using a qualitative analytical 
strategy, I borrow from Kitschelt and his operationalization of the concept 
(Kitschelt 1986). I posit that political systems with more open decision making 
structures encourage coalitions to use more “assimilative” strategies, whereas 
coalitions operating within closed COS are prodded to use “confrontational” 
strategies (Kitschelt 1986, 66). Assimilative strategies are those mechanisms that 
are employed through existing policy channels and institutional venues. 
Confrontational strategies, on the other hand, are employed outside of the already 
established institutional access points. Examples of assimilative strategies include 
lobbying, petitioning, judicial appeals, referendum campaigns, and participation 
in electoral campaigns. Confrontational strategies include methods such as civil 
disobedience, violent protests, demonstrations, and mass rallies. Using the cases, 
the following two hypotheses explore the role played by COS and their impact on 
strategies adopted by coalitions: 
 
 
50 
H7: In policy subsystems where decision-making authority is concentrated 
and access to decision-making is restricted, revisionist coalitions will be more 
likely to adopt confrontational strategies such as public protest and rallies that 
are designed to disrupt the subsystem.  
H8: In policy subsystems where decision-making authority is dispersed 
and access to decision-making is open, revisionist coalitions will be more likely to 
adopt assimilative strategies such as deliberation, appeals, and petitions that are 
designed to work within the subsystem.   
Having summarized the empirical focus, scope of inquiry, and the 
theoretical framework for this dissertation, the next three chapters test the 
hypotheses listed above. Chapter 3 explores the hypothesized relationships 
between COS and policy change, which are then broken down further in chapters 
4 and 5 by asking how they are connected. For this, I focus on two mechanisms—
coalition formation (analyzed in chapter 4) and coalition strategies (analyzed in 
chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3: Nuclear Facility Siting, Coalition Opportunity 
Structures and Policy Change 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the hypothesized relationships between the 
characteristics of COS and prospects for policy change. Each individual case of 
nuclear facility siting commenced with a policy decision by governmental 
authorities to build that facility. For our purposes, the decision to site sets the 
“status quo” for the case. The development of the case is therefore subject to one 
of two possible policy outcomes: the maintenance of the status quo that results in 
an operational facility or policy change that results in a cancelled facility.14 This 
chapter studies how variations in COS influence the patterns of policy change. It 
begins with a description of the theoretical framework and the testable hypotheses 
listed in the previous chapter. Then it outlines the analytical procedure employed 
                                                
14 By framing the cases in this dichotomous way, a “delay” in siting is considered 
a continuation of the status quo. The final outcome of interest here is policy 
change, which (under this coding scheme) can only be ascertained once the siting 
process has ended. The siting process can end in one of two ways—continuation 
of the status quo where the site becomes operational, and cancellation of the status 
quo where the site never opens. To be included in the database, a case has to fall 
into one of the two categories—cancelled or operational. Therefore, cases that are 
delayed but were never cancelled or never opened (for example the Yucca 
Mountain repository) are not included in this database. 
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to explore this link and test the hypotheses, along with the data collection and 
coding process used to measure the attributes and outcomes of the cases. Finally, 
it presents the findings and the implications to be drawn from them. 
3.2. Theoretical Framework 
Public policy, as conceived by most policy scholars, is a purposive course 
of action undertaken by an authoritative actor or body of government to deal with 
matters of public concern. It includes the initial decision to adopt a policy, as well 
as the subsequent decisions needed to implement and revise that policy. In 
systems such as the U.S., policy can be created in the legislature, within agencies, 
or in the courts – each of which is a “venue” in which policies can be influenced. 
The U.S. is an example of a system with “rich” COS that provides a lot of 
opportunities and incentives for opponents and challengers of the status quo to 
attempt to intervene and change it. In contrast, systems with “sparse” COS 
provide fewer or no opportunities for opponents of the status quo to intervene in 
the policy process and attempt to change the status quo. Centralized political 
systems such as France are examples of the latter. In addition, it is important to 
note that policies typically evolve over long periods of time and along the way, a 
host of decisions must be made across multiple policy-making institutions, many 
of which can delay, derail, or fundamentally alter the initial policy decision. This 
might also suggest that systems with rich COS where policy decisions have to 
pass through multiple venues are more prone to delays or derailment than systems 
with sparse COS. To understand the factors that will influence these decisions, it 
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is important to consider the way in which collective decisions are made. This 
chapter explores the concept of COS as one mechanism that provides conceptual 
order in an otherwise bewildering and chaotic process of collective decision-
making.  
Conceptual order comes from the enactment and enforcement of rules and 
norms—both formal and informal—meant to govern the decision-making process. 
In doing so, COS define the central features of the public policy process, 
including the rules for political elections15, the federal separation of powers, and 
the rules that govern policymaking agencies. By extension, the opportunity 
structures built into the system also influence public policy because they dictate 
which coalitions/actors may engage in the process, how they are able to act, and 
how much influence each coalition/actor has once they seek to engage in the 
policymaking process. In essence, COS are the points of access that provide 
coalitions and actors the ability to influence the policy process. Systems with rich 
COS have multiple points of access that can be used by opponents to the status 
quo in their attempts to overturn it. In contrast, systems with sparse COS have 
very few, if any, points of access that are available to status quo opponents. The 
absence of these points of access reflects a limited ability of coalitions to impact 
policy decisions, whereas their presence reflects an increased ability of coalitions 
                                                
15Recent Supreme Court decisions concerning campaign finance, for example, 
changed the institutional arrangements for elections by disallowing government 
limits on campaign spending by corporations and unions. 
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challenging the status quo to impact policy decisions and bring about policy 
change.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of COS was incorporated into the 
ACF to account for the differences between the US and other political systems 
throughout the world. Theoretical assumptions based on features unique to 
American-style pluralism consisting of well organized interest groups, mission-
oriented agencies, weak political parties, numerous decision making venues and 
the need for supermajorities for major policy change, for example, may not be 
applicable to European corporatist regimes or developing countries with strong 
patronage networks (Chandra 2004; Greer 2002; Larsen, Vrangbæk, and Traulsen 
2006; Lulofs and Hoppe 2010; Parsons 1995)). In light of this consideration, 
scholars have begun to offer theoretical explanations of these opportunity 
structures, but their theoretical conjectures have outpaced empirical tests (Kübler 
2001; Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). For example, 
borrowing extensively from the largely European literature on “political 
opportunity structures” (Kriesi et al. 1995; Kübler 2001; McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald 1996), the ACF argues that opportunity structures represent the 
“relatively enduring features of a polity that affect the resources and constraints of 
subsystem actors” (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 200).  
More specifically, Sabatier and Weible (2007) identify two sets of 
variables borrowed from comparative politics literature on consensual democracy 
and the work of Lijphart (1999)—degree of consensus needed for major policy 
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change and openness of political system. The openness of political systems is 
further divided into two sub-dimensions: the number of decision-making venues 
that any major policy proposal must go through and the accessibility of each 
venue. They argue that, in general, the higher the degree of consensus required in 
a political system for any major policy change, the more incentive coalitions have 
to be inclusive and seek compromise with their adversaries. Coalitions in such 
systems have an incentive to share information and minimize the “devil shift”, 
leading to a higher likelihood of policy change.16  
With reference to the openness of a political system, the higher the 
number of decision making venues, the more open the system is to opponents of 
the status quo. Coalitions in such systems have more opportunities to become a 
part of the policy process and pursue their policy goals. Systems where the 
number of decision making venues is low (for example corporatist systems) tend 
to be less open to outside players. Following the same logic, coalitions in these 
systems will have fewer opportunities to get involved in the policy process and 
pursue policy change. For example, countries like the US with clear separation of 
powers and strong regional governments have multiple decision making venues 
built in. Systems like the US also provide multiple institutional bases for 
alternative venues, such as the bureaucracy, legislature and strong independent 
                                                
16 The “devil shift”, as conceived within the ACF, is the tendency for actors to 
view their adversaries as less trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they 
actually are. 
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courts, creating an open policy environment with multiple opportunities for actors 
to get involved. In contrast, parliamentary systems like Britain that lack clear 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of 
government have fewer decision making venues built in. As a result, such systems 
provide fewer opportunities for coalitions to get involved. In addition to the 
number of decision making venues, it matters how accessible these venues are. 
For instance, pluralist systems like the US have multiple decision making venues, 
which are also accessible to different political actors and interest groups. On the 
other hand, unitary systems with corporatist traits have centralized decision 
making structures, which lead to fewer decision making venues that are not easily 
accessible.   
How do openness and norms of consensus relate to policy change? This 
chapter is dedicated to answering this question and exploring the relationship 
between COS and policy change. Having described the dimensions of COS in the 
previous chapter as well as in the section above, I move on to understanding what 
these concepts mean and how they might play out in a policy scenario. Doing so 
will provide the necessary substance to the theoretical explanations posed above, 
and also help visualize how these dynamics would function. The significance of 
COS in the overall framework is clear: it boosts the applicability of the 
framework to different types of political systems and translates the relatively 
stable parameters into more specific constraints and resources influencing 
policymaking both in the short and long term (Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
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Building upon this addition, I attempt to offer some clarity to the key concepts 
that make-up these opportunity structures. For instance, how should the concepts 
of openness, accessibility, and consensus be defined, measured, and 
operationalized? Sabatier and Weible (2007) offer brief explanations of what the 
dimensions of COS are and how they might influence the policy process. The 
remainder of this section adds to their explanations by using the example of a 
revisionist coalition—a coalition that exists with the purpose of challenging the 
status quo—and how it will function in different opportunity structures.  
Revisionist coalitions, once a part of a policy subsystem, are driven by 
their pursuit of policy change. In order to achieve this change, some revisionist 
coalitions are aided by the existing rules and norms of consensus in place. At 
other times, revisionist coalitions find themselves stranded without the help of 
existing institutional pathways that might help them make their case for policy 
change. In the former case, where rules and norms exist as possible enablers for 
revisionist coalitions, these coalitions can choose to use these opportunities to 
their advantage. For instance, systems requiring a high degree of consensus for 
major policy change provide revisionist coalitions with the ability to disrupt the 
implementation of the status quo. For example, countries like Switzerland with 
strong norms of consensus value the opinions of the minority and regularly 
employ direct democracy measures like referendums as a means of political 
decision making. In such systems, revisionist coalitions will generally have more 
opportunities to voice their opposition and get involved in the policy process. This 
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is apparent in Switzerland’s history of neutrality, strong welfare state 
characteristics, and stress on direct democracy (Daalder 1971). In contrast, 
countries like Pakistan with strong authoritarian traits and low norms of 
consensus provide fewer opportunities for revisionist coalitions to voice their 
opposition in the political arena. Moreover, the range of the degree of consensus 
varies substantially across countries ranging from 1) less than a majority (in non-
democratic countries and strong centralized systems like Pakistan and France; 2) a 
bare majority (in Westminster systems like the UK and New Zealand; 3) a 
supermajority (in separation-of-power systems like the US); and 4) to a consensus 
(in systems with strong cultural norms of consensus like Switzerland, Austria and 
the Netherlands) (Sabatier and Weible 2007). It is important to remember that as 
with any other institutional/structural argument, these rules and norms only 
provide revisionist coalitions with an opportunity to impact the policy process. 
The final outcome is still dependent on their actions and willingness to use these 
opportunities.  
Using the norms of consensus as a built in opportunity, we can now look 
at a real world example to understand how revisionist coalitions might use these 
established norms. As specified above, the US falls in the middle of the range of 
the degree of consensus required, which can be employed by coalitions opposed 
to the status quo. For example, the siting of the proposed Yucca Mountain 
Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada was disrupted when strong political players 
and some revisionist groups (including state actors such as the senator Harry Reid 
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and state Attorney General Catherine Masto; and advocacy groups like the 
Nuclear Energy Institute) entered the subsystem with the goal of disrupting the 
implementation of the status quo. The status quo, which was established by the 
passing of the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, clearly designated Yucca 
Mountain as the only option to be considered for the siting of the high level waste 
repository. This consideration was delayed and the status quo disrupted when the 
revisionist coalitions chose to use the opportunity structures in place to oppose the 
status quo. In addition to the norms of consensus in place, these coalitions also 
took advantage of the openness of the American system and the accessibility of 
various venues like the judicial system and the regulatory agencies. The US, with 
its strong pluralist traits, is an example of an open system with accessible venues 
that can enable revisionist coalitions in their pursuit of policy change. In contrast, 
countries like China, with its highly closed-off centralized decision making and 
weak norms of consensus are example of closed systems with very few 
opportunities for revisionist coalitions to become involved in the policy process. 
Again, the US is a good example of a political system with “rich” COS, whereas 
China is an example of a system with “sparse” COS.  
Taking the two dimensions of COS as specified by Sabatier and Weible 
(2007), the goal in this chapter is to provide some analytical clarity and to test the 
propositions about how norms of consensus and openness influence policy 
change. In general, building upon their work, I argue that open political systems 
with a higher number of accessible decision-making venues and a high degree of 
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consensus required for policy change will be more susceptible to such changes. 
More specifically, the following hypotheses will hold: 
H1: Political systems characterized by a higher number of decision-
making venues are more likely to experience policy change. 
H2: Political systems characterized by a higher degree of accessibility are 
more likely to experience policy change. 
H3: Political systems characterized requiring higher degrees of consensus 
are more likely to experience policy change. 
The remainder of this chapter uses the issue of nuclear facility siting to 
test these hypotheses.  
3.3. Research Design, Variable Operationalization and Data Collection 
As conceptualized in this dissertation, the siting of a nuclear facility is a 
long-term policy process, which includes a problem (whether nuclear facilities are 
beneficial/necessary), different policy options (what is the best way to site these 
facilities), policy decisions (laws, rules, and regulations attached to facility siting), 
and policy implementation (agencies and authorities in charge of implementing 
the policy decisions). This chapter theorizes that the broad national opportunity 
structures enable or constrict the ability of actors to bring about policy change by 
challenging and perhaps overturning the policy status quo. In this instance, for 
example, the status quo is established when a particular piece of land is officially 
designated for future use as a nuclear facility. In some cases this status quo is 
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disrupted and plans to site the facility are cancelled. Instances where the status 
quo is overturned are termed as cases that experience policy change. On the other 
hand, cases where the status quo remains in place and the site become operational 
as intended never experience policy change. The question raised in this chapter is 
about the relationship between a country’s built in COS and policy change. Do 
COS influence whether some cases of nuclear facility siting experience policy 
change whereas others do not? The issue of nuclear facility siting is an important 
one because siting efforts have been attempted in many different political 
systems, which provide the necessary variation on the independent variable—
COS. Also, this issue has a unique ability to speak to other cases of LULUs more 
generally, which increases the ability of this dissertation to generalize beyond 
nuclear energy.   
3.3.1. Variables and Measures 
3.3.1.1. Policy Change 
The dependent variable for the analysis in this chapter is policy change. 
To measure it, this chapter uses an original dataset comprising 269 cases of 
proposed nuclear facilities that result in one of two policy outcomes: an 
operational facility or a cancelled one. In cases that resulted in a cancelled 
facility, policy change took place. In other cases where the facility became 
operational, the initial policy decision was upheld, thereby maintaining the 
established status quo. This variable is operationalized as a dichotomous variable 
with a 0 for siting efforts where the status quo was maintained and the facility 
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became operational and a 1 for cases with cancelled facilities (policy change took 
place). These codes represent the status of a facility at the time of the final 
decision to either cancel the facility or when the facility reaches criticality (in case 
of nuclear power plants) or begins accepting used nuclear fuel (in case of nuclear 
repositories).  
By framing the cases in this dichotomous way, a “delay” in siting is 
considered a continuation of the status quo. The final outcome of interest here is 
policy change, which (under this coding scheme) can only be ascertained once the 
siting process has come to an end. The siting process can end in one of two 
ways—continuation of the status quo where the site becomes operational, and 
cancellation of the status quo where the site never opens. To be included in the 
database, a case has to fall into one of the two categories—cancelled or 
operational. Some facilities remain at a standstill for decades without being 
formally cancelled or becoming operational. Such cases that are delayed but were 
never cancelled or never opened (for example the Yucca Mountain repository) are 
not included in this database.  
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean SD 
Policy Change 0 1 0.22 0.41 
Number of Venues Index 0 6 3.26 2.40 
Accessibility of Venues Index 1 10 9.28 1.76 
Degree of Consensus Required 0 4 3.03 1.35 
Time 0 (1956) 56 (2012) 23.15 10.4 
Crisis Events 0 1 0.24 0.43 
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As Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 illustrate, approximately 20 percent of cases 
in the database experienced policy change. In these cases, the designated site for 
construction of a nuclear facility was cancelled before it became operational. In 
the remainder of the cases (about 80 percent), the status quo was maintained and 
the site became operational as intended.  
Figure 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
 
 
3.3.1.2. Opportunity Structures 
3.3.1.2.1. Relative Openness of a Political System 
According to the ACF, the relative openness of a political system can be 
defined along two sub-dimensions—(a) the number of decision making venues 
that policy proposals must go through and (b) the accessibility of those venues. 
 
 
64 
These concepts have been described in more detail in the theoretical section of 
this chapter and in the previous chapter. The primary goal in this section is to 
describe how I measure these concepts.  
To measure the former (number of venues), this analysis uses an additive 
index based on the following institutional characteristics, which (from low to 
high) specify the availability of decision making venues at the time of the siting 
decision: strength of federalism, strength of bicameralism, executive-legislative 
separation of power and regulatory insulation/independence. This measure was 
recorded at the end of the siting decision, in the year when the final decision was 
made. This constitutes the year that the site became operational or the year that 
the site was formally cancelled. The measures in this category are not prone to 
short term changes, other than in cases that experienced a major regime change. 
To keep the analytical logic simple and uniform, I chose to record the measures at 
the point in time when a final decision was made either to cancel the facility or 
when it reached criticality. Strength of federalism and strength of bicameralism 
were coded according to the data and procedures outlined in the Comparative 
Political Dataset compiled by Armingeon, Weisstanner, Engler, Potolidis, and 
Gerber (CPDS I).17 Strength of federalism is assessed according to three 
categories, where 0 = no federalism, 1 = weak federalism, and 2 = strong 
federalism. Strength of bicameralism is also measured according to three 
                                                
17 For data and more information, see: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=6&sub=1. 
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categories, where 0 = no or very weak second chamber, 1 = weak separate 
chamber, and 2 = strong second chamber. Executive-legislative separation of 
power is also measured as a dichotomy, where 0 = no or little separation of power 
(as in parliamentary systems of government) and 1 = strong separation of power 
(as in presidential systems). Last but not least, regulatory independence is 
measured as a dichotomy, where 1 demarcates the existence of an independent 
agency exclusively charged with regulating the nuclear industry (like the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which began operations in 1975) and 0 
indicates the absence of an independent regulator or the existence of a regulatory 
agency that is organizationally subordinate to the agency responsible for 
developing, managing, and/or promoting nuclear energy in the country (like the 
US Atomic Energy Commission, which regulated the industry prior to the NRC). 
When these items are summed, we get a “number of venues” index that ranges 
from 0 (few venues) to 6 (many venues). Again, as reflected in Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.1, this index has a mean of 3.26 indicating ample variation across the 
cases with a majority of the cases occupying the two ends of the scale.  
For the second sub-dimension (accessibility of decision making venues) 
this chapter employs an index of public participation within a political system. 
This index is created using two scales of public participation: a) the 
competitiveness of participation and b) the regulation of participation. Both of 
these variables were coded according to the data and procedures outlined in the 
Polity IV 2012 Database founded by Robert Gurr and supported by the Political 
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Instability Task Force, Societal-Systems Research Inc, and Center for Systemic 
Peace.18 The competitiveness of participation gauges the extent to which 
individuals have the ability to pursue alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership within the political arena. Coded on a five point scale, the measure 
ranges from 1 (repressed polities where no significant opposition activity is 
permitted outside the ruling party); 2 (suppressed polities where some political 
competition occurs but is sharply limited to exclude substantial groups of people); 
3 (factional polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly 
compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas); 4 
(transitional polities that are open to competing interests and where sectarian and 
secular groups coexist); and 5 (competitive polities where secular political groups 
regularly compete at the national level and transfer of power is regular and 
voluntary).  
The regulation of participation refers to the existence of rules about when 
and how political preferences can be expressed. All political systems regulate 
participation in different ways and to different degrees. This variable captures the 
opportunities (or lack thereof) that actors and coalitions might have to participate 
in the policy process. The Polity IV database scores countries on a five point scale 
ranging from 1 (unregulated systems where political participation is fluid with no 
systematic regime controls on political activity but the number and relative 
                                                
18 For data and more information about the Polity IV project can be found here: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time); 
2 (multiple identity systems with relatively stable and enduring political groups 
that compete at the national level); 3 (sectarian systems where political groups are 
based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population 
historically have been excluded from access to positions of power); 4 (restricted 
systems where some organized participation is allowed but significant groups and 
issues are regularly excluded from the political process); and 5 (regulated systems 
where stable and enduring groups regularly compete for political influence with 
little use of coercion. No significant groups or issues are excluded from the 
political process in these systems).  
Combining these two variables—competitiveness of participation and 
regulation of participation—generates an “accessibility index” that ranges from 1 
(low accessibility) to 10 (high accessibility). If the theoretical logic and the 
hypotheses posed are correct, countries with a high accessibility score will be 
more likely to experience policy change than countries with a low accessibility 
score. This is because more accessibility creates venues that can be used by 
opponents of the status quo, giving them opportunities to change the policy 
decision to site the facility. Low accessibility, on the other hand, reflects a general 
lack of available venues and opportunities to challenge the status quo and bring 
about policy change.    
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3.3.1.2.2. Degree of Consensus Needed for Policy Change 
The degree of consensus required for policy change varies across 
countries, subsystems and time. Due in part to the difficulties and controversies 
associated with measuring norms of consensus at the national level (see Lijphart 
1999), and the general lack of relevant information regarding such variables for 
some cases (example, those in post-USSR countries and East Germany), this 
chapter employs a broad-ranging measure that closely mirrors the theoretical 
explanation provided by Sabatier and Weible (2007). In its description of this sub-
dimension of COS, the ACF argues that strong norms of consensus provide added 
incentives for coalitions to be more open and for actors to reconcile, thus 
increasing the likelihood of policy change. On the other hand, political systems 
with weak/no norms of consensus lack such incentive, therefore making policy 
change more difficult without the consent of those in power.  
To operationalize the degree of consensus dimension, this chapter uses a 
measure of constitutional rigidity, coded according to the data and procedures 
outlined by Lijphart (1999). Simply put, this measure captures the degree of 
consensus required for amending the constitution.19 Countries are scored on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 4, based on the level of difficulty in place to amend the 
constitution. Non-democratic countries with no constitution and/or method for 
amendments receive a 0. Countries at this end of the scale with a score of 0 reflect 
                                                
19 Note that the original measure focused exclusively on democracies so the scale 
used here was expanded to include the non-democracies in the dataset. 
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the least formalized requirements for consensus before amendments can be 
adopted. Countries requiring an ordinary majority for passing constitutional 
amendment receive a 1; those requiring more than an ordinary but less than two-
thirds majority or ordinary majority plus referendum receive a 2; those requiring a 
two-thirds majority or equivalent get a 3; and finally those requiring more than a 
two-thirds vote get a 4. Countries at this end of the scale with a score of 4 reflect 
the most extensive formalized rules of consensus that have to be met before 
amendments can be adopted. This measure is a proxy for the norms of consensus 
in a political system. So countries with strict formalized rules required to amend 
the constitution reflect the existence of high degrees of consensus required for 
policy change. Countries with no formalized rules in place to amend the 
constitution do not require high degrees of consensus for other policy changes 
either. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 include some descriptive information about this 
variable.  
If the theoretical logic and the hypotheses posed are correct, countries 
scoring low on the constitutional rigidity scale will be less likely to experience 
policy change than countries scoring high on the scale. This is because countries 
with lower degrees of consensus required are more likely to be able to maintain 
the status quo than countries with a higher degree of consensus required, where 
numerous opponents to the status quo can get involved and attempt to change the 
policy.    
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3.3.1.3. Control Variables 
In addition to COS, the ACF posits another major driver of policy 
change—external subsystem events. It argues that external system events can alter 
the available resources and level of influence a coalition has compared to its 
opponents, thereby affecting the likelihood of policy change. Depending on the 
nature of the event, it may make change less or more likely. To account for this, 
this analysis incorporates two important control variables that are of direct 
relevance to nuclear facility siting cases, to ensure robust findings: linear time and 
proximity to major nuclear crisis events.  
Controlling for time neutralizes any effects suffered due to the huge range 
of years and cases incorporated into the dataset. Over time, nuclear energy has 
become more common and more countries have decided to use it as a source of 
electricity. As a result, more people have become exposed to the issue of nuclear 
energy and its associated risks, which have contributed to growing public opinion 
against it. Finally, the cumulative effect of nuclear power plant accidents, both big 
and small, have added to the public’s general distrust towards nuclear energy. The 
dataset used in this analysis includes cases ranging from 1956 to 2012, and this 
control measure will ensure that any impact of time in and of itself does not bias 
the results.  
Additionally, the analysis controls for three major crisis events that have 
impacted the nuclear energy industry—the Three Mile Island accident, the 
Chernobyl disaster, and most recently the Fukushima disaster. The Three Mile 
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Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdown that occurred in one of the two 
reactors at Three Mile Island power plant in the US in 1979. It is arguably the 
worst accident in the US commercial nuclear power plant history.20 The 
Chernobyl disaster was a nuclear accident that occurred in 1986 at the Chernobyl 
Nuclear power plant in Ukraine (then USSR). Fire and an explosion resulted in 
the release of large quantities of radioactive particles into the atmosphere. It is 
widely considered to be the worst nuclear accident in global history (Medvedev 
1992). Finally, and most recently, the Fukushima disaster occurred in 2011 at the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan. Triggered by a tsunami, the accident 
caused equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns, and the release of radioactive 
materials into sea water. It is considered to be the biggest nuclear catastrophe 
since the Chernobyl disaster (Wittneben 2012).      
Crisis events or “focusing” events as they are often referred to in the 
policy literature can fundamentally alter subsystem dynamics to bring about 
policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Birkland 1997; Nohrstedt and 
Weible 2010; Nohrstedt 2005). A negative policy image arising from a crisis 
event can lead to increased attention towards the policy issue and act as an aid to 
opponents who are seeking to alter the status quo (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). 
Accidents such as those listed above focus public attention on the costs, safety, 
risks, and nuclear waste issues associated with nuclear energy (Birkland 1997). 
                                                
20 For more on the Three Mile Island accident, see http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last accessed on 10/18/2013).  
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Additionally, crisis events are external shocks that can often open up windows for 
revisionist coalitions and increase their ability to access new resources and appeal 
to new institutional venues (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Nohrstedt 2008, 2013). 
These resources often come in the form of increased political attention towards 
the issue, bringing the nuclear issue to the national agenda, and creating the need 
for congressional hearings and political debate more generally. More resources 
and an ability to mobilize the masses can be crucial in changing the balance of 
power in the favor of revisionist coalition, ultimately making policy change more 
likely.  
To control for these effects, each case was coded as having been 
proximate to a major nuclear event if the siting decision was made within 3 years 
following the TMI, Chernobyl or Fukushima events. The decision to code for 
proximity within 3 years of these crises was a result of a separate analysis where I 
tested for alternative time lags following the major nuclear events, ranging from 
one year to ten years. The best model fit was obtained with the three year lag, and 
therefore we used the three year window to code the cases for proximity to a 
nuclear event. This is an important finding in and of itself because although 
scholars have studied the relationship between crisis events/external 
shocks/focusing events and policy change, the ACF is largely silent about the 
period of time over which crises advantage one coalition over another. The 
findings from this empirical data and time lag analysis indicate that the span for 
nuclear facility siting is about 3 years. This means that following a major crisis 
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event in the nuclear facility siting industry, the most potent “window of 
opportunity” for revisionist coalitions to influence the policy process is about 3 
years. This is corroborating evidence for the “window of opportunity” that results 
from crises, providing insight into how these events can impact policy change 
(Kingdon 1984). This lag could be different for other issues of course, which is 
something to keep in mind.   
3.3.2. Data Collection 
To develop the data for this analysis, I compiled a nearly exhaustive list of 
269 cases, combining operational, decommissioned, and cancelled nuclear facility 
sites from the United States and 29 other countries (See Appendix 1 for a 
complete listing of cases). My interest in final political outcomes (policy change 
or maintenance of status quo) required that I exclude sites that are still being 
considered. The dataset does not include, for example, the proposed Yucca 
Mountain repository site because the Obama Administration’s action to withdraw 
the license application to the NRC is still under legal review. The reasons for this 
decision have been described in more detail in the previous section.  
Note that due to information gaps, efforts to formulate a complete list of 
nuclear facilities proved to be quite challenging, especially for sites outside the 
United States and in the earlier years of nuclear development. The difficulty in 
finding accurate data is particularly acute for cancelled, non-US sites (nuclear 
facilities that were firmly proposed by the governments but never became 
operational). Nevertheless, the list of cases compiled for this project covers a 
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majority of the known operational, decommissioned, and cancelled nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities from the United States and globally. I realize that there may be 
some cases of siting efforts that were cancelled but never became publically 
known or covered in the media, which makes them hard to find. Also, the 
database excludes cases from present day Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran. 
This decision was primarily driven by the lack of availability of accurate data 
from these countries.  
The population of cases for this analysis was compiled using a three-step 
process. In the first step, a number of sources were used to compile a list of 
operational and decommissioned plants. For the US, the primary source was the 
NRC website. For international cases, the primary source of information on 
operational and decommissioned plants was the Power Reactor Information 
System (PRIS), which is developed and maintained by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). In the second step, a list of cancelled facilities was 
compiled using country reports produced by the World Nuclear Association and 
the list of cancelled sites mentioned in a recent report by the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI 2011). In the third step, I comprehensively searched the Internet, 
newspaper archives, and academic literature (journal articles and books) for 
additional mentions of cancelled nuclear facilities. 
The dataset includes a total of 115 US facility-siting efforts, and 154 
international facility-siting efforts (excluding Russia, China, North Korea, and 
Iran due to the lack of access to relevant information). I understand that these 
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cases will be systematically different from the other cases because of the nature of 
the COS present in these countries. This limits to some extent the ability of the 
findings to speak to these cases, but countries similar to Russia, China, North 
Korea, and Iran in the database (for example, Pakistan, South Korea during its 
authoritarian rule, and former USSR countries like Ukraine) will provide some 
basis for predicting how cases from these countries would fare. Of the 115 US 
observations, 78 are currently operational (or now decommissioned but once 
operational) facilities and 37 are siting efforts that were cancelled before they 
could become operational. Of the 154 international observations, 133 are 
currently operational or now decommissioned but once operational facilities, and 
21 are siting efforts that were cancelled before becoming operational. A listing of 
the number of proposed facilities for which data were available, and the 
percentage of the identified facilities that experienced policy change, is shown in 
Table 3.2. Again, policy change as conceptualized in this dissertation occurs when 
a pre-designated site fails to become an operational nuclear facility. Alternatively, 
status quo is upheld any time a siting effort is completed and the facility becomes 
operable. As you can see in the table below (Table 3.2), the percentage of cases 
that experienced policy change is much higher in the US—about 32. This is offset 
by the lower percentage of cases for which policy changed in international cases. 
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Table 3.2: Percentage of Policy Change of Proposed Facilities by Country 
Country Total Cases Percent Policy Change 
United States 115 32.2 
France 24 8.3 
Germany 22 18.2 
Japan 19 10.5 
United Kingdom 16 12.5 
Spain 10 30.0 
India 7 14.3 
Switzerland 6 33.3 
Canada 5 0 
Italy 5 20.0 
Sweden 5 20.0 
USSR 7 0 
Other 28 10.7 
 
3.4. Analytical Procedure and Findings 
In order to test H1, H2, and H3, I estimate a set of logistic regression 
models that predict the outcomes of nuclear facility siting efforts (whether policy 
change occurs or not) as a function of the coalition opportunity structures 
surrounding each case. More specifically, the first model tests H1 by predicting 
policy change as a function of the venue index explained above; the second model 
tests H2 by regressing policy change on the accessibility index; and the third 
model tests H3 by modeling the impact of the degree of consensus required on 
policy change.21 Then, I run a fourth model that estimates the impact of each 
                                                
21 In separate models, I modeled within country (rather than between country) 
variation by including fixed country effects in the models. The results were 
largely similar, so I chose to present the more parsimonious models. 
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structure when accounting for the other structures. All four models include 
controls for time and crisis events. 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2 summarize and illustrate the estimates derived 
from these models and (in so doing) provide support for the three hypotheses. 
Beginning with the openness of a political system, the results indicate that there is 
a positive and statistically significant relationship between the venues index and 
policy change (i.e. the likelihood that a nuclear facility siting effort will be 
cancelled before the facility becomes operational). When venues or access points 
are relatively sparse (X = 0), the predicted probability that policy change will 
occur is 0.0522; when venues are myriad (X = 6), the probability increases to 0.27. 
This finding is consistent with H1, which posits that policy change is more likely 
to occur in open systems characterized by a larger number of decision-making 
venues. The finding is indicative of the argument that the more points of decision-
making exist, the more likely it is that actors and coalitions can get involved and 
topple the status quo and bring about policy change. This finding is consistent 
when accounting for all the other variables in the model, including the 
accessibility index, the degree of consensus required and the control measures 
(time and crisis events). 
 
                                                
22 Predicted probabilities and 90% confidence intervals (in brackets) were 
calculated using the simulation procedures outlined in King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000) and Gelman and Hill (2007). 
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Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Policy Change 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Openness of Political 
System 
    Number of Venues Index 0.376*** -- -- 0.327** 
 
(0.083) (0.126) 
Accessibility Index -- 0.569** -- 0.419* 
 
(0.179) (0.190) 
Degree of Consensus 
Needed for Policy Change 
    Constitutional Rigidity -- -- 0.644*** -0.064 (0.184) (0.293) 
Control Variables 
    Crisis 0.718* 1.011** 0.947** 0.813* 
 
(0.357) (0.350) (0.351) (0.367) 
Time 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
Intercept -5.253*** -9.239*** -5.652*** -9.163*** 
 
(0.730) (1.968) (0.885) (2.060) 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log-likelihood -109.898 -113.900 -113.918 -106.686 
Deviance 219.796 227.800 227.835 213.372 
AIC 227.796 235.800 235.835 225.372 
BIC 242.175 250.179 250.214 246.940 
N 269 269 269 269 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
 
The findings also indicate that accessibility (as indicated by the 
competitiveness and regulation of political participation in a country) has a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with policy change. This finding 
is consistent with H2, which infers that policy change is more likely to occur in 
systems that are more accessible. When the points of accessibility are low (X=1), 
the likelihood that policy change will occur is less that 0.01; when accessibility is 
at its highest (X=10), the likelihood of policy change goes increases to 0.17. This 
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finding provides support for the idea that openness is a combination of the 
number of venue points a policy must pass through and how accessible those (and 
other) venues are. A system where accessibility is limited does not provide 
coalitions the ability to pursue policy change. It is also important to note that this 
relationship was consistent when accounting for the other independent variables 
in the model as well as the control measures.   
 
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Policy Change 
 
 
In contrast to the openness of a political system, the relationship between 
the degree of consensus required for policy change (as measured by the relative 
constitutional rigidity of a country) and policy change is not clearly defined. 
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
prob(Policy Change|X)
Consen. = 4
Consen. = 0
Access = 10
Access = 1
Venues = 6
Venues = 0 CI: 95%
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While on its own, the variable has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with policy change, this relationship does not hold when accounting 
for the effects of the openness of the system. As seen in Table 3.3 and results 
from Model 4, the degree of consensus required for policy change is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of whether a nuclear facility becomes 
operational or not. Among other things, this null finding could be due to the crude 
nature of this measure.  
Finally, the relationship between both control measures (time and crisis 
events) and policy change is positive and statistically significant, reflecting the 
notion that external events and long term changes in the global nuclear domain 
have made it more difficult to site new facilities. Beginning with time, for 
example, the predicted probability of policy change in 1956 is 0.015, in 1984 is 
0.19, and in 2012 is 0.80. These figures, in tandem with the coefficient from the 
combined logit model in Table 3.3 illustrate the increasing likelihood of policy 
change over time. Similarly, with reference to crisis events, the predicted 
probability of policy change when proximity to crisis is 0 (not within 3 years of a 
crisis event) is 0.11 and when proximity to crisis is 1 (within 3 years of a crisis 
event) is 0.22, indicating that the likelihood of policy change is higher in the 
aftermath of a crisis.23 
                                                
23 Note: In alternative model specifications, I explored the possibility that time 
and crisis might interact with openness and consensus to influence policy change. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
In Chapter 2 I explained the theoretical basis for this dissertation and 
outlined three sets of hypotheses. This chapter was motivated by a simple yet 
critical question: how does the nature of the COS influence the likelihood of 
policy change? To answer this question, I proceeded to test three separate 
hypotheses, each derived from the dimensions of COS put forth within the ACF. 
As illustrated by the analysis, I found tentative support for all the hypotheses. 
Both sub-dimensions of openness—the number of decision making venues and 
the accessibility of those venues—have a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with policy change. As the number of decision making venues 
increases, the likelihood of policy change goes up. Similarly, the more accessible 
these venues are, the more likely policy change is. In contrast, the relationship 
between the degree of consensus required and policy change is less clear. When 
policy change is estimated as a function of the degree of consensus alone 
(controlling for time and crisis events), the two have a statistically significant 
relationship. However, in Model 4, incorporating the dimensions of openness of a 
political system dissipates that relationship. One reason for this could be the crude 
nature of the measure; constitutional rigidity might not be capturing the norms of 
consensus sufficiently. The next chapter will explore a more nuanced way to 
                                                                                                                                
However, these interactions did not improve model fit and they were not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
82 
operationalize the degree of consensus required, which will shed more light on 
how this variable might influence the policy process.  
A few important implications can be drawn from these results. First, and 
perhaps the broadest is the insight gained into the non-stochastic elements of the 
policy process. Simply put, the findings in this chapter suggest that the structural 
forces within which policymakers operate influence some portion of the policy 
process. This is an important and relevant finding, especially when trying to make 
sense of seemingly random policy outcomes that occur in domains like nuclear 
energy. However, this is not a novel finding, and several scholars have studied the 
relationship between structural features of the policy context and corresponding 
policy outcomes. What is new are the specific results of the hypotheses tests. In 
other words, what influence do structural features in different political systems 
have on policy outcomes? The answer to this question leads us into the second set 
of implications to be drawn from this chapter.  
Given the findings presented here, it is important to ask what it means for 
countries to have certain COS in place—how do these structures impact their 
policy process and the ability of actors to attempt to pursue policy change. An 
interpretation of the findings reveals some trends for countries depending on the 
nature of the COS in place, which in turn has important implications for the 
likelihood of policy change. Countries like the US, with rich COS (defined by the 
large number of venues, high accessibility of those venues, and the high degree of 
consensus required for policy change), provide numerous access points to 
 
 
83 
opponents of the status quo, making policy change more likely. This means that 
siting efforts within the US will face strong opposition and have a higher 
likelihood of being cancelled than efforts in countries with sparse COS (defined 
by a small number of decision making venues, low accessibility of those venues, 
and the low degree of consensus required for policy change). The latter, because 
of the lack of available opportunities, does not experience policy change as often. 
This is not to say that status quo cannot be sustained in countries with rich COS 
(US is a good example with the largest number of operational nuclear power 
plants in the world), or that countries with sparse COS will never experience 
policy change. The gist of the argument, which is largely supported by the 
analysis presented here, is that the COS built into a political system provide a 
baseline access to opponents of the status quo, either increasing or limiting their 
ability to pursue policy change.  
Related to this, the third implication speaks to the real-world global 
problems of the future of nuclear energy and how best to deal with used nuclear 
fuel (UNF). Growing demand for energy, coupled with concern for climate 
change and the dearth of non-renewable energy sources have driven countries like 
Australia, Jordan, South Africa and Turkey to consider nuclear energy as a viable 
solution. Similarly, countries like Sweden, Finland, Canada and the US are in the 
midst of planning and implementing deep geological repositories as a solution to 
the UNF issue. These actions require the siting of new nuclear facilities, and this 
chapter sheds light on the baseline factors that will influence these processes.     
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Fourth, the external validity of these findings is important to discuss—do 
these findings on nuclear facility siting apply to other types of policy issues? The 
findings presented here certainly have some bearing on the issue of LULUs more 
generally, providing important insight into the siting of contentious facilities such 
as prisons, landfills, and airports. Generally speaking, this chapter provides 
insight into how structural features of a political system can provide a baseline on 
what is possible for coalitions to do in the midst of collective action problems. 
Given the number of venues built into a system and their accessibility, coalitions 
have an option to try and impact policy change. Additionally, the norms of 
consensus within a system also enable or constrict coalitions from attempting to 
change the status quo. The model developed in this chapter applies well to 
situations similar to nuclear facility siting, where risk perceptions are heightened 
and individuals have an incentive to become a part of the policy process. Issue 
areas where this incentive is missing may not be as easily studied using this 
model. This is something that requires further research. For instance, do COS 
have varying influence depending upon the kind of issue at hand? Are they more 
consequential for some issues than others? I plan to pursue this in the future.  
The final implication is most directly relevant to this dissertation and the 
ACF; findings from this chapter speak to the growing literature on COS and the 
role they play in the policy process. Building upon the detailed case studies 
(Kübler 2001) and the more general hypothesis listing (Sotirov and Memmler 
2012), this chapter analyzes data to demonstrate how these opportunity structures 
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influence policy change. This was established through empirical testing of 
theoretically derived hypotheses, which will be valuable as we continue to 
understand and build upon this concept. Countries like the US, with its numerous 
venues and high accessibility, would imply that nuclear facilities would be 
extremely difficult to site. Despite all the roadblocks, the US has successfully 
sited multiple nuclear facilities. Understanding this paradox requires us to break 
open the black box of this relationship and ask: how do COS influence policy 
change? What happens in the midst of this relationship? To further understand 
these complex dynamics, the next two chapters focus on the two of the 
mechanisms through which COS affect policy change—coalition formation and 
behavior. 
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Chapter 4: Coalition Opportunity Structures and the Formation 
of Revisionist Coalitions 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explored the relationship between COS and 
policy change. My findings indicate that opportunity structures do, indeed, 
influence policy change. However, the mechanisms that connect opportunity 
structures and policy change (or a lack thereof) remain unexamined. What 
specifically, do COS do to increase or decrease the likelihood of policy change in 
a given subsystem? Chapters 4 and 5 seek to answer this question by analyzing 
the relationship between COS and two potentially significant intervening 
mechanisms—coalition formation and behavior. The former is explored in this 
chapter and the latter in Chapter 5.  
Coalition formation is an important link to understanding the policy 
process and policy change within the ACF. Studies have shown that in the battle 
for policy change, some subsystems are dominated by single coalitions that are 
able to translate their beliefs into policy with relative ease. Other subsystems are 
inhabited by multiple coalitions fueled by competing belief systems (Weible, 
Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). In such instances, the hegemonic coalitions that 
once dominated a subsystem (and enacted the policies they preferred) face 
varying degrees of pressure from revisionist coalitions keen on disrupting the 
status quo—when the latter are successful, policy change occurs. In the nuclear 
siting domain, for example, some subsystems are controlled by hegemonic 
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coalitions that establish the status quo by instituting a policy decision to build a 
facility. Other subsystems, in contrast, are inhabited by one or more rival 
coalitions that constantly challenge the status quo by attempting to overturn the 
decision to site the facility. 
Why do revisionist coalitions form in some subsystems and not others? To 
answer this question, this chapter focuses upon COS, arguing that relatively stable 
political institutions (i.e., basic constitutional structures) create opportunity 
structures that incentivize or disincentivize and (by extension) explain individual 
decisions to form coalitions that challenge the status quo in a given subsystem. 
When it is relatively easy to enter (access) the subsystem and the potential 
benefits of doing so are high, the likelihood that a revisionist coalition will 
emerge is relatively high. When barriers to entry are high and potential benefits 
are low, the probability that a coalition will emerge that challenges the status quo 
is significantly lower. To test this proposition, this chapter systematically analyzes 
the COS surrounding 50 nuclear facilities in 13 democratic countries around the 
world. The analysis reveals tentative support for the hypotheses and (in so doing), 
further empirical support for the oft theorized but empirically untested notion that 
COS impact the policymaking process. 
4.2. Theoretical Framework 
Advocacy coalitions are an integral part of the ACF. They are comprised 
of a multitude of actors from “public and private organizations who are actively 
concerned with a policy problem” (Sabatier 1988, p. 131). Held together by a 
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shared set of belief systems, these actors engage in non-trivial degrees of 
coordination to pursue common policy goals. Over the years, considerable 
attention has been paid to the structure, content, stability, and evolution of belief 
systems held by coalition members (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The 
majority of research on coalitions has focused on the study of coordination and 
collaboration within networks, belief stability, and change within coalitions 
(Ingold 2011; H. C. Jenkins-Smith, Clair, and Woods 1991; Lubell, Henry, and 
McCoy 2010; Matti and Sandström 2011; Pierce 2011; Weible and Sabatier 2005; 
Weible 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). While significant, this literature says 
relatively little about why, how, and when coalitions are likely to form in the first 
place (Weible and Nohrstedt 2012).  
This is an important omission because in the face of important societal 
problems, actors who seek to form coalitions are required to initiate and sustain 
coordination internally, often without the existence of clear hierarchy and rules 
(S. G. Tarrow 1994). This is usually accompanied by high costs of coordination, 
the potential benefits of which remain uncertain. For example, in the nuclear 
energy domain, some communities are faced with a policy decision to site a 
facility without a process that registers their consent. In such a scenario, some 
actors in that community may want to oppose the decision but may lack the 
resources and collective motivation to initiate and sustain the coordination and 
effort required to do so. Even if they come together to seek policy change, there is 
no guarantee that they will succeed. In some cases, this may mean that the policy 
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decision goes unchallenged. In other cases, interested groups, local communities, 
and other stakeholders come together and form a “revisionist” coalition designed 
to oppose the siting decision.24 With these collective action problems in mind, 
why do revisionist coalitions arise in some nuclear energy subsystems but not 
others?  
Answering this type of question has beguiled ACF scholars for some time 
now. In fact, the framework is commonly criticized for its inability to account for 
how and why actors overcome collective action problems to form advocacy 
coalitions (Kübler 2001; Schlager 1995). As Schlager (1995) notes, “[F]or a 
framework significantly oriented to individual behavior, AC raises, but does not 
satisfactorily address, many behavioral issues. For instance, there is no attempt to 
account for how actors with similar belief systems overcome collective action 
problems and cooperate to pursue common strategies and common goals” (p. 
246). Responding to this critique, ACF theorists offer three conditions that help 
explain how individuals overcome collective action problems: (1) similar beliefs 
among actors reduce transaction costs, (2) actors can choose varying levels of 
coordination (ranging from weak coordination to strong coordination), and (3) in 
high conflict situations, the “devil shift” will exacerbate the power and 
maliciousness of opponents as well as the rising costs of inaction (Sabatier and 
                                                
24 As described in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, revisionist coalitions are defined in this 
dissertation as coalitions that pursue policy change by actively challenging the 
status quo policy decision. 
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Weible 2007; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, p. 197). However, these explanations do 
not describe how factors like shared beliefs and “devil shift” lead actors to decide 
whether or not to form coalitions in the first place. Rather, it is assumed that if 
concerned individuals share common beliefs, and share common adversaries, then 
they will form a coalition. Also, such explanations are heavily reliant on belief 
systems and ignore the role played by external parameters and structural 
characteristics of the subsystem.  
To explore the relationship between institutional factors and the policy 
process, some ACF scholars have stressed the role played by institutions in 
coalition formation, stability, and behavior over time. They argue that institutions 
define the parameters around which individuals decide to form coalitions. These 
institutions also dictate the level of coordination within a coalition and the 
strategies they can pursue (Fenger and Klok 2001; Nohrstedt 2010; Weible and 
Nohrstedt 2012; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). Some scholars have also studied the 
role of organizational structures (purposive vs. material) on coalition formation 
and defection (H. C. Jenkins-Smith, Clair, and Woods 1991). However, none of 
these studies have looked at variations in COS and how that might impact 
coalition formation. Inspired by this research, this chapter theorizes that COS (as 
defined in previous chapters), influence coalition formation. They (in addition to 
other factors, like resource availability) influence the transaction costs and 
perceived benefits that individuals weigh when deciding whether or not to form 
(or join) a coalition that challenges the status quo in a given subsystem. When the 
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barriers to entry (costs) are relatively low (i.e., access is readily achieved) and the 
potential benefits of coalition formation are high (i.e., there are a relatively large 
number of potentially sympathetic venues that require consensus and therefore 
give weight to those who dissent from the status quo decision) the likelihood that 
individuals and organizations will decide to form (or join) revisionist coalitions 
will increase. When barriers to entry are high (i.e., access is restricted) and 
potential benefits are low (i.e., the number of potentially sympathetic venues is 
relatively small and/or dominated by a select group of people), decisions to form 
(or join) revisionist coalitions will be significantly less likely. If this is true, then 
the following hypotheses will hold: 
H1: revisionist coalitions have greater incentives to form and are therefore 
more likely to emerge in open settings characterized by a high number of 
decision-making venues 
H2: revisionist coalitions have a greater incentive to form and are 
therefore more likely to emerge in open settings characterized by a high degree of 
accessibility 
H3: revisionist coalitions have a greater incentive to form and are 
therefore more likely to emerge in settings where consensus is a needed (or highly 
valued) precondition for policy change. 
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4.3. Research Design, Variable Operationalization and Data Collection 
4.3.1. Nuclear Facility Siting 
To test these hypotheses, I systematically analyze the subsystem dynamics 
associated with nuclear facility siting in 13 different democracies. Similar to the 
last chapter, nuclear siting presents an intriguing opportunity to study the 
formation of revisionist coalitions for a variety of reasons. First, policymakers 
around the world have made hundreds of decisions about when and where nuclear 
power plants and/or storage facilities should be constructed. This provides a large 
pool of substantively comparable cases from which to draw upon for purposes of 
quantitative hypothesis testing. Second, this pool of cases provides considerable 
variation on the dependent variable—in some cases, governmental decisions to 
site a facility are challenged by revisionist coalitions seeking to derail and project. 
In other cases, revisionist coalitions fail to emerge and the status quo (i.e., the 
decision to site the facility) is upheld. Last but not least, the cross-national context 
within which these decisions are made provides the variation necessary to 
systematically analyze the impact of political institutions on opportunity 
structures and, ultimately, coalition formation.   
4.3.2. Data 
4.3.2.1 Population and Sampling Procedure 
The dataset used in this analysis was compiled in two stages. In the first 
stage, a population database that consists of 269 known nuclear facilities that have 
been proposed in the US and 31 other countries around the world was 
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constructed.25 It includes a total of 115 US cases and 154 international cases. 68% 
(n = 78) of the facilities proposed in the US are currently or were once operational 
(now decommissioned), while 32% (n = 37) were cancelled prior to operation. By 
comparison, 86% (n = 133) of the international cases included in the database 
became operational and 14% (n = 21) were cancelled prior to operation. The 
previous chapter used this dataset in its entirety for analyzing the relationship 
between COS and policy change.  
In the second stage of this study, the population database was restricted to 
democratic countries26 and 50 cases were randomly selected from this subset to 
analyze in the sections that follow. The population was restricted to democratic 
countries because theory (backed by preliminary analysis) suggests that 
revisionist coalitions are 1) unlikely to form in non-democratic settings, or 2) 
extremely private in their behavior, which makes them difficult to detect and 
therefore difficult to study. Random selection was used in order to ensure that the 
results of the analysis are generalizable to the universe of proposed facilities 
included in the population database. Every case had an equal opportunity of being 
selected so there are no a priori reasons to believe that the relationships observed 
                                                
25 I excluded Russia, China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union due to 
lack of access to relevant information. 
26 Countries were coded as democratic if they received a score +6 or higher on the 
-10 to +10 Polity IV scale, which is described here: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.    
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in this subset of 50 cases are any different than the relationships that might be 
observed if a different set of cases is selected. As indicated in Table 4.1, this 
selection procedure yielded cases from 13 different countries. 
Table 4.1: Number of Cases by Country 
Country Number of Cases 
United States 20 
Japan 5 
United Kingdom 5 
France 5 
Germany 3 
Italy 3 
Sweden 2 
Spain 2 
Switzerland 1 
Finland 1 
Austria 1 
Belgium 1 
Netherlands 1 
 
4.3.3. Variables and Measures 
4.3.3.1. Evidence of a Revisionist Coalition 
As indicated in the preceding sections, I am interested in the impact of 
COS on the formation of revisionist coalitions. To measure coalition formation, I 
amassed and then searched newspaper archives and secondary literature for 
documentary evidence of at least one revisionist coalition in each of the 50 cases 
included in the sample. Evidence, in this case, was defined as one or more textual 
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indicators that a group of actors mounted an organized challenge to the siting 
decision.27 The following quotes represent examples of such evidence:  
1. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Japan): “Despite… attempts to 
garner public trust and acceptance, the decision to site new reactors…set 
off years of struggle and forced MITI to create more sophisticated 
strategies for handling resistance. By late 1969, declaring that the ground 
under the site was “as soft as tofu,” local high school teachers and others 
in Kashiwazaki formed an anti-nuclear-power union and demonstrated 
against the plant. In 1972 anti-nuclear citizens gained a majority on the 
town council and successfully brought up a referendum that opposed 
construction” (Aldrich 2008, 129). 
2. Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant (US): “Opposition had formed among the 
beach communities, and the Atlantic County Citizens Council on the 
Environment had petitioned to intervene. Before the plant could be built, 
hearings would be held at every level, & the fate of the project depended 
on the outcome of each hearing” (Janson 1978, 27). 
If such evidence was found, the case received a 1 and the formation of a 
revisionist coalition was assumed; if evidence was not found the case received a 
0.28 Descriptive statistics listed in Table 4.2 illustrate the variation of this variable; 
revisionist coalitions formed in roughly 50% of the cases. 
                                                
27 I recognize that this is a fairly relaxed indicator of advocacy coalitions, which 
the ACF defines as groups of actors that 1) share policy beliefs and 2) coordinate 
their behavior in a nontrivial manner (Sabatier and Weible 2007). However, the 
large-N nature of this research in addition to inequalities in the availability of 
information on international cases prohibits the depth of analysis necessary to 
establish these two conditions in all 50 cases. 
28 In order to ensure inter-coder reliability, two different researchers 
independently collected data, searched for evidence, and coded each case 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean SD 
Evidence of a Revisionist Coalition 0 1 0.54 0.50 
Number of Venues Index 0 6 3.94 2.62 
Accessibility of Venues Index 1 5 4.04 1.58 
Evidence of an Engagement Program 0 1 0.50 0.51 
 
4.3.3.2. Opportunity Structures 
4.3.3.2.1 Relative Openness of the Political System 
Similar to the previous chapter, the relative openness of a political system 
are defined here along two sub-dimensions—(a) the number of decision making 
venues that policy proposals must go through and (b) the accessibility of those 
venues of those venues. 
To measure the former (number of venues), I employ the same additive 
index as Chapter 3, based on the following institutional characteristics that (from 
low to high) demarcate the proliferation of decision making venues: strength of 
federalism, strength of bicameralism, executive-legislative separation of power, 
and regulatory insulation/independence. Strength of federalism and strength of 
bicameralism were coded according to the data and procedures outlined in the 
Comparative Political Dataset compiled by Klaus Armingeon, David Weisstanner, 
                                                                                                                                
according to their findings (Cohen’s kappa = 0.92). All discrepancies were 
resolved by way of group agreement. 
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Sarah Engler, Panajotis Potolidis, and Marlene Gerber (CPDS I).29 Strength of 
federalism is assessed according to three categories, where 0 = no federalism, 1 = 
weak federalism, and 2 = strong federalism. Strength of bicameralism is also 
measured according to three categories, where 0 = no or very weak second 
chamber, 1 = weak separate chamber, and 2 = strong second chamber. Executive-
legislative separation of power is also measured as a dichotomy, where 0 = no or 
little separation of paper (as in parliamentary systems of government) and 1 = 
strong separation of power (as in presidential systems). Last but not least, 
regulatory independence is measured as a dichotomy, where 1 demarcates the 
existence of an independent agency exclusively charged with regulating the 
nuclear industry (like the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which 
began operations in 1975) and 0 indicates the absence of an independent regulator 
or the existence of a regulatory agency that is organizationally subordinate to the 
agency responsible for developing, managing, and/or promoting nuclear energy in 
the country (like the US Atomic Energy Commission, which regulated the 
industry prior to the NRC). When these items are summed, I get a “number of 
venues” index that ranges from 0 (few venues) to 6 (many venues). The 
Cronbach’s Alpha value for this index is 0.78, indicating that the index is 
internally consistent.  
                                                
29 For data and more information, see: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=6&sub=1. 
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Following the advice outlined by Sabatier and Weible (2007), I measure 
accessibility by accounting for important distinctions between corporatist and 
pluralist systems. Compared to pluralistic systems (like the US), corporatist 
systems (like Austria) are generally less open—policymaking is highly 
centralized and participation is restricted to a relatively small number of peak 
associations and government authorities (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 200). To 
account for this, I use a reversed version of Manfred Schmidt’s (1982) 
corporatism scale, which scores countries on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from low (1) 
to high (5) corporatism. Reversing this measure achieves an “accessibility of 
venues” scale that ranges from 1 (high corporatism/low accessibility) to 5 (low 
corporatism/high accessibility). Descriptive statistics for both these sub-
dimensions are listed in Table 4.2. 
4.3.3.2.2. Degree of Consensus Needed for Policy Change 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the degree of consensus needed for 
policy change is a complex concept that varies across countries, subsystems, and 
time. The measure used in Chapter 3 provided mixed results; while the variable 
had a statistically significant relationship with policy change on its own, the 
results waned when controlling for the openness variables. As a result, this 
chapter explores a more nuanced measure of consensus that could capture 
underlying norms in each subsystem rather than at a broad national level. One 
such measure is whether there exist stakeholder engagement mechanisms to 
ensure that opposition groups have an opportunity to voice their concerns 
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throughout the siting of the facility. The presence of stakeholder engagement 
programs suggests an underlying respect for the norms of inclusiveness and 
deliberation. The absence of such mechanisms, on the other hand, reflects a 
disregard for broad norms of consensus. 
To create this measure, I began by systematically searching newspaper 
archives and secondary literature for evidence of public outreach/stakeholder 
engagement in each of the 50 cases included in the sample. Evidence, in this case, 
was defined as one or more textual indicators that the decision makers responsible 
for siting the nuclear facility attempted (in some way or another) to engage the 
public and/or relevant stakeholders (via public information campaigns, hearings, 
referendums, etc.) prior to the construction/operation of the faculty. The following 
quotes represent examples of such evidence:  
1. Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant (France): “Caught between pro- and 
anti-nuclear groups, Falmanville’s mayor experimented with a 
referendum. Although anti-nuclear groups published booklets and 
provided information to the people, EDF representatives also visited the 
village, offering information and tours of nearby plants. Approximately 
half the residents voted, the majority supporting the siting” (Aldrich 2008, 
167). 
2. Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station (US): “The Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation and the Citizen’s Council for a Clean Potomac have been 
granted intervener status in the joint hearings by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Maryland Public Service Commission on the two-
reactor plant, which is proposed across the Potomac River from Stafford’s 
Widewater Beach. The evidentiary hearings, which start at 1 p.m. Monday 
in Thomas Stone High School in Waldorf, are also open to members of the 
public who want to make statements about the proposed 2.3 million 
Kilowatt power plant, one of the largest in the nation” (Epstein 1976, 5). 
3. Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (US): “Public hearings open here 
Wednesday on Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.’s request for a federal 
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license to operate a nuclear power plant here. Radiological issues will first 
be discussed at the first session before the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
safety licensing board. Harold P. Green, attorney for Citizens for Safe 
Power, the group intervening in the AEC hearings, said he expects the first 
set of hearings to run through Friday” (Bangor Daily News 1972, 25). 
If evidence of engagement was found, the case received a 1 and it was 
assumed that the decision makers responsible for siting the facility were interested 
(for legal or normative reasons) in achieving some degree of consensus; if no 
evidence was found the case received a 0.30 Descriptive statistics for this variable, 
listed in Table 4.2 indicate that 50% of cases had some evidence of stakeholder 
engagement. This suggests that in roughly half of the cases, the norms of 
consensus were relatively high leading to the formulation of programs designed to 
provide people an opportunity to get involved in the policy making process.  
4.3.3.3. Control Variables 
As in Chapter 3, I control for two important variables. The first is external 
crisis events designed to control for big events in the global nuclear energy arena 
like Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl and most recently the Fukushima 
disaster. This is a crucial variable because events like these have the ability to 
reverberate to multiple subsystems. These external shocks can often open up 
windows for revisionist coalitions and increase their ability to access new 
resources (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Nohrstedt 2008, 2013). New windows and 
                                                
30 Again, two different researchers independently collected data, searched for 
evidence, and coded each case according to their findings (Cohen’s kappa = 0.88). 
All discrepancies were resolved by way of group agreement. 
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access to more resources in turn provide higher incentives to actors, perhaps 
making them more likely to form revisionist coalitions. Controlling for these 
crises, therefore, will neutralize any coalition formation activity that might have 
taken place as a response to said events. Similar to Chapter 3, each case was 
coded as having been proximate to a major nuclear event if the siting decision was 
made within 3 years following the TMI, Chernobyl or Fukushima events.31 The 
second control variable is linear time, which helps us to account for any 
underlying trends over the range of years and cases incorporated into the sample.   
4.4. Analytical Procedure and Findings 
In order to test H1, H2, and H3, I estimate a set of logistic regression 
models that predict the formation of a revisionist coalition based upon the 
configuration of COS surrounding each case. More specifically, the first model 
tests H1 by predicting formation as a function of the venue index explained above; 
the second model tests H2 by regressing formation of a revisionist coalition on the 
openness (venue accessibility) scale; and the third model tests H3 by modeling the 
impact of engagement programs (consensus needed) on evidence that a revisionist 
                                                
31 The analysis tested for alternative time lags following the major nuclear events, 
ranging from one year to ten year. The best model fit was obtained with the three 
year lag, and therefore we used the three year window to code the cases for 
proximity to a nuclear event. 
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coalition formed.32 Then, I run a fourth model that estimates the impact of each 
structure when accounting for the other structures. All four models include 
controls for time and crisis events. 
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 summarize and illustrate the estimates derived 
from these models and (in so doing) provide mixed support for the hypotheses. 
Beginning with the openness of a political system, the results indicate a mixed 
albeit weak relationship between the number of decision making venues in a 
political system and the formation of revisionist coalitions. When estimated as a 
bivariate model (Model 1), there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between the two variables. However, the magnitude of this relationship is small, 
and it loses its statistical significance when accounting for the other independent 
variables in the multivariate model (Model 4). These findings provide weak, if 
any, support for H1, which posits that revisionist coalitions have an incentive to 
and are therefore more likely to form in open systems characterized by a high 
number of decision-making venues. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 In separated models, I modeled within country (rather than between country) 
variation by including fixed effects in the models. The results were largely 
similar, so I only present the more parsimonious bivariate models. 
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Table 4.3: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Coalition Formation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Openness of Political 
System 
    Number of Venues Index 0.257* -- -- -0.113 
 
(0.141) (0.230) 
Accessibility Index -- 0.145 -- 0.345 
 
(0.207) (0.322) 
Degree of Consensus 
Needed for Policy Change 
    Evidence of Stakeholder 
Engagement -- -- 
3.689*** 4.067*** 
(0.966) (1.167) 
Control Variables 
    Crisis -0.201 -0.205 0.740 -0.855 
 
(0.797) (0.782) (1.103) (1.123) 
Time 0.121** 0.126** 0.151* 0.166* 
 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.062) (0.066) 
Intercept 3.400** 3.253** -4.888** -6.476*** 
 
(1.228) (1.415) (1.698) (2.485) 
P 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Log-likelihood -27.393 -28.930 -17.688 -17.106 
Deviance 54.785     57.860 35.376 34.211 
AIC 62.785     65.860 43.376 46.211 
BIC 70.433     73.508 51.024 57.684 
N 50 50 50 50 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
 
With respect to accessibility of different venues, the analysis reveals that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between accessibility and the 
formation of revisionist coalitions. Both the bivariate model (Model 2) and the 
multivariate model (Model 4) reveal similar results. This finding is inconsistent 
with H2, which infers that revisionist coalitions have an incentive to and are 
therefore more likely to form in systems that are more accessible. This finding is 
also inconsistent with the findings in the previous chapter, where accessibility (as 
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measured by regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation) had 
a statistically significant relationship with policy change. 
Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of a Revisionist Coalition 
 
With respect to the degree of consensus required, the analysis reveals a 
strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between evidence of a 
stakeholder public engagement program and evidence of a revisionist coalition. 
When no such programs exist (X = 0), the predicted probability that a revisionist 
coalition formed is 0.14; in cases were engagement programs do exist (X = 1), the 
probability increases to 0.90. This finding is consistent with H3, which states that 
revisionist coalitions have an incentive to and are therefore more likely to form in 
systems where consensus is needed (or valued) for major policy change. This 
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relationship remains robust when accounting for all the other variables in the 
model, including the venues and accessibility indices and the control measures 
(time and crisis events).    
Finally, the relationship between both control measures (time and crisis 
events) and coalition formation is mixed. While there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between coalition formation and linear time, no such 
relationship is apparent between coalition formation and crisis events. The first 
finding is indicative of the notion that long term trends in the global nuclear 
domain have made it more likely that revisionist coalitions opposing status quo 
policy decisions to site a facility will form. However, the results do not indicate 
that proximity of crisis events has a substantive effect on the formation of these 
coalitions. This finding is interesting, especially given theoretical expectations, 
which suggest that crisis events provide new opportunities to actors who wish to 
form pro-change coalitions, thus making coalition formation more likely 
(Nohrstedt 2008). Perhaps the lack of skillful exploitation by individuals explains 
the absence of a relationship, but the behavior of coalitions in the aftermath of 
crises is critical to answer this question. Scholars have begun looking at coalition 
mobilization and policy learning post crises, but future research can benefit from 
the addition of COS and the role they play to the mix of explanatory variables 
(Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Nohrstedt 2013). In addition to explaining the 
actions and strategies adopted by coalitions in the aftermath of crisis events, 
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future research should also look at how these events might impact the genesis of 
revisionist coalitions in the first place.    
4.5. Conclusions 
In Chapter 3 I explored the link between COS and policy change. In 
essence, the analysis revealed that specific opportunity structures, varying across 
different countries, influence the likelihood of policy change. In this chapter, I 
untangle one of the mechanisms that might account for this finding by answering 
a simple yet important question pertaining to coalition formation: why do 
revisionist coalitions form in some subsystems and not others? I did so by 
exploring the relationship between COS and the likelihood that a given nuclear 
facility will face opposition in the form of a revisionist coalition during the siting 
process. Inspired by recent improvements to the ACF, I posit and empirically test 
the proposition that political institutions create coalition opportunity structures 
that incentivize and (by extension) explain decisions to form revisionist 
coalitions.  
The findings reveal partial support for the theory. First, with respect to 
openness of a political system, the analysis reveals little to no support for the 
hypotheses. Theory would suggest that when the potential benefits of entering a 
subsystem are high and the barriers to entry are small, more revisionist coalitions 
will form. However, I find that the number of decision making venues and their 
accessibility do not seem to matter much for the formation of revisionist 
coalitions. This can mean any number of things. It may mean, for example, that 
 
 
107 
proliferation of venues and their accessibility does not matter—that it does not 
incentivize nor impact the formation of revisionist coalitions. Alternatively, it 
could mean that openness of a political system does not matter in this (the 
nuclear) domain, but may matter in other (i.e., less technical) domains. Last but 
not least, it could be that these variables do matter, but that our measure is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the variations in openness and accessibility that 
meaningfully incentivize policy actors. 
Second, and perhaps the most important and interesting finding is the 
strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between the norms of 
consensus required for policy change and the formation of revisionist coalitions. 
In cases where strong norms of consensus (as measured by the presence or 
absence of stakeholder engagement programs) existed, revisionist coalitions were 
more likely to form. The interpretation of this finding requires some thought, as it 
is possible that the relationship suffers from an endogeneity problem. Do 
stakeholder engagement programs lead to the formation of revisionist coalitions 
or vice versa? If the existence of stakeholder engagement programs does make 
revisionist coalitions more likely to form, the policy implications could be far 
reaching. On the one hand, public consent and deliberative decision making 
achieved through stakeholder engagement programs is critical for sustaining the 
essence of democratic governance. Governments in advanced democracies thrive 
on the principles of empowering citizens (or subjects), providing access to 
resources that allows opposition groups to form revisionist coalitions in the face 
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of policy decisions. It is not surprising, then, that giving local residents and other 
affected parties the means to engage in the siting process would stimulate the 
formation of organized forms of opposition. On the other hand, the formation and 
growth of revisionist coalitions often leads to political deadlock, putting important 
policy decisions in limbo and draining both time and money. The case of the 
Yucca Mountain repository is a good example—over ten years and $12 billion 
dollars were spent characterizing and evaluating the site—resources that have 
gone to waste without solving the issue of storing the country’s increasing stock 
of spent nuclear fuel.  
If, on the contrary, it is the case that revisionist coalitions are leading to 
the establishment of stakeholder engagement programs, then the lessons could be 
drastically different. It is possible that in the face of heavy opposition, the 
government is forced to adopt stakeholder engagement programs as a way to 
alleviate (and recognize) public backlash. If this is true, it suggests the ability of 
strong revisionist coalitions to create opportunity structures in the form of 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms as a way to influence the siting process. 
This is an important feedback loop that could provide crucial insight into the 
dynamics of the siting process and the policy process more generally.  
Lastly, it is interesting to note the there was no relationship between crisis 
events and formation of revisionist coalitions. This contradicts theoretical 
expectations that crisis events open windows of opportunity for actors to come 
together and get involved in the policy process. One reasons for this contradiction 
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could be the absence of strategic behavior on the part of coalition actors. It could 
also mean that while crisis events are crucial for policy change (as we saw in 
Chapter 3), they do not matter much for actual formation of new coalitions. In 
other words, already existing revisionist coalitions might take advantage of crisis 
events, but that such events do not appear to influence the formation of new 
coalitions in a significant way. Nonetheless, this is an important link that needs to 
be explored further in future research.  
While these findings provide both theoretical and empirical insights, 
perhaps one reason for the mixed results is not the theory but the manner in which 
the concepts were operationalized and analyzed. It could be the case that some of 
these relationships are too nuanced and cannot be teased through quantitative 
analyses where detail and context are sacrificed to incorporate more cases. It is 
also possible (as reflected in the robustness of the stakeholder engagement 
measure) that broad national level variables need to be supplemented with case 
specific subsystem variables. To explore this further, the next empirical chapter 
adds value to this dissertation in four ways: (1) it employs a more detail oriented 
qualitative comparative methodology for comparing two different case studies; 
(2) it focuses on case specific subsystem level COS; (3) it expands the substantive 
focus of the dissertation by comparing nuclear energy subsystem to forest 
management subsystem in India; and (4) it does all this by exploring how the 
mechanism of coalition behavior can shed light on the relationship between COS 
and policy change. 
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Chapter 5: Coalition Opportunity Structures at the Subsystem 
Level: Comparing Coalition Strategies Using Case Studies of 
Nuclear Energy and Forest Management in India 
5.1. Introduction 
Thus far, this dissertation has presented empirical analyses of two separate 
but interconnected theoretical relationships. First, in Chapter 3 I analyzed the 
relationship between COS and policy change, and found strong evidence that 
specific structural features of a political system influence the probability of policy 
change in that system. Second, in chapter 4 I explored the relationship between 
COS and coalition formation. Part of the goal in chapter 4 was to uncover one of 
the mechanisms through which COS influence policy change. I argued that the 
formation of organized opposition challenging the policy status quo is one link 
that connects COS to policy change. Among other things, the analysis revealed a 
strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between the norms of 
consensus required for policy change in a political system (as measured by the 
existence of stakeholder engagement mechanisms) and the formation of 
revisionist coalitions. Chapter 5 aims to focus on another link in the policy 
process that might connect opportunity structures to policy change—coalition 
behavior. By coalition behavior, I mean the strategies adopted by revisionist 
coalitions in their pursuit of policy change. I argue that the choice of specific 
strategies also connect opportunity structures to policy change. Coalition 
strategies, as conceptualized in this chapter, refer to the process of choosing and 
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executing a plan of action to help coalitions realize their policy goals (Pralle 
2006b). The motivation behind this chapter is a simple but important question: 
what motivates coalitions to pursue one strategy over another?  
In answering this question, the chapter also adds value to this dissertation 
in two ways. First, this chapter helps to expand the theoretical scope of the 
dissertation by supplementing the measurement and operationalization of COS at 
the national level by studying the variation of opportunity structures at the 
subsystem level. When measuring the dimensions of openness and consensus, this 
chapter focuses on subsystem specific actors and institutions instead of broad 
national features such as strength of bicameralism, type of political system, and 
degree of corporatism. Second, this chapter adds to the depth of analysis by 
employing a qualitative case study methodology to study the relationship between 
COS and coalition behavior. The use of qualitative controlled case comparison in 
this chapter complements the large-N analysis employed in chapter 3 and 4. 
Besides providing a different vantage point from which to understand the role of 
COS and a more thorough understanding of the dynamics involved, it also 
provides an important check on both the internal and external validity of the study 
(Slater and Ziblatt 2013). 
Why should we care about coalition behavior and the strategies they 
adopt? In addition to the ability of actors to form revisionist coalitions (as 
explored in chapter 4), the host of strategies they have available to them shapes 
their ability to gain more resources and eventually impact the decision-making 
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process. The ACF contends that policymaking is the end result of a long-term 
struggle between conflicting groups (coalitions) that are trying to advance their 
beliefs about how the world should work (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). In 
their endeavor to influence policy outcomes, coalitions adopt specific strategies 
that would provide them the greatest amount of leverage and tip the balance of 
resources in their favor. The coalition that is able to amass more resources, as 
compared to the competing coalition (i.e., legal authority, public opinion, 
information, financial resources, skillful leadership, and mobilizable public) will 
be the most successful in achieving their preferred outcomes (Sabatier and Weible 
2007). The ACF and political science more generally recognizes the importance 
of coalition behavior and strategies used by actors/groups in pursuit of additional 
resources to influence policy change (Elgin and Weible 2013). However, scholars 
are only beginning to understand the underlying forces that impact coalition 
behavior. Using case studies of nuclear energy and forest management 
subsystems in India, this chapter explores how COS at the subsystem level impact 
coalition strategies. It analyzes how coalitions function within different 
institutional and policy contexts and why they choose one strategy over another.  
The impetus behind choosing these two cases is simple; I wanted to 
analyze the influence of COS within a political system across two different issue 
areas. This comparison plays a critical role in the dissertation for two reasons. 
First, the case of nuclear energy in India provides a check on the large-N analyses 
presented in chapters 3 and 4. Second, the case of forest management provides a 
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check on the generalizability of the findings with respect to COS and nuclear 
energy. It is a first step towards applying the concept of opportunity structures to 
issue areas other than nuclear energy and LULUs, to gage its overall utility for 
policy scholars and policymakers.  
5.2. Theoretical Framework 
Though policy scholars have dabbled in the area, extant research spends 
relatively little time characterizing and systematically analyzing the nature of the 
strategies that coalitions employ in order to bolster their resources and influence 
policy outcomes (Mintrom and Vergari 1996). When this does come up, 
researchers tend to focus on the strategies that coalitions use in order to augment 
their legal authority by “shopping” for different “venues” within which to wage 
their battle (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; 
Guiraudon 2000; Pralle 2003; Nohrstedt 2011; Burnett and Davis 2002; Godwin 
and Schroedel 2000; Hansen and Krejci 2000). Broadly speaking, venue shopping 
refers to the activities adopted by coalitions who seek out a political access point 
where they can petition alternative policy preferences. In federal systems, for 
example, coalitions can move between the national, state, and local levels of 
government in search of a favorable venue that is willing to hear their argument. 
In unitary systems, on the other hand, policymaking authority tends to be 
concentrated at the federal level, providing coalitions with limited opportunities to 
garner traction at other levels of government.  
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In a comparative study of environmental advocacy in the US and Canada, 
for example, Pralle (2006b) outlines how the agenda-setting literature can help 
understand the divergent political outcomes in the two cases. Ultimately 
interested in the political success of Canadian environmental groups with regard 
to attracting global attention and achieving province wide forestry reform, and the 
lack of success in the case of American environmentalists, Pralle argues that the 
ability of the former to sufficiently expand the scope of conflict explains their 
favorable outcome. The successful expansion of the scope of conflict, in part, 
depends on their ability to define and redefine key issues, form successful 
alliances, and their ability to seek out new institutional venues. Similarly, Burnett 
and Davis (2002) study the shifts in national forest policy in the US as a result of 
environmental coalitions’ ability to use new information and find favorable 
decision-making venues. They find that the increasing role of congressional 
members as a sympathetic venue provided the environmental coalitions with the 
necessary push to overcome the existing structural biases of the decision-making 
system.  
This growing area of research fills an important theoretical gap within the 
field of public policy. It also strengthens the call by ACF scholars for the need to 
better understand coalition strategies (Elgin and Weible 2013). Despite these 
acknowledgments, a lot remains unanswered about why coalitions choose certain 
strategies over others when fighting policy battles. I argue in this chapter that 
COS can help us understand some of the motivation behind strategy adoption by 
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revisionist coalitions. To maintain analytical clarity, I focus exclusively on 
revisionist coalitions, which are coalitions that form with the explicit purpose of 
challenging the status quo policy decision. Governing coalitions, which are 
coalitions that establish and support the status quo policy decision, also strategize 
in order to maintain their political position. However, because of the underlying 
interest in comprehending policy change, for the purposes of this dissertation, I 
focus exclusively on revisionist coalition strategies. The remainder of this section 
describes COS and existing literature in the social movement sub-field as well as 
public policy regarding these structures and their possible influence on 
coalition/group strategies. 
As described in previous chapters, COS represent the broad structural 
features of a political system or subsystem that influence the actions and 
interactions of individuals and groups inhabiting it. Surrounded with unique 
venues points, coalitions are forced to “interact in the context of nested 
institutional arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain scientific and 
technical information about problems and alternatives” (Weible, Sabatier, and 
McQueen 2009: 121). In other words, COS can influence strategies in multiple 
ways, including providing opportunities or constraining access to new resources 
within a subsystem; and by shaping the opportunities for venue exploitation, 
establishing norms of consensus, and setting legal impediments that can impact 
the range of available political strategies. Institutions—defined as the “formal or 
informal procedures, routines or norms and conventions embedded in the 
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organizational structure of the polity or political economy”—are the basis for 
understanding COS within a particular system (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938).33 
COS provide a unique window into understanding institutions, particularly in the 
way that they either enable or constrain political action. For example, knowing 
that a country has a parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature is useful for 
some studies. However, COS embedded within such institutions helps to 
comprehend how political actors and/or coalitions can use these institutions to 
their advantage.   
Within the public policy literature, COS has been applied to policy 
problems only a handful of times (see chapter 2). With respect to coalition 
strategies in particular, these instances are even fewer. One such example is 
Kübler (2001), who uses the concept of political opportunity structures to 
understand coalition strategies. In so doing, he hypothesizes that “coalitions adopt 
their strategies according to characteristic openings in a given political 
opportunity structure, measured by the degree of territorial decentralization, of 
functional separation of power, of party system fragmentation, as well as by the 
extent of direct democratic procedures” (p. 629). He borrows the measurement of 
opportunity structures from Kriesi et al. (1995) in their study of social movements 
                                                
33 See, for example Evrard (2012), where the author compares partisan influence 
on the national energy policy in France and Germany. In particular, the article 
highlights how the institutional context in Germany made it possible for actors to 
have more influence than their French counterparts.  
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in Western Europe. Ultimately interested in drug policy change in Switzerland, he 
finds that some elements of his measurement of opportunity structures were more 
influential on coalition strategies than others. For instance, he finds that strong 
independent judiciary shaped the strategies of one of the coalitions, leading them 
to adopt litigation as one of their tools. However, party system fragmentation 
seemed to have little effect on the strategies different coalitions adopted.  
While the link between COS and coalition strategy is understudied in the 
field of public policy, social movement scholars have been studying it for 
decades. Kitschelt (1986) for example, compared anti-nuclear movements in four 
democracies (France, Sweden, United States, and West Germany) using the 
framework of “political opportunity structures” to understand the nature of the 
protest and varying political outcomes. He argues that, among other things, 
“political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the 
impact of social movements on their environments” (Kitschelt 1986, p. 58). 
Ultimately interested in the varying outcomes of the anti-nuclear protest 
movements in the four democracies, Kitschelt focuses on the role of institutional 
constraints faced by these movements. Borrowing loosely from the resource-
mobilization literature in the social protest research, Kitschelt argues that groups 
within social movements act as rational decision-makers choosing the best 
available strategies given the external opportunity structures they face.34 While 
                                                
34 For more on resource-mobilization and social protest, see McCarthy and Zald 
(1977).  
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cognizant of the fact that these opportunity structures do not explain the 
movements’ outcome in its entirety, the author argues that these in-built structures 
can still explain a good deal about how movements mobilize and what their 
outcome is. He hypothesizes that political systems with more open decision 
making structures allow coalitions to use more “assimilative” strategies, whereas 
coalitions operating within closed opportunity structures are forced to use 
“confrontational” strategies (Kitschelt 1986, 66). Assimilative strategies are those 
mechanisms that are employed through existing policy channels and institutional 
venues. Confrontational strategies, on the other hand, are employed outside of the 
already established institutional access points.  
Borrowing from Kitschelt’s (1986) operationalization of protest strategies, 
this chapter suggests that revisionist coalitions will adopt different strategies in 
pursuit of policy change based upon the openness of a political system and the 
resulting nature of the COS. Thus, the dependent variable of this chapter, 
coalition strategies, is measured using a dichotomous typology—assimilative 
versus confrontation strategies. The independent variables—COS—and their 
operationalization remains the same, identified along two dimensions: (1) the 
openness of a political system and (2) the degree of consensus needed in a 
political system for major policy change (Weible and Sabatier 2007). These will 
be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
I argue in this chapter that depending on the type of political system and 
COS, revisionist coalitions are afforded different “baseline” options for pursuing 
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their goals. In some cases, where enough opportunity structures are built in to the 
system to provide some prospect of success and the system is relatively open, 
revisionist coalitions will use assimilative strategies in pursuit of their policy goal. 
In other cases, where the systemic access points are absent and the system is 
closed, revisionist coalitions are forced to invent their own opportunity structures 
and are likely to use confrontational strategies to achieve their policy goals. In 
essence, in cases where the subsystem is inclusive rather than exclusive, 
revisionist coalitions have an incentive to work within the system and 
“assimilate”. On the other hand, in cases with a closed-off subsystem that tends to 
exclude important stakeholders, revisionist coalitions will tend to “confront” the 
system to try and topple the status quo.  
Using the cases of nuclear energy and forest management, the following 
two hypotheses explore the role played by COS and their impact on strategies 
adopted by coalitions: 
H1: In policy subsystems where decision-making authority is concentrated 
and access to decision-making is restricted, coalitions will adopt confrontational 
strategies such as public protest and rallies that are designed to disrupt the 
subsystem.  
H2: In policy subsystems where decision-making authority is dispersed 
and access to decision-making is open, coalitions will adopt assimilative 
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strategies such as deliberation, appeals, and petitions that are designed to work 
within the subsystem.   
The section below presents the research design, variable 
operationalization, data, and methods used in this chapter, followed by an in-
depth comparison of two policies in India: nuclear energy and forest management. 
The goal of this comparison is to capture the role of varying COS across 
subsystems. In addition, the role of varying COS within a single subsystem over 
time is analyzed using the case of forest management in India. After laying out 
the advocacy coalitions and opportunity structures that inhabit each subsystem, 
the findings section presents the results from the comparative analysis, which 
adds to and enriches the findings of the large-N study from chapters 3 and 4.  
5.3. Research Design, Variable Operationalization, and Data Collection 
5.3.1. Nuclear Facility Siting and Forest Management 
To test the hypotheses listed in the previous section, I analyze the 
subsystem dynamics associated with two different issue areas within India: 
nuclear energy and forest management. Any comparative analysis must clearly 
state why a particular case was chosen rather than others, and what the 
comparisons are going to be. With reference to the substantive issue areas 
analyzed in this chapter, the goal was to pick two somewhat similar mainstream 
policy areas that have historically received both political and public attention. 
Nuclear energy and forest management fit that description because they both 
inherently deal with the notion of resource management and resource allocation. 
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Nuclear energy in India is portrayed as the country’s answer to increasing energy 
deficits. Similarly, forest management is crucial in dealing with increasing 
population size and deforestation. The debate surrounding nuclear energy in India 
is topical and important, both because of the country’s policy to substantially 
expand the role of nuclear energy by building huge “energy parks”, and 
international focusing events like the Fukushima crisis. At the same time, the 
issue of nuclear energy is not new and has been an integral part of Indian energy 
policy since the 1940s. The forest management policy also represents an issue that 
has been part of the national development plan since India gained independence in 
1947. Both these issues lend themselves well to an ACF study, which is chiefly 
applicable for analyzing subsystems where a policy struggle has persisted for a 
decade or more.  
The reason for focusing on India is simple but significant: India provides a 
unique opportunity to apply the ACF to a non-western political system, where 
most of the scholarship has focused in the past. This is changing, with more 
studies attempting to push the limits of ACF to other contexts; this paper is a 
contribution in this direction. India has a parliamentary federal political system, 
but what makes it stand out most is its political diversity. India’s political 
landscape incorporates a wide variety of religious, caste, and class based 
platforms. It also has a strong role for regional and local political parties, which 
impacts the political resources advocacy coalitions have access to.  
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5.3.2. Variables and Measures 
5.3.2.1. Coalition Strategies 
The measure of coalition strategies employed in this chapter mirrors 
Kitschelt’s (1986) analysis, breaking them down into two main categories—
assimilative and confrontational. Assimilative strategies are those mechanisms 
that are employed through existing policy channels and institutional venues. 
Confrontational strategies, on the other hand, are employed outside of the already 
established institutional access points. Examples of assimilative strategies include 
lobbying, petitioning, judicial appeals, referendum campaigns, and participation 
in electoral campaigns. Confrontational strategies include methods such as civil 
disobedience, violent protests, demonstrations, and mass rallies. Assimilative 
strategies are employed by coalitions wishing to act “within” the system and bring 
about policy reform from the inside through peaceful means. Confrontational 
strategies, on the other hand, are employed by coalitions who find that they are 
“outsiders” to the subsystem and are thus forced to bring about policy reform 
through unconventional means. 
5.3.2.2. Coalition Opportunity Structures 
As discussed in previous chapters, the ACF operationalizes COS along 
two dimensions—relative openness of a political system and the degree of 
consensus required for policy change in that system. Unlike chapters 3 and 4 
where quantitative measures of COS were developed, this chapter measures COS 
qualitatively. To achieve this, I measure and trace the evolution of COS at the 
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subsystem level as a function of the openness of the subsystem and the degree of 
concentration of decision making authority. These characteristics are determined 
by the level of hierarchy of the institutional setup within the subsystem, the 
distribution of political authority, and how open the system is to outside actors.  
In addition to exploring a new mechanism through which COS can impact 
policy change (i.e. coalition strategies), this chapter also expands the way in 
which these structures are measured. Both Kübler’s (2001) research, and its 
subsequent incorporation into the broader ACF framework has focused on the 
opportunity structures that exist at the national or system level. All of the 
variables laid out by Kübler--the degree of territorial decentralization, of 
functional separation of power, of party system fragmentation, as well as by the 
extent of direct democratic procedures—capture institutional variation at the 
national level. I argue that in addition to opportunity structures at the national 
level, there exist crucial parallel dynamics at the subsystem level; and including 
these critical features that exist at the domain specific subsystem level can 
increase our explanatory power.35 For example, a cursory look at the national 
                                                
35 This conception of unique subsystem level COS and their influence on coalition 
strategies is reminiscent of the argument made by Jeremy Richardson (1982) and 
Gary Freeman (1985) in the field of comparative public policy. The authors 
argued that in addition to focusing on “national” styles of policy making, scholars 
should pay attention how different “sub-national” policy sectors shape the politics 
surrounding them and the policy outcomes that result from these policy styles.  
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level suggests that India is a relatively open system (federal, multi-party), where 
multiple access points exist for different types of actors to seek to influence the 
policymaking process. One could argue that the parliamentary arena in India 
provides coalitions with some unique avenues for action. The multi-party system 
and coalition governments, which has flourished in India since the late 1980s, aids 
coalitions with additional access points in the policy making process.  
5.3.3. Data 
The qualitative content analysis presented in this chapter required data that 
allow the researcher to record and evaluate the different types of strategies 
employed by the revisionist coalitions in each case. Before this is possible, 
however, revisionist coalitions had to be identified. To do this, an exhaustive 
search on Google News database for newspaper articles about each case, as well 
as on Google Scholar, Google Books for scholarly accounts of each case was 
conducted. During this search, groups were defined as part of a revisionist 
coalition if: (1) they expressed anti-nuclear or anti-state forest control policy core 
beliefs and (2) there was evidence that they coordinated their efforts with like-
minded revisionist groups. Since this chapter does not analyze the strategies 
employed by status quo coalitions (pro-nuclear and pro-state forest control 
groups), these are not explicitly identified here.  
Once the list of revisionist coalitions was complete, the search for the 
various strategies used by these revisionist coalitions commenced. These were 
primarily derived from public consumption documents (such as those available on 
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the website by the anti-nuclear coalition in the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant 
(JNPP) called “Jaitapur Speaks”), newspaper accounts (both national and local 
archives accessed through Google News), petitions and letters written to the 
government, and existing historical accounts. These were collected and evaluated 
in two phases. In the first phase, an exhaustive search for any documents and 
accounts directly related to the coalitions was conducted. The websites of 
coalition groups were also combed for any available documents. During this 
search, any strategies or mechanisms used by the coalitions were archived.  
In the second phase, the archived list of strategies and mechanisms was 
evaluated using a base rubric, which divided the strategies according to their core 
type: assimilative or confrontational. Again, assimilative strategies work within 
the established policy channels whereas confrontational strategies work outside 
the existing access points. Additionally, assimilative strategies aim to maintain the 
system while at the same time influencing how policies are made and 
implemented. However, confrontational strategies aim to overhaul the existing 
system and bring about a larger change affecting the underlying structure as well 
as the proximate implementation of the policy.     
5.3.2. Methods 
The analysis that follows compares the issues of nuclear energy and forest 
management in India using the most similar systems approach (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970; Lijphart 1971). Based on Mill’s method of difference or similarity, 
the logic of comparison used in this approach is quite simple—if you have two 
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systems that are similar but diverge on the dependent variable, you should look to 
any existing differences in order to establish the reason for the divergence.  To 
illustrate the influence of COS both within and across subsystems, the chapter 
employs this method in two different ways. First, the comparative method of 
similarity is used to analyze and compare the nuclear energy subsystem to date 
and the forest management subsystem in the post-1970s. Second, the same 
method is used to analyze and compare the forest management subsystem in India 
during two separate time periods, one being from the mid-19th century to the late 
1970s and the other beginning in the late 1970s. The subsystem during these two 
time periods is similar on most accounts, including the coalitions involved and the 
seemingly irresolvable goal conflicts surrounding it. The choice of similar cases 
within the same national context allows for a comparison of the two issues and the 
influence the COS might have on coalition strategies. Simultaneously, the 
decision to study forest management was also driven by the resulting opportunity 
to compare the same issue across two different time periods. This type of 
comparison allows for everything except the changing COS to be held constant, 
which helps highlight the impact these changes might have on coalition strategies. 
As a result, the comparative method applied here is simple but effective. This 
chapter employs two different comparisons, one studying the role of opportunity 
structures across different subsystems and the other within a single subsystem 
over time.  
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It is also important to note that for the purposes of analytical simplification 
and clarity, this chapter focuses on revisionist coalitions in each issue area. 
Revisionist coalitions are those coalitions that form and exist specifically to 
challenge the existing status quo. In the case of nuclear energy, revisionist 
coalitions are those coalitions that form to challenge the construction of specific 
nuclear power plants. In the case of forest management, revisionist coalitions are 
those coalitions that form to challenge the rising state control over national 
forests. For the nuclear energy subsystem, the chapter focuses on the strategies 
adopted by anti-nuclear coalitions during the siting of two nuclear power plants in 
different parts of India—Jaitapur nuclear power plant in Maharashtra and 
Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. For the forest management 
subsystem, the chapter analyzes the strategies adopted by anti-state forest control 
coalitions during the two separate time periods—before and after the 
implementation of the JFM policy in various states across India.   
5.4. Analytical Procedure 
This section begins by presenting a brief description of the coalitions that 
inhabit the nuclear energy policy subsystem and the COS they function within.36 
                                                
36 The definition of coalitions in this chapter corresponds with that of most ACF 
studies, where groups with share beliefs engage in a nontrivial degree of 
coordination. Coalitions are identified, for the purposes of this chapter, during the 
historical analysis of each case. However, in both cases, the coalitions were 
largely localized and limited around the area most affected by the policy. 
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This includes the history of nuclear energy in India, the nature of its nuclear 
establishment, and other relevant institutional characteristics. Following this, a 
parallel description of the forest management policy subsystem is presented, 
which includes a description of the COS surrounding the forest management 
subsystem and major changes that occurred in 1990 after the adoption of the Joint 
Forest Management (JFM) policy.  
5.4.1. Nuclear Energy Subsystem in India 
The nuclear energy subsystem in India is inhabited by two main coalitions. 
The first coalition, which includes pro-nuclear actors and organizations, are united 
by their belief that nuclear energy is the only feasible solution to the country’s 
increasing energy deficits. The second coalition, which is comprised of anti-
nuclear actors including interest groups and national and international NGOs, 
believes that nuclear energy is dangerous and unnecessary (Bidwai and Ramana 
2007; Rao and Ramana 2008). The foundations for the strong and autonomous 
nuclear establishment were laid in the 1940s and 50s when under the leadership of 
Jawahar Lal Nehru (then prime minister), India institutionalized its existing 
atomic research wing. The Board of Atomic Research was set up, led by physicist 
Homi Bhabha, also known as the father of the nuclear program in India (Frey 
2006: 33). Bhabha, who shared a close personal and professional relationship with 
Nehru, recommended in 1948 that “[T]he development of atomic energy should 
be entrusted to a very small and high powered body composed of say, three 
people with executive power, and answerable directly to the Prime Minister 
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without any intervening link. For brevity, this body may be referred to as the 
Atomic Energy Commission” (Venkatraman 1994: 145). This marked the 
beginning of a small but powerful nuclear program in India.  
The COS surrounding this subsystem consist of a few intricately linked 
organizations, that are uniquely autonomous and closed-off from external scrutiny 
(Tellis 2001: 6; Ramana and Kumar 2010: 53). Unlike other public sector 
organizations that are accountable to the national legislative body, the nuclear 
establishment is constitutionally placed under the direct authority of the Prime 
Minister of India (Frey 2006: 61; Abraham 1999). Critics of India’s nuclear 
establishment argue that policymaking related to nuclear issues has historically 
been handled by the Indian Prime Minister in a personal ad hoc manner, based on 
input from a key group of elite bureaucrats and scientists (Frey 2006: 49). At the 
top of the nuclear establishment apex lays the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), which was set up in 1948 under the Atomic Energy Act. The AEC was 
formulated for promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy in India (Frey 2006: 
49). Following this, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was established in 
1954 for carrying out all activities related to the research and development of 
nuclear energy and commercial reactor operation (Ramana 2012). As mentioned 
before, these organizations are intricately linked to one another. For instance, 
there have been instances where the Secretary of the DAE has also served as the 
chairman of the AEC. Starting in 1954, the AEC was responsible for formulating 
the policies of the DAE for the consideration and approval of the Prime Minister 
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along with the implementation of official policy in all matters concerning atomic 
energy (Reddy and Ramana 2003: 213-214).  
The DAE consists of a number of subsidiary organizations, including five 
research centers, five government owned companies (“public sector enterprises”), 
three industrial organizations, and three service organizations (DAE 2010). The 
research centers include the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indira 
Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), and Atomic Mineral Directorate 
(AMD). The public sector enterprises include the Nuclear Power Corporation of 
India Limited (NPCIL), Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam (BHAVINI), and 
Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL). Of these, the NPCIL is 
responsible for designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating nuclear 
power reactors throughout the country. Breeder reactors are the responsibility of 
BHAVINI and UCIL is in charge of mining and milling of uranium. Finally, the 
nuclear establishment also contains the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board 
(AERB), which is responsible for the safety of all nuclear installations that have 
not been demarcated as military, including research reactors, reprocessing 
facilities, and uranium enrichment plants. AERB also regulates other facilities in 
the country that involve radiation in some way, for example, medical facilities and 
educational laboratories that use radiation sources. The AERB is also intricately 
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linked to the nuclear establishment, and it is constitutionally required to “be 
responsible to the AEC.”37  
5.4.2. Forest Management Subsystem in India 
Much like the nuclear energy subsystem, the forest management 
subsystem in India is characterized by seemingly irresolvable goal conflicts, as 
well as conflicting beliefs and interests. The two primary coalitions that inhabit 
this subsystem are: the state and the forest industry, which includes groups united 
by their belief that forests are a national asset and therefore, should be used for 
national interests. The second coalition includes the villages, tribes, and local 
populations surrounding forests united by their belief that forests are a community 
resource that should be used to sustain their daily livelihood (Tiwary 2004: 7). 
These coalitions have taken form over long periods of time, as a result of 
historical practices adopted by the state as well as village communities. 
Historically, forests played a crucial role in India, both in the form of revenue for 
the government (resulting from the production of goods such as timber, paper, 
bamboo, and pine resin), and in the form of daily livelihood for tribes and other 
rural populations. State monopoly over forests was instated during the British rule 
                                                
37 For more on the constitutional order specifying the role and powers of the 
AERB, see 
http://www.aerb.gov.in/AERBPortal/pages/English/Constitution/gazzette_aboutU
s.action (Last accessed on 11/13/2013).  
 
 
132 
in the 19th century, with the abolishment of local rights over forest land, and the 
belief that forests are a national resource that should serve national interests 
(Guha 1983). For village communities and tribal populations, forests represented 
a source of food and raw materials that helped them to sustain their daily 
livelihood.  
Beginning in the 1970s, forestry became a contested environmental issue, 
primarily due to the vast amounts of forest cover that has been lost as a result of 
deforestation. Both coalitions offer different explanations for this deforestation: 
on the one hand, the state forest departments argue that unscientific practices 
followed by the villages and tribes are the culprit. For example tribes in the states 
of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa used forests for engaging in shifting agriculture or 
“podu” cultivation. Considered as a way of life, podu cultivation requires them to 
move from place to place, leaving the ecology of the land in shambles. On the 
other hand, villagers argue that indigenous practices have maintained a balanced 
ecosystem for centuries, and it is state acquisition of forest land that has disrupted 
this balance (Guha 1983; Guha and Gadgil 1989; Sen 1992). At the heart of this 
debate is the issue of “access” to forest land and how best to manage it, something 
that has been contested or decades.  
The nature of the COS surrounding this subsystem can be divided into two 
eras: the pre-1970s and the post-1970s. The foundations for COS that define the 
pre-1970s era can be traced back to the Indian Forest Act of 1865 passed under 
colonial rule, giving the “imperial Forest Departments” the power to declare any 
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land covered with trees as government owned, and to make the necessary rules to 
manage them (Guha 1983). The goal was to provide the government with 
extensive control over forests, and allow them to maximize the production and 
sale of commercial products such as timber (Guha and Gadgil 1989). The nature 
of this forest management regime during this period led to large scale conflicts 
between the government and the local people who were dependent on forests for 
daily sustenance. After 1947, independent India continued on this path of 
alienating people from the forests, and accentuating the conflictual relationship 
between the government and the local communities. The opportunity structure 
during this period was characterized by a limited number of decision making 
venues, low accessibility levels, and low degrees of consensus required for policy 
change, where most policy decisions were restricted to high-level political and 
bureaucratic personnel.  
Beginning in the late 1970s, there were several social forestry programs 
developed to deal with rising deforestation and the seemingly incongruent 
interests of the two coalitions (Robinson 1998). These programs, above all, aimed 
to put the power back into the hands of the people. The most recent and most 
widely implemented of these is the Joint Forest Management (JFM) policy, which 
was introduced in 1990 (Agarwal 1999). Under this policy, states are given 
directives by the federal Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) wherein 
they are advised to reach out and engage the local communities. In a nutshell, this 
program was put in place “for giving to the village communities living close to 
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the forest land usufructory benefits to ensure their participation in the 
afforestation programme. …if they successfully protect the forests, they may be 
given a portion of the proceeds from the sale of trees when they mature” 
(Government Of India 1990, cited in Tiwary 2004: 22). Unlike the centre heavy 
policy formulation and implementation in the case of nuclear energy, the COS 
surrounding forest management in India provides considerable autonomy to state 
and local officials. It is up to the Forest Department (FD) in each state, for 
example, to formulate how the JFM policy will be implemented, including how to 
name village forest committees, what the actual size and structure of these 
committees will be, and how much forest produce the villagers will have access to 
(Tiwary 2004). At the grassroots level, this policy is implemented by a general 
body that consists of one member from every village household, an executive 
committee that is elected from this general body called forest protection 
committees (FPCs) (Murali, Murthy, and Ravindranath 2006). In addition to local 
populations, this policy has also accommodated NGOs by urging them to play the 
role of a mediator between the locals and the state officials, and by educating 
people and raising their awareness about forest management (Saxena 1997).  
From this brief overview of these two subsystems and their respective 
COS, a few main features stand out. Perhaps the biggest distinction lies in the way 
that the structures of the nuclear energy subsystem and the forest management 
subsystem in the post 1970s differ greatly despite the fact that they exist within 
the same overarching federal structure. The nuclear energy subsystem is 
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characterized by a limited number of decision making venues, low accessibility 
levels, and low degrees of consensus required for policy change that provides a 
few key federal agencies the power to dictate everything. In contrast, the forest 
management subsystem is characterized by a larger number of decision making 
venues, high accessibility, and a high degree of consensus required that  provides 
greater discretion to state and divisional authorities as well as more opportunities 
for revisionist coalitions to become part of the policy process. Even though the 
level of decentralization varies, both subsystems are comprised of competing 
coalitions with seemingly irresolvable goals, values, and interests. In the case of 
the nuclear energy subsystem, state officials believe in the usefulness of nuclear 
energy and its importance for the continued development of the nation; contrasted 
by local communities and activists who categorically oppose nuclear energy as a 
viable solution. Similarly, in the case of the forest management subsystem, the 
two competing coalitions have differing views on how to protect forests and 
prevent further deforestation.  
The next section of the chapter explores the strategies adopted by 
revisionist coalitions in both subsystems. If my hypotheses are correct, we should 
see the adoption of different strategies in the two issue areas. Specifically, the 
strategies adopted by anti-state forest control coalitions in the post-1970s forest 
management subsystem should be less disruptive and less challenging to the 
system that those adopted by the anti-nuclear coalitions in the nuclear energy 
subsystem and the anti-state forest control coalitions in the pre-1970s forest 
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management subsystem. This is because the decentralized nature of the post-
1970s forest management subsystem should provide more autonomy to state and 
local groups, giving them greater opportunities to work within the system to 
further their policy positions. Some scholars have argued that “the participatory 
regime resulted in the transition of the Forest Department from a “closed system” 
to an “open” one, where cross-sectoral integration gained importance” 
(Chaturvedi and Godbole 2005: 13). The persistent centralized nature of the 
nuclear energy subsystem on the other hand has worked to curtail these 
opportunities, forcing opposition groups to work outside the subsystem and try to 
disrupt it.  
5.5. Findings 
This section explores the different strategies adopted by coalitions in the 
two subsystems. For the nuclear energy subsystem, the chapter focuses on the 
strategies adopted by anti-nuclear coalitions during the siting of two nuclear 
power plants in different parts of India—Jaitapur nuclear power plant in 
Maharashtra and Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. For the forest 
management subsystem, the chapter analyzes the strategies adopted by anti-state 
forest control coalitions during the two separate time periods—before and after 
the implementation of the JFM policy in various states across India.  
5.5.1. Strategies Adopted by Anti-Nuclear Coalitions 
Currently, India has a total of 20 nuclear reactors that produce roughly 
2.8% of the total electricity. In 2005, the nuclear energy industry received a major 
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impetus when India and the US signed a treaty allowing them to trade in civilian 
nuclear raw materials (Potter 2005; Levi et. al. 2006; Perkovich 2010). Following 
this, the Indian government announced plans to expand the role of nuclear energy 
with the construction of four new ‘energy parks’ across the country. The Jaitapur 
Nuclear Power Plant (JNPP) in the western state of Maharashtra and Kudankulam 
Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) in the southern state of Tamil Nadu are two of these 
energy parks.38 Feasibility studies for the JNPP project began in 2002, and the site 
was approved in 2005.39 Despite receiving additional regulatory and 
environmental clearance in December 2010, construction has yet to begin. KNPP 
on the other hand, has finished constructing its first reactor unit but has yet to 
produce any electricity. It has been at this stage for over 18 months now, facing 
significant delays that have contributed to rising costs associated with the project 
(world-nuclear-news.org 2012). Efforts by the anti-nuclear coalitions have 
presumably played a part in delaying the progress at both projects, making it 
imperative to study the strategies that these coalitions have adopted.40 Although 
                                                
38 The other two proposed sites include Kakrapar in Gujarat and Rawatbhata in 
Rajasthan. 
39 “A Brief on Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project,” accessed via the Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India Limited’s webpage, available at: 
http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/A_Brief_on_JNPP.pdf.  
40 Looking at the impact these strategies have had on the siting process is an 
interesting empirical question, but it remains outside the scope of this study.  
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the efforts have been led by different coalitions, both cases of nuclear facility 
siting witnessed several common strategies. In particular, both coalitions have 
resorted to the use of two main strategies in their campaigns against the 
projects—mass mobilization efforts using tactics such as rallies, protests, and 
hunger strikes; and venue shopping strategies using tactics such as legal petitions.  
In Jaitapur, following the environmental approval in December 2010, 
protests intensified at the site. Led by local activist organizations such as Janhit 
Seva Samiti (JSS) and Konkan Vinashkari Prakalp Bachao Samiti (KVPBS), 
people from surrounding villages protested on the streets, attempting to block 
officials from going to the site. The intensity of the protests can be judged from 
the fact that the local police was forced to make mass arrests after warnings to 
retreat were ignored by the protestors. The following statement from a news 
article covering the protests on the streets of Jaitapur offers a description, 
“[H]undreds of activists protesting the Jaitapur nuclear power project Tuesday 
blocked traffic and torched trucks and buses in different parts of Ratnagiri to 
protest the police firing a day ago in which one person was killed. … More than 
two thousand people took part in the demonstrations against the proposed 9,900-
MW JNPP coming up in Jaitapur” (nerve.in 2011). Continuing this strategy of 
mass mobilization using protests, the anti-nuclear coalition in Jaitapur also 
organized rallies in the national capital of Delhi, hoping to get more publicity and 
spread the word. Approximately 1500 people marched from Mandi House to 
Jantar Mantar in New Delhi. According to an interview conducted by an Indian 
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magazine Tehelka with one of the coalition members, their strategy included 
expanding the scope of conflict as much as possible by incorporating more people 
from across the country (Schattschneider 1957). For instance, he stated that “We 
are also trying to mobilise people from Haryana, Bhavnagar, Mithivirdi where 
nuclear plants are coming up” (Ghanekar 2011). A similar story can be told about 
KNPP, where the anti-nuclear coalition is led by an activist group called People’s 
Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE). In order to mobilize people and 
launch their anti-nuclear campaign in South India, the coalition urged people to 
adopt Gandhian means of protest. Among other things, this included the adoption 
of indefinite fasting by men and women from villages surrounding the site for 
nine days (hindustantimes.com 2012a). The fast was initiated in response to the 
government’s decision to approve the commissioning of the project 
(indiatoday.intoday.in 2012a).   
In addition to efforts of mass mobilization, anti-nuclear coalitions in both 
cases adopted strategies of venue shopping, including legal petitions and 
formation of citizen-led advisory panels. Note that these were independent panels, 
formed and funded without government aid. For example, the anti-nuclear 
coalition in Jaitapur formed a people’s tribunal composed of a panel of three 
former high court justices. The aim of this tribunal was to provide the people with 
a platform to speak about their grievances and to implement an independent study 
of the likely social and environmental effects of the project (Deshpande 2011). 
The coalition also petitioned to the regional high court against the manner in 
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which the government was acquiring the land for the project, how the 
environmental impact assessment was carried out, and the lack of information 
provided to the people. Similarly, the anti-nuclear coalition in Kudankulam has 
petitioned to the regional high court on multiple occasions. In the most recent 
petition, the coalition has argued that clearance given by the Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board (AERB), the national regulator, is premature and does not take 
into account the full security review conducted by a task force 
(hindustantimes.com 2012b). The petition stated that on behalf of the people of 
Kudankulam, we (environmental activists) file this petition “to undertake a fresh 
review of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project by affording an opportunity to the 
public to express their views on the feasibility of commissioning Kudankulam 
Nuclear Power Project and forbearing the respondents from commissioning the 
said project until such review is completed in all respects” (Sundarrajan 2011). 
The coalition has also filed other Public Interest Litigations (PILs) based on the 
lack of transparency of the siting process, and the absence of sufficient emergency 
preparedness to ensure the safety of local communities (indiatoday.intoday.in 
2012b). At one point, the Madras High Court was hearing a total of 17 PILs.  
5.5.2. Strategies Adopted by Anti-State Forest Control Coalitions 
Historically, anti-state forest control coalitions (which consisted of local 
villagers and tribes) have long employed the strategy of mass mobilization against 
private forest reservation by the government. This strategy can be traced back to 
the 1850s (popularly known as forest satyagraha), and continued until the Forest 
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Policy Act of 1988 was passed, ultimately leading to the adoption of JFM policy 
in 1990. United by their belief that forests are a crucial means of subsistence and 
daily livelihood for them, villagers and local populations all across India protested 
the leasing of forests to private contractors leading to tree felling and 
deforestation (Weber 1989). Perhaps the most widely cited example of these 
coalitions’ use of mass mobilization strategy is the “Chipko Movement” or 
“Embrace-the-Tree” movement, which originated in the Garhwal Himalayas of 
Uttar Pradesh in the 1970s. Similar to the anti-nuclear coalitions’ strategies in 
recent years, the Chipko Movement was inspired by Gandhian values of civil 
disobedience. For example, in 1978 a villager in Badiyargarh went on an 
indefinite fast as a protest against tree felling in the local forest (Shiva and 
Bandyopadhyay 1986). This movement was successful in achieving a 15 year 
long ban on tree felling in the state of Uttar Pradesh by then Prime Minister, 
Indira Gandhi (Mawdsley 1998). The movement soon spread to other parts of 
India including Uttaranchal, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Karnataka. The 
core belief of the movement was that forests must be maintained as a source of 
sustained ecology, not used as a fleeting source of commerce and industry. In 
some ways, this movement was a culmination of the prolonged struggle of this 
coalition against post-colonial policies such as the zamindari (landlord) system, 
which had solidified private ownership of traditionally common village resources 
(Shiva and Bandyopadhyay 1986). The Chipko Movement played a significant 
role in the adoption of the JFM policy in 1990, which came with the realization 
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that the government could no longer alienate the people from the forests. This 
shift in core values can be attributed to several factors. In the early 1980s, Indira 
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, placed a 15-year long ban on tree felling in 
several states, including Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, and Himachal Pradesh. This 
victory of the Chipko movement and several smaller anti-state forest control 
efforts reflects a shift in the values of the governing regime. Simultaneously, there 
was also an increase in the levels of ecological awareness among the Indian 
masses, providing critical momentum to the anti-forest control coalitions.  
Shifting the official policy from maximizing state interests (such as 
maximization of timber production) to increasingly using state owned forest land 
for ecological purposes required overhauling the relationship between the forest 
department employees and local villagers. The biggest change with the advent of 
this policy was in the way that the COS surrounding this subsystem were defined. 
Before the adoption of the policy of JFM, most of the political and administrative 
power was concentrated in the hands of upper level bureaucrats starting from the 
minister of environment and forests, which is a political appointment. Below him 
were other bureaucratic layers that included the secretary of environment and 
forests, the principal chief conservator of forests and the chief conservator of 
forests (Tiwary 2004). Even though there existed state officials at the local 
level—the range forest officer, the beat officer, and the forest guard—their role 
was limited and they were trained to deal with villagers and forest encroachers by 
policing them and often arresting or fining them. However, under the new policy, 
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the states began to actively engage people and make them a part of the decision-
making apparatus. The biggest shift in the opportunity structure came with the 
setting up of FPCs at the village level, which were composed of villagers, placing 
them in charge of forest protection. So the anti-state forest control coalitions now 
found themselves to be a part of the system, possibly leading them to revise their 
strategies. To give you an idea of the extent of the possible decentralization, by 
2001, 27 out of 28 states had adopted this policy; instituting a total of about 
63,000 FPCs (MOEF 2001). The change in strategies is evident in the way that 
these coalitions have shaped their response to government actions in different 
parts of India.41 In contrast to earlier strategies aimed at changing the balance of 
power within the subsystem, these coalitions now focused on ensuring that the 
implementation of the JFM policy was as efficient as possible. For example, 
village FPCs commonly expressed their grievances regarding a lack of 
administrative and financial freedom. State FDs have been slow to hand over 
                                                
41 The “coalition” is united by its belief that state owned forests rightly belong to 
the people, and thus, should be handed over to them. However, because of the 
localized nature of this policy issue, the actual coalitions were composed of 
different local actors in various forested zones throughout India. While the 
coordination among local anti-state forest control coalitions is minimal, there 
were some national efforts like the “Chipko Movement” and the “Save Himalaya 
Movement” that super ceded local boundaries and had regional and/or national 
implications. 
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decision-making responsibilities to FPCs for issuing contracts and implementing 
strict protection rules. In the state of Gujarat, for instance, FPCs raided houses to 
confiscate illegally poached wood. However, when it came to decisions about 
what should be done with the confiscated goods, the FD overruled the FPCs 
(Saxena 1997: 134). In addition to the issue of administrative and financial 
freedom, there has also been some pushback from the villagers regarding the role 
of women in FPCs. It is argued that women do not have the required legal rights, 
and are not adequately represented under this policy framework (Roy 1992; 
Saxena 1997). The crucial difference between the more recent complaints and the 
earlier grievances is the manner in which they were expressed. Instead of mass 
protests, more recent complaints are generally expressed through peaceful 
administrative channels, such as talking to local forest officials.  
In sum, it is evident from comparing the two subsystems that the distinct 
characteristics of the COS at the subsystem level influenced coalition strategies in 
an expected manner. In the case of the nuclear energy subsystem, the lack of 
openness (i.e. small number of decision making venues and low accessibility) and 
the lack of consensus required for policy change alienated the anti-nuclear 
coalition, leading it to adopt strategies aimed at disrupting the system. We also 
saw similar strategies adopted by the anti-state forest control coalitions in the pre-
1970s forest management subsystem. Again, these strategies were driven in part 
by the closed nature of the COS at the subsystem level and a general lack of 
consensus required for policy change. In contrast, the strategies adopted by anti-
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state forest control coalitions in the post-1970s forest management subsystem 
were less disruptive, due in part to the proliferations of decision making venues, 
higher accessibility levels, and higher degrees of consensus required following the 
adoption of the JFM policy. These findings, albeit preliminary, support the 
proposed hypotheses, and illustrate the influence of varying COS both within and 
across subsystems. In the future, I plan to measure and trace coalition strategies 
and tactics used by revisionist coalitions in a way that allows for streamlined data 
collection. Doing so will help to confirm the findings of this chapter and test the 
validity of the measures presented here.  
5.6. Conclusions 
The findings presented in this chapter provide important insights into 
opportunity structures, their influence on strategies that revisionist coalitions 
pursue, and the applicability of the ACF to India. The analysis provides 
qualitative support for the hypotheses listed above. Again, I hypothesized that 
subsystems with a limited number of decision-making venues and restricted 
access to these venues will lead revisionist coalitions to adopt confrontation 
strategies. On the other hand, subsystems with a large number of decision-making 
venues and open access to these venues will lead revisionist coalitions to adopt 
assimilative strategies. Findings suggest that policy subsystems where the number 
of decision-making venues is small and the accessibility to those venues is limited 
lead coalitions to adopt confrontational strategies such as public protest, hunger 
strikes, and rallies that are designed to disrupt the subsystem status quo. This was 
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evidenced in the strategies adopted by the anti-nuclear coalitions in the cases of 
JNPP and KNPP, and the anti-state forest control coalitions during the “Chipko 
movement”. By contrast, findings from policy subsystems with relatively open 
decision-making processes illustrate that revisionist coalitions operating in these 
subsystems are likely to adopt assimilative strategies such as deliberation, 
appeals, and petitions that are designed to work within the subsystem status quo. 
This was evident in the case of JFM beginning in 1970, when the subsystem COS 
were sufficiently reorganized providing the previously excluded anti-state forest 
control coalitions more access to decision-making. This resulted in these 
coalitions altering their strategies from attempts to disrupt the subsystem through 
protests, to now work within the subsystem in an attempt to make it more 
efficient. Despite these distinctions, it is important to note that that coalitions 
operating in centralized subsystems can also use deliberative methods. For 
example, the anti-nuclear coalitions in the case of both JNPP and KNPP used 
judicial appeals as a strategy.  
The chapter contributes to the broader ACF literature in the following 
ways: first, the multi-layered comparative analysis of how opportunity structures 
can vary both across subsystems and within subsystems over time is an interesting 
addition to the existing methods of illustrating the role of COS adopted by 
previous scholars. Second, by refining the concept of COS to include subsystem 
level dynamics this research is a step towards bolstering the generalizability of the 
ACF and its applicability in different institutional and political settings. The third 
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contribution relates to the insights of this analysis regarding political behavior and 
strategies that fill a significant gap in public policy. Scholars in the field of 
comparative politics have long studied the concept of political opportunity 
structures and how they affect group behavior and social movements. Bringing 
the concept into mainstream comparative public policy and theories of the policy 
process research marks an attempt to build an important bridge between the fields. 
Doing so can help assimilate knowledge across both fields. The social movement 
literature can draw from the detailed analysis of coalition formation and 
subsystem level dynamics; whereas the policy process literature can benefit from 
the use of the comparative method as well as knowledge of varying institutional 
and political contexts.  
Finally, this chapter marks the first attempt to apply the ACF in India and 
the findings illustrate that for the most part, the framework of COS within the 
ACF does an adequate job of explaining the variation in coalition strategies in the 
two policy areas. Nonetheless, the findings from the analysis should be 
generalized with some caution. India with its unique and diverse political, social, 
and economic features could skew some findings from the analysis.  The 
differences in strategies and behavior of the coalitions in the two issue areas could 
also be a result of underlying distinctions of the nature of these issues. Nuclear 
energy and forest management are different, but were comparable in this instance 
due to their similar underlying division into competing coalitions along the lines 
of seemingly irresolvable goal conflicts. It is somewhat difficult to say whether 
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the strategies adopted by revisionist coalition within the nuclear energy issue are a 
result of the inherent nature of that policy area. However, as the analysis 
demonstrates, the revisionist coalitions in the forest management subsystem also 
used confrontational strategies in the pre-1970s phase, suggesting that the nature 
of the policy is not the sole driver of coalition strategies. In the future, the 
preliminary results of shown here could be strengthened with a more detailed 
analysis of the issue areas, perhaps across different countries and across different 
issues. The concept of COS at both the national and subsystem level also requires 
continued attention, as doing so would allow us to better our understanding of 
how and why actors/groups act the way they do. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future 
Research 
6.1. Conclusions 
This dissertation was motivated by the pressing need to understand the 
dynamics behind Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULUs); why are some efforts to 
site contentious facilities (like nuclear facilities, prisons, landfills, and airports) 
successful and not others? As with most dissertations, I commenced the project by 
examining previous research on siting contentious facilities, specifically nuclear 
facilities. The literature review revealed, among other things, that scholarship on 
siting nuclear facilities is somewhat disparate, with most studies focusing on risk 
perceptions and risk alleviation at the individual level. To complement this array 
of scholarship, this dissertation studied the influence of political and institutional 
contexts—in the form of COS—on siting outcomes. The primary empirical 
research question that motivated the dissertation was: does variation in coalition 
opportunity structures influence the siting of nuclear facilities? If so, how? This 
structural approach to studying contentious siting fills an important gap in the 
empirical literature and provides a core theoretical framework that can be used to 
study contentious facility siting in the future. While this dissertation focuses on 
structural variations and how they might affect the policy process, this does not 
imply that these are the only variables that matter. As the literature review in 
chapters 1 and 2 illustrated, scholars have studied a wide array of influential 
factors, ranging from individual risk assessments to policy design and 
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implementation. This dissertation focused on the study COS because of the 
relative dearth of scholarship (both empirical and theoretical) on how these 
structures shape and influence the policy process. The goal is to understand the 
role played by COS, and to use the knowledge generated in this dissertation to 
complement what we already know about siting contentious facilities and the 
policy process more generally.  
The findings from chapters 3, 4, and 5 explore the relationship between 
COS and three different elements of the siting process—the final policy outcome 
of the siting process, the emergence of organized opposition to siting, and the 
strategies used by revisionist coalitions. With reference to the emergence of 
organized opposition to siting, the findings indicated that the norms of consensus 
in a political system (as measured by the existence of stakeholder engagement 
measures) affect the likelihood that revisionist coalitions will emerge. On average, 
siting efforts that incorporated stakeholder engagement mechanisms of some sort 
witnessed more organized opposition in the form of revisionist coalitions. This is 
an interesting and important finding, and its possible policy implications will be 
discussed in the next section. Findings from chapter 5 provided strong qualitative 
evidence that the nature of the opportunity structures at the subsystem level 
influences the strategies that these revisionist coalitions use in pursuit of policy 
change. In particular, I found that revisionist coalitions in closed, centralized 
subsystem are more likely to use confrontational strategies like public protest and 
rallies designed to disrupt the subsystem than revisionist coalitions that exist in 
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open, decentralized subsystems. Coalitions that occupy subsystems with more 
open and decentralized COS tended to adopt assimilative strategies such as 
deliberation, appeals, and petitions that are designed to work within the 
subsystem. These findings have important theoretical implications about the 
expected patterns of behavior of coalitions within distinct kinds of subsystems. 
On the one hand, confrontational strategies within closed and/or centralized 
subsystems may increase the likelihood of conflict and contention, which can in 
turn be disruptive to the policy process. On the other hand, open subsystems with 
multiple points of access can lead to significant delays and political deadlocks. 
From a policy efficacy standpoint, it may be that the latter are more desirable 
because ultimately, they engender institutional trust and confidence rather than 
disdain.  
Finally, with reference to the relationship between COS and policy 
change, two dimensions of COS stood out—the number of decision making 
venues in a political system, and the accessibility of those venues. The number of 
decision making venues, as described in chapter 3, were operationalized using an 
additive index based on the following key institutional characteristics—strength 
of federalism, strength of bicameralism, executive-legislative separation of power 
and regulatory insulation/independence. The accessibility of these venues was 
operationalized using a combination of two measures—competitiveness of 
participation in a polity and the degree to which that participation is regulated by 
the government. Both of these variables were shown to directly affect the 
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likelihood of policy change (whether or not a nuclear facility becomes 
operational). Subsystems with relatively sparse decision making venues were less 
likely to experience policy change than subsystems with multiple decision-
making venues. This pattern is consistent with the notion that decision-making 
venues provide opponents to the status quo with opportunities to disrupt the 
policy status quo and bring about policy change. The larger the number of 
decision-making venues, the more likely this is. The accessibility of these 
decision-making venues also matters. Venues that are easier to access will attract 
revisionist coalitions and provide them with extra incentives in their attempt to 
disrupt the status quo.  
In addition to these findings, the analysis in this dissertation fills a 
theoretical vacuum in the public policy literature. The concept of COS used to 
answer the empirical questions outlined above is underspecified and largely 
untested within the field of public policy. In addressing these empirical questions, 
this dissertation provides an example of how to measure and empirically explore 
the role of COS in the policy process. The primary theoretical impetus behind this 
dissertation is: what are the mechanisms through which coalition opportunity 
structures influence the policy process? By and large, the findings from the three 
empirical chapters indicated that COS play an important role in the policy 
process. As reviewed above, openness and norms of consensus have an influence 
on the policy process through dynamics such as coalition formation, coalition 
strategies, and policy change. The dissertation was able to demonstrate this 
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overall relationship both through quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Additionally, the analysis in chapter 5 was conducted at the subsystem level 
rather than at the national level, which provided insights into sub-national 
relationships that had not yet been explored. Findings suggested that COS in 
which subsystems operate have an influence on coalition strategies, particularly 
whether coalitions were more likely to choose confrontational strategies than 
assimilative ones.  
The dissertation serves an additional theoretical purpose, in that it 
contributes to two relatively understudied questions within the ACF. First, chapter 
4 analyzes the link between COS and the likelihood of the formation of revisionist 
coalitions. This analysis not only adds to our knowledge on COS, but it also 
speaks to why coalitions form in the first place. The concept of advocacy 
coalitions is central to the ACF, yet we know little about when and why coalitions 
form in some subsystems and not others. Second, chapter 5 analyzes the link 
between COS and the strategies adopted by revisionist coalitions. Again, this 
analysis contributes to our knowledge about COS, but also about why coalitions 
adopt the strategies they do. ACF scholars argue that coalitions adopt specific 
strategies in pursuit of their policy beliefs, yet we know little about which 
strategies they choose to adopt and why.  
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6.2. Implications 
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from this dissertation. 
First, this analysis makes clear that scholars, policy makers, and practitioners who 
are interested in LULUs and the dynamics behind contentious facility siting need 
to consider the role of COS and the underlying features of the political and 
institutional context within which the siting effort takes place. This dissertation 
analyzed how the opportunity structures of a country can influence the policy 
process and the ability of opposition groups to form and act within these 
structures. So, when designing policies related to nuclear facility siting or other 
forms of contentious facilities, it is important to keep in mind that countries have 
varying institutional structures and different norms of engagement; any policy 
design must keep these institutional characteristics in mind—the US is different 
from Sweden and Sweden is different from India. The underlying characteristics 
of a country provide different obstacles and incentives for groups to form and act 
within a policy subsystem and attempt to influence the policy process. As such, 
there are no “one size fits all” siting policies that will work equally well in all 
political systems. A policy that worked in Sweden is not necessarily going to 
work in the US or the UK and vice versa. Rather, policies must be designed with a 
country’s specific COS in mind; doing so will change the probability that 
facilities will be successfully sited.   
This dissertation studied the influence of two different types of COS—
broad, national level characteristics that do not change over long periods of time, 
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and subsystem or policy specific features that lend themselves to change in the 
near term. The former opportunity structures include characteristics such as 
judicial independence and quality of democracy. The most effective way for 
policy makers to deal with these relatively fixed opportunity structures is to 
acknowledge them and to design policies around and within them. In other words, 
policy makers and practitioners are unlikely to be able to (or desire to) transform 
these features in the short term. Understanding the role played by these features is 
critical for understanding the existing or default benchmark for key political 
activities like the formation of opposition groups and the tactical utilization of 
institutional venues in pursuit of policy change. The more readily modified 
aspects of opportunity structures include subsystem or policy specific features 
such as stakeholder engagement mechanisms and the regulatory independence of 
key agencies. These features of COS are more malleable in the near term, and 
policy makers can actively seek to design them to influence the likely outcomes 
of the policy process. For example, chapter 5 illustrated that revisionist coalitions 
tend to choose confrontational strategies when faced with closed subsystems. If 
policy makers seek to avoid or minimize confrontation, they can attempt to design 
more open subsystems where the access to decision making authority is 
decentralized. Doing so might alleviate some of the contention that we sometimes 
witness during many cases of nuclear facility siting. 
The relationship between open subsystems with dispersed decision making 
authority and confrontational strategies is not straightforward. For instance, the 
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analysis in chapter 4 revealed a positive relationship between the existence of 
strong norms of consensus and the likelihood of the formation of revisionist 
coalitions that oppose the existing status quo. Interpreting this finding requires 
some thought, especially with reference to its policy implications. Do stakeholder 
engagement programs lead to the formation of revisionist coalitions, or vice 
versa? If the existence of stakeholder engagement programs does make revisionist 
coalitions more likely to form, the policy implications could be far reaching. On 
the one hand, public consent and deliberative decision making achieved through 
stakeholder engagement programs may be critical for sustaining the essence of 
democratic governance. Governments in advanced democracies thrive on the 
principles of empowering their publics, providing access to resources that allows 
opposition groups to form revisionist coalitions in the face of policy decisions. It 
is not surprising, then, that giving locals and other affected parties the means to 
engage in the siting process would lead to organized forms of opposition. On the 
other hand, the formation and growth of revisionist coalitions often leads to 
political deadlocks, putting important policy decisions in limbo and draining both 
time and money.  
Note that the reverse can also hold true—the formation of revisionist 
coalitions is often times seen as a signal by governments of the need to establish 
stakeholder engagement programs as an effort to mitigate opposition. In such 
scenarios, opposition precedes stakeholder engagement measures. The case of the 
Yucca Mountain repository may be a good example—over ten years and $12 
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billion dollars were spent to evaluate the suitability of the site—resources that 
have gone to waste without solving the issue of disposing of the country’s 
increasing stock of spent nuclear fuel. In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
the US Congress outlined a plan to study three sites for possible use as nuclear 
waste repositories. The goal was to pick the ‘best’ site based on geographical 
equity and technical attributes. However, this plan was abandoned with the 
passing of an amended Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987, which singled out 
Yucca Mountain as the only potential repository.  
This shift in policy generated strong public opposition from residents in 
Nevada, who felt as though the decision to single them out was unfair. While the 
1987 Act did include a nuclear waste negotiator who was tasked with engaging 
the local communities, it did not garner success. The initial decision in 1982 to 
study Yucca Mountain as a potential site was characterized by a lack of public 
engagement measures. This lack of early engagement measures, coupled with the 
1987 “decide-announce-defend” approach adopted by the US Congress and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) further heightened public opposition and prevented 
the development of any sort of citizen-based consensus on the issue. This, among 
other factors, contributed to the strong backlash against the proposed facility, and 
the ultimate stagnation of the project (BRC 2012). Whether stakeholder 
engagement measures precede or follow the emergence of organized opposition is 
an empirical question that should be tackled in future research.  
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6.3. Directions for Future Research 
As discussed in the previous section, the theory and findings presented in 
this dissertation address a number of important questions that have direct and 
indirect implications for the field of public policy. The results presented here 
should—like all ongoing research programs—be subjected to future testing and 
refinement using additional data, alternative research designs/methods, and 
different issue areas. As a first step in this direction, a study of this sort should be 
replicated using different issues, other than nuclear facility siting. Nuclear siting 
efforts are characterized by heightened risk perceptions and an incentive for 
individuals and groups to participate in the policy process. Additionally, the issue 
of nuclear facility siting is unique in that it is highly technical and access to 
decision making authority is often limited to a few key agencies and individuals. 
These characteristics provide an ideal frame to study the influence of the 
underlying COS in a system. However, in order to judge the generalizability of 
the framework, future research should study how COS function in issues where 
the subsystem dynamics are either less contentious or less technical. Chapter 5 
presented some preliminary analysis of how COS impact the strategies adopted by 
revisionist coalition in the case of forest management in India. The issue of forest 
management, while contentious, is not as technical as nuclear energy. Results 
indicated that shifts in the nature of COS (an increase in the number of decision 
making venues and the accessibility of those venues) led to a corresponding 
change in coalition strategies in the forest management subsystem from 
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confrontational to assimilative. In the future, I plan to measure and trace coalition 
strategies and tactics used by revisionist coalitions in a way that allows for 
streamlined data collection.   
Second, future research should provide evidence from the kinds of 
political systems missing in this database (i.e. Russia, China, North Korea, and 
Iran). These cases are systematically different and could offer new insights. It is 
important to note, however, that the database used in this dissertation and the 
analysis conducted can still speak to these cases because of the inclusion of 
countries like present day Ukraine (then USSR) and Pakistan. However, the 
ability to infer conclusions based on the current findings remains limited and 
studying the siting efforts from the countries excluded from this dissertation is 
important, both to improve our empirical and theoretical understanding of the 
process and to increase confidence in our empirical findings.  
The third area of future research relates to experimenting with new ways 
to operationalize both the dependent and independent variables used in this 
dissertation. For instance, this dissertation measured policy change in a simplified 
dichotomous manner, where facilities that became operable were coded as 0 on 
policy change and those that were officially cancelled as a 1 on policy change. 
While this measurement technique was useful in this dissertation for the purposes 
of keeping the research design clear and concise, it also meant that cases that 
experienced a lengthy delay but were never cancelled, or eventually became 
operational, had to be excluded from the database. In future research, it would be 
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useful to experiment with other ways to operationalize policy change; perhaps one 
that included delayed cases in some form. Doing so will allow us to understand 
how specific COS might increase the likelihood of delays or modified designs in 
the course of the siting process than others, even if those facilities eventually go 
on to become operational. This refined measure of policy change will be able to 
track changes in facility design such as limits on the type and amount of waste to 
be included or adding a research laboratory to the facility, but nevertheless 
resulted in an operable facility.  
Different measures for openness and consensus should also be explored. 
Chapter 5 analyzed the impact of openness of an issue specific subsystem on 
coalition strategies. In future research, I plan to develop measures of subsystem 
specific COS measures that can be used to conduct a large-N analysis. With 
reference to the degree of consensus required for policy change, future research 
should continue to refine the stakeholder engagement measure. Among other 
things, a refined measure of stakeholder engagement should include a temporal 
element that helps us track when these measures were implemented in the policy 
process.  
The fourth focus for future research concerns untangling some of the 
complex relationships identified in the dissertation. One such relationship is that 
between norms of consensus (specifically stakeholder engagement mechanisms) 
and the likelihood of emergence of opposition to siting. As suggested before, this 
dissertation found that these two variables share a strong, positive, and 
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statistically significant relationship but the causal direction of this relationship 
remains unclear. Does stakeholder engagement policy cause the emergence of 
opposition or vice versa? Future research should study this relationship in more 
detail and attempt to disentangle the direction of causality. Developing refined 
measures of stakeholder engagement as described above will help that effort. 
Similarly, this dissertation found that there exists a relationship between the 
nature of the COS surrounding a subsystem and the strategies revisionist 
coalitions tend to adopt. Future studies of the link between specific strategies and 
their influence on policy outcomes would be important and interesting.  
Finally, future research should pay close attention to how the different 
elements of the policy process might in turn affect the nature of COS in a political 
system. This “feedback loop” is an important link that needs to be explored in 
detail. For example, once revisionist coalitions have formed in a system with 
sparse COS, how do they push the boundaries of that subsystem to transform the 
opportunity structures over time? In sum, this chapter has sought to convey the 
depth and breadth of the knowledge generated in this dissertation. It also provides 
a sense of the important policy implications of the findings, and the rich array of 
future directions for research concerning the nature and role of COS in the public 
policy process. 
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Appendix 1: Table of Cases 
*Indicates case was included in the randomly drawn subset of cases for Stage 2 analysis 
Name of Facility Country Year of Decision Outcome 
Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant Argentina 1974 Operational 
Embalse Nuclear Power Plant Argentina 1983 Operational 
Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant* Armenia (USSR) 1976 Operational 
Zwentendorf Nuclear Power Plant Austria 1978 Cancelled 
Doel Nuclear Power Station Belgium 1974 Operational 
Tihange Nuclear Power Station Belgium 1975 Operational 
Angra Nuclear Power Plant* Brazil 1982 Operational 
Belene Nuclear Power Plant Bulgaria 2012 Cancelled 
Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant* Bulgaria 1974 Operational 
Bruce Nuclear Generating Station Canada 1976 Operational 
Darlington Nuclear Generating 
Station Canada 1990 Operational 
Gentilly-I Nuclear Generating 
Station Canada 1970 Operational 
Pickering Nuclear Generating 
Station Canada 1971 Operational 
Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating 
Station Canada 1982 Operational 
Temelin Nuclear Power Station Czech Republic 2000 Operational 
Dukovany Nuclear Power Station Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) 1985 Operational 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant Finland 1977 Operational 
Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant Finland 1978 Operational 
Belleville Nuclear Power Plant France 1987 Operational 
Blayais Nuclear Power Plant* France 1981 Operational 
Brennilis Nuclear Power Plant France 1966 Operational 
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Bugey Nuclear Power Plant France 1972 Operational 
Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant France 1986 Operational 
Chinon Nuclear Power Plant France 1962 Operational 
Chooz Nuclear Power Plant France 1966 Operational 
Civaux Nuclear Power Plant France 1997 Operational 
Cruas Nuclear Power Plant France 1983 Operational 
Dampierre Nuclear Power Plant France 1980 Operational 
Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant France 1977 Operational 
Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant* France 1985 Operational 
Golfech Nuclear Power Plant* France 1990 Operational 
Gravenlines Nuclear Power Plant France 1980 Operational 
Le Carnet Nuclear Power Plant France 1997 Cancelled 
Marcoule Nuclear Site France 1958 Operational 
Nogent Nuclear Power Plant France 1987 Operational 
Paluel Nuclear Power Plant France 1984 Operational 
Penly Nuclear Power Plant France 1990 Operational 
Plogoff Nuclear Power Plant France 1981 Cancelled 
Saint-Alban Nuclear Power 
Plant* France 1985 Operational 
Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power 
Plant* France 1969 Operational 
Superphenix Nuclear Power Plant France 1985 Operational 
Tricastin Nuclear Power Plant France 1980 Operational 
Stendal Nuclear Power Plant Germany 1990 Cancelled 
Greifswald nuclear power station* Germany (East) 1973 Operational 
Rheinsberg Nuclear Power 
Station Germany (East) 1966 Operational 
Wurgassen Nuclear Power Plant Germany (East) 1971 Operational 
Biblis Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1974 Operational 
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Breisach Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1973 Cancelled 
Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1986 Operational 
Brunsbuttel Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1976 Operational 
Emsland Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1988 Operational 
Grafenrheinfeld Nuclear Power 
Plant Germany (West) 1981 Operational 
Grohnde Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1984 Operational 
Gundremmingen Nuclear Power 
Plant Germany (West) 1966 Operational 
Isar Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1977 Operational 
Kruemmel Nuclear Power Plant* Germany (West) 1983 Operational 
Mulheim-Karlich Nuclear Power 
Plant Germany (West) 1986 Operational 
Neckarwestheim Nuclear Power 
Station Germany (West) 1976 Operational 
Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1968 Operational 
Philippsburg Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1979 Operational 
SNR-300 Fast Breeder Reactor* Germany (West) 1995 Cancelled 
Stade Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1972 Operational 
Unterweser Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1978 Operational 
Wyhl Nuclear Power Plant Germany (West) 1977 Cancelled 
Paks Nuclear Power Plant Hungary 1982 Operational 
Haripur Nuclear Power Plant India 2011 Cancelled 
Kaiga Atomic Power Station India 2000 Operational 
Kakrapar Atomic Power Station India 1992 Operational 
Madras Atomic Power Station India 1983 Operational 
Narora Atomic Power Station India 1989 Operational 
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station* India 1972 Operational 
Tarapur Atomic Power Station India 1969 Operational 
Caorso Nuclear Power Plant Italy 1977 Operational 
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Enrico Fermi (Trino Vercellese) 
Nuclear Power Plant* Italy 1964 Operational 
Garigliano Nuclear Power Plant Italy 1963 Operational 
Latina Nuclear Power Plant Italy 1962 Operational 
Montalto di Castro (Alto Lazio) 
Nuclear Power Plant* Italy 1987 Cancelled 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant Japan 1970 Operational 
Genkai Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1975 Operational 
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1974 Operational 
Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant Japan 2005 Operational 
Ikata Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1977 Operational 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear 
Power Plant* Japan 1984 Operational 
Maki Nuclear Power Plant* Japan 2004 Cancelled 
Mihama Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1970 Operational 
Monju Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1994 Operational 
Ohi Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1977 Operational 
Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1983 Operational 
Sendai Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1983 Operational 
Shika Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1992 Operational 
Shimane Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1973 Operational 
Suzu Nuclear Power Plant Japan 2003 Cancelled 
Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1974 Operational 
Tokai Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1965 Operational 
Tomari Nuclear Power Plant* Japan 1988 Operational 
Tsuruga Nuclear Power Plant Japan 1969 Operational 
Kori Nuclear Power Plant Korea 1977 Operational 
Uljin Nuclear Power Plant* Korea 1988 Operational 
Wolseong Nuclear Power Plant* Korea 1982 Operational 
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Yeonggwang/Youngkwang 
Nuclear Power Plant Korea 1986 Operational 
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Lithuania (USSR) 1983 Operational 
Laguna Verde Nuclear Power 
Plant Mexico 1988 Operational 
Borssele Nuclear Power Plant* Netherlands 1973 Operational 
Dodewaard Nuclear Power Plant Netherlands 1968 Operational 
Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Pakistan 2000 Operational 
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant Pakistan 1971 Operational 
Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant Romania 1996 Operational 
Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant* Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) 1972 Operational 
Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant Slovakia (Slovac Republic) 1998 Operational 
Krsko Nuclear Power Plant Slovenia (Yugoslovia) 1981 Operational 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station South Africa 1984 Operational 
Almaraz Nuclear Power Plant Spain 1981 Operational 
Asco Nuclear Power Plant Spain 1983 Operational 
Cofrentes Nuclear Power Plant* Spain 1984 Operational 
Jose Cabrera Nuclear Power 
Station Spain 1968 Operational 
Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant Spain 1983 Cancelled 
Santa Maria de Garona Nuclear 
Power Plant Spain 1970 Operational 
Sayago Nuclear Plant* Spain 1983 Cancelled 
Trillo Nuclear Power Plant Spain 1988 Operational 
Valde Caballeros Nuclear Power 
Plant Spain 1983 Cancelled 
Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant Spain 1972 Operational 
Barseback Nuclear Power Plant Sweden 1975 Operational 
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Brodalen Nuclear Power Plant Sweden 1980 Cancelled 
Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant Sweden 1980 Operational 
Oskarshamn Nuclear Power 
Plant* Sweden 1970 Operational 
Ringhals Nuclear Power Plant Sweden 1973 Operational 
Beznau Nuclear Power Plant Switzerland 1969 Operational 
Gosgen Nuclear Power Plant* Switzerland 1979 Operational 
Kaiseraugst Nuclear Power Plant Switzerland 1990 Cancelled 
Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant Switzerland 1984 Operational 
Muhleberg Nuclear Power Plant Switzerland 1971 Operational 
Niederamt Nuclear Power Plant Switzerland 2011 Cancelled 
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Turkey 2012 Cancelled 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Ukraine (USSR) 1977 Operational 
Khmelnytsky Nuclear Power 
Plant Ukraine (USSR) 1987 Operational 
Rivne Nuclear Power Plant Ukraine (USSR) 1980 Operational 
South Ukraine Nuclear Power 
Plant Ukraine (USSR) 1982 Operational 
Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant Ukraine (USSR) 1984 Operational 
Berkeley Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1961 Operational 
Bradwell Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1961 Operational 
Braystones Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 2010 Cancelled 
Calder Hall Nuclear Power 
Station United Kingdom 1956 Operational 
Chapelcross Nuclear Power 
Station United Kingdom 1958 Operational 
Dungeness Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1965 Operational 
Hartlepool Nuclear Power 
Station* United Kingdom 1983 Operational 
Heysham Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1983 Operational 
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Hinkley Point Nuclear Power 
Station* United Kingdom 1964 Operational 
Hunterston Nuclear Power 
Station* United Kingdom 1963 Operational 
Kirksanton Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 2010 Cancelled 
Oldbury Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1967 Operational 
Sizewell Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1965 Operational 
Torness Nuclear Power Station* United Kingdom 1988 Operational 
Trawsfynydd Nuclear Power 
Station United Kingdom 1964 Operational 
Wylfa Nuclear Power Station United Kingdom 1969 Operational 
Alan R. Barton Plant USA 1975 Cancelled 
Allens Creek Nuclear Power Plant USA 1982 Cancelled 
Arkansas Nuclear One USA 1974 Operational 
Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1978 Cancelled 
Bailly Nuclear Power Plant USA 1981 Cancelled 
Beaver Valley Power Station* USA 1976 Operational 
Bellefonte Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1988 Cancelled 
Big Rock Point Power Plant USA 1962 Operational 
Black Fox Nuclear Power Plant USA 1982 Cancelled 
Blue Hills Nuclear Power Plant USA 1978 Cancelled 
Bodega Bay Nuclear Power Plant USA 1964 Cancelled 
Braidwood Station USA 1987 Operational 
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant USA 1974 Operational 
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant USA 1975 Operational 
Byron Station USA 1985 Operational 
Callaway Plant USA 1984 Operational 
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1975 Operational 
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Carroll County Nuclear Power 
Plant* USA 1988 Cancelled 
Catawba Nuclear Station USA 1985 Operational 
Cherokee Nuclear Power Plant USA 1983 Cancelled 
Clinton Power Station USA 1987 Operational 
Columbia Generating Station* USA 1984 Operational 
Comanche Peak Steam Electric 
Station USA 1990 Operational 
Connecticut Yankee Nuclear 
Power Plant* USA 1968 Operational 
Cooper Nuclear Station  USA 1974 Operational 
Crystal River Nuclear Generating 
Plant USA 1977 Operational 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
Station USA 1978 Operational 
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 
Plant* USA 1985 Operational 
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1975 Operational 
Douglas Point Nuclear Generating 
Station* USA 1977 Cancelled 
Dresden Nuclear Power Station USA 1960 Operational 
Duane Arnold Energy Center USA 1974 Operational 
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant USA 1974 Operational 
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant USA 1972 Operational 
Erie Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1980 Cancelled 
Forked River Nuclear Power Plant USA 1980 Cancelled 
Fort Calhoun Station USA 1973 Operational 
Fort St. Vrain Generating Station USA 1977 Operational 
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station USA 1985 Operational 
Greene County Nuclear Power 
Plant* USA 1979 Cancelled 
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H. B. Robinson Steam Electric 
Plant* USA 1971 Operational 
Hartsville Nuclear Plant* USA 1984 Cancelled 
Haven Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1980 Cancelled 
Hope Creek Generating Station USA 1986 Operational 
Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1963 Operational 
Indian Point Nuclear Generating* USA 1962 Operational 
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear 
Power Plant USA 1975 Operational 
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant USA 1977 Operational 
Kewaunee Power Station USA 1974 Operational 
LaSalle County Station USA 1982 Operational 
Limerick Generating Station* USA 1986 Operational 
Lyons Kansas Nuclear Waste 
Repository USA 1972 Cancelled 
Maine Yankee Nuclear Power 
Plant* USA 1972 Operational 
Marble Hill Nuclear Power Plant USA 1985 Cancelled 
McGuire Nuclear Station USA 1981 Operational 
Midland Cogeneration Venture USA 1986 Cancelled 
Millstone Power Station USA 1970 Operational 
Montague Nuclear Power Plant USA 1980 Cancelled 
Monticello Nuclear Generating 
Plant USA 1971 Operational 
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station USA 1969 Operational 
North Anna Power Station USA 1978 Operational 
Oconee Nuclear Station USA 1973 Operational 
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1969 Operational 
Palisades Nuclear Plant* USA 1971 Operational 
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Palo Verde Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1988 Operational 
Pathfinder Atomic Power Plant USA 1966 Operational 
Peach Bottom Atomic Power 
Station USA 1966 Operational 
Pebble Springs Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1982 Cancelled 
Perkins Nuclear Power Plant USA 1982 Cancelled 
Perry Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1986 Operational 
Phipps Bend Nuclear Power Plant USA 1982 Cancelled 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station USA 1972 Operational 
Point Beach Nuclear Plant USA 1970 Operational 
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating 
Plant USA 1973 Operational 
Quad Cities Nuclear Power 
Station USA 1972 Operational 
Quanicassee Nuclear Power Plant USA 1974 Cancelled 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant USA 1970 Operational 
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1975 Operational 
River Bend Station USA 1986 Operational 
Salem Nuclear Generating Station USA 1977 Operational 
San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1968 Operational 
Saxton Nuclear Generating 
Station USA 1961 Operational 
Seabrook Station USA 1990 Operational 
Sears Isle Nuclear Power Plant USA 1977 Cancelled 
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant* USA 1981 Operational 
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1987 Operational 
Shippingport Atomic Power USA 1957 Operational 
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Station* 
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1989 Cancelled 
Skagit Nuclear Power Plant USA 1983 Cancelled 
Skull Valley Repository USA 2007 Cancelled 
Somerset Nuclear Power 
Plant/Kintigh Generating Station USA 1975 Cancelled 
South River Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1978 Cancelled 
South Texas Project* USA 1988 Operational 
St. Lucie Plant* USA 1976 Operational 
Stanislaus Nuclear Power Plant USA 1979 Cancelled 
Sterling Nuclear Plant USA 1980 Cancelled 
Sundesert Nuclear Power Plant* USA 1978 Cancelled 
Surry Nuclear Power Station USA 1972 Operational 
Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station USA 1982 Operational 
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station USA 1974 Operational 
Trojan Nuclear Power Plant USA 1976 Operational 
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating USA 1972 Operational 
Tyrone Nuclear Power Plant USA 1979 Cancelled 
Vandalia Nuclear Project USA 1982 Cancelled 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1973 Operational 
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station USA 1984 Operational 
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant USA 1987 Operational 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant  USA 1999 Operational 
Waterford Steam Electric Station USA 1985 Operational 
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant USA 1996 Operational 
William H. Zimmer Power 
Station USA 1984 Cancelled 
Wolf Creek Generating Station USA 1985 Operational 
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Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power 
Station USA 1960 Operational 
Yellow Creek Nuclear Power 
Plant USA 1984 Cancelled 
Zion Nuclear Power Station USA 1973 Operational 
 
 
 
